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ABSTRACT 
 
MATTHEW NICHOLAS GREEN: THE KREMLIN‟S CONSTRAINTS: A Three-Tiered 
Model for Explaining Gubernatorial Vulnerability in Russia, 2005-2007 
(Under the direction of Dr. Graeme B. Robertson) 
 
 
This paper examines the new system of gubernatorial appointments in Russia and 
argues that in spite of the expansion of federal powers in this area, the federal center is still 
restricted in its usage of these powers. These limitations are demonstrated through the 
creation of an index that assesses gubernatorial vulnerability and produces a three-tiered 
model of strength classification. These classifications dictate to the center both a governor‟s 
susceptibility to replacement as well as the terms on which any change will take place. The 
model is supported by the introduction of three case studies, one belonging to each strength 
tier.
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................... ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................... x 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: A SYSTEM THAT RECENTRALIZES POWER? .............................1 
Project Sourcing.....................................................................................................3 
Plan of the Paper ...................................................................................................6 
 
CHAPTER 2: A TRAGEDY AND A NEW ERA .................................................... 10 
Why Governors?................................................................................................... 14 
Testing the Governors .......................................................................................... 16 
Related Literature ................................................................................................ 17 
 
CHAPTER 3: THE MODEL: ESTABLISHING VULNERABILITY                    
AND TRANSITION TYPES ................................................................................... 22 
Definitions and Processes..................................................................................... 23 
Case Population and Selection ............................................................................. 26 
Constructing the Model ........................................................................................ 27 
Indicator I: Substantial Regional Economy (GRP) ............................................... 30 
Indicator II: Retention of State Control of Enterprises .......................................... 31 
Indicator III: Regional Ethnic Stability ................................................................. 32 
vi 
 
Indicator IV: Tenure ............................................................................................. 33 
The Vulnerability Index and Outcomes ................................................................. 33 
An Alternative Demonstration of Regional Tiers: The “Varangian Factor”.......... 35 
The Limitations of the Model ................................................................................ 39 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 43 
 
CHAPTER 4: STILL TOGETHER AFTER ALL THESE YEARS: 
THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN & MINTIMER                                 
SHARIPOVICH SHAIMIEV................................................................................... 44 
Tenure .................................................................................................................. 45 
Regional Economy................................................................................................ 48 
Enterprise Control................................................................................................ 48 
Republic Status ..................................................................................................... 53 
Shaimiev’s “Two Reappointments” ...................................................................... 56 
Looking Ahead ..................................................................................................... 59 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 61 
 
CHAPTER 5: REJECTIONS, INSURRECTIONS, AND RESURRECTIONS: 
THE SARATOVSKAYA OBLAST & DMITRII FEDOROVICH AYATSKOV ..... 62 
Regional Economy................................................................................................ 64 
Tenure .................................................................................................................. 65 
Republic Status ..................................................................................................... 65 
Enterprise Control................................................................................................ 66 
The Pitfalls Facing a Middling Governor: Ayatskov’s Replacement ..................... 66 
vii 
 
A Region Divided ................................................................................................. 69 
Ayatskov Ascendant .............................................................................................. 75 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 79 
 
CHAPTER 6: A DEPARTURE INTO OBSCURITY: THE  SAKHALINSKAYA 
OBLAST & IVAN PAVLOVICH MALAKHOV .................................................... 81 
Regional Economy................................................................................................ 82 
Enterprise Control................................................................................................ 84 
Tenure .................................................................................................................. 87 
Republic Status ..................................................................................................... 88 
Malakhov’s Fall: Bad Performance or Energy Intrigue? ...................................... 89 
A Native (and Sympathetic?) Son .......................................................................... 90 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 91 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 93 
Results .................................................................................................................. 94 
Establishing Vulnerability vs. Predicting an Appointment Decision ...................... 95 
Significance of the Reforms ................................................................................ 102 
Looking Ahead ................................................................................................... 106 
 
APPENDIX A: Vulnerability Index Scores ............................................................ 108 
 
APPENDIX B: Governors by Strength and Fate .................................................... 111 
 
APPENDIX C: Relationship between GRP and Retention of Office....................... 112 
viii 
 
APPENDIX D: Relationship between Enterprise Control 
and Retention of Office .......................................................................................... 114 
 
APPENDIX E: Relationship between Republic Status and Retention of Office ...... 116 
 
APPENDIX F: Relationship between Tenure and Retention of Office.................... 118 
 
WORKS CITED .................................................................................................... 120 
 
 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
1. Table 2.1: Average Annual Turnover, Based on Era ........................................... 14 
 
2. Table 3.1: Gubernatorial Appointment Decision Types ...................................... 24 
 
3. Table 3.2: Ex- Governors‟ Fates ......................................................................... 36 
 
4. Table 3.3: “Varangians” and Vulnerability Index Point Totals............................ 39 
 
5. Table 7.1: Relationship between Retention of Post 
and Electoral Performance ................................................................ 96 
 
6. Table 7.2: Relationship between Retention of Post 
and Economic Performance .............................................................. 97 
 
7. Table 7.3: Relationship between Retention of Post 
and Quality of Life Performance ....................................................... 98 
 
x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
1. Figure 2.1: Gubernatorial Turnover Rates .......................................................... 13 
 
2. Figure 3.1: Gubernatorial Appointment Process Model ...................................... 29 
CHAPTER 1 
 
A SYSTEM THAT RECENTRALIZES POWER? 
 
 
 
 
 
“Hello Vladimir Vladimirovich. My name is Natal’ya Bugaeva. I live in the city of Birobidzhan. I am 11 
years old. I want to ask you this question: Why in the central square of this city have they erected an 
artificial New Year’s tree and not a live one?” 
  
 
“Natasha, honestly speaking, I don’t know why this happened. Especially since Birobidzhan is situated in such 
a place where there are plenty of live fir trees. Maybe it’s only because an artificial tree is more expensive and 
someone from the local leadership needs to incur charges for some incomprehensible reason. At the same 
time, I want to remind you that today is the birthday of your governor, Nikolai Mikhailovich Volkov, for which 
I want to congratulate him. I think that it would be right if the governor gave a present to both you and all the 
residents of Birobidzhan for his birthday, and erected a live fir tree in the city square, and not an artificial 
one.” 
– President Vladimir Putin, appearing in his annual 
 “Direct Line” phone-in show, 20021 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1
 “Stenogramma „Pryamoi linii c Prezidentom Rossii,‟” 19 Dec. 2002, State Television Channel “Rossiya,” 19  
Mar. 2008, <http://www.linia2002.ru/>. 
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President Vladimir Putin‟s two terms have typically been seen as synonymous with 
recentralizing power in Moscow.
2
 In order to ascertain how representative of reality this 
impression is, an analysis of Russia‟s governors3 proves useful as an indicator of the political 
balance of power between the federal and regional levels of government. I argue that while 
Putin‟s attempt to centralize is very real, and to some extent successful, the federal 
government in Moscow is still limited in its reach. Nikolai Petrov wrote: 
The system of governors, even the reappointments, has thus far been a hybrid: on one hand, it has 
introduced elements of rotation – as in the Stalinist era; on the other hand, it is a compromise with the 
old clan-elites. The latter is particularly noticeable in the case of such heavyweights and traditional 
irritants for the Kremlin as Yurii Luzhkov, Mintimer Shaimiev, or Murtaza Rakhimov. Politics is the 
art of the possible, and even untying its hands legally, the Kremlin is forced to suffer many of its most 
inconvenient governors.4  
 
I find myself in general agreement with Petrov on these points, but they are left as little more 
than unsubstantiated observations in the brief article in which they appeared. They do, 
however, provide a suitable point from which to embark upon a more detailed and 
comprehensive examination of the gubernatorial appointment system. In this project, I will 
                                                             
2 See for but a few examples:  Wines, Michael, “Putin‟s Plan to Centralize Power in the Kremlin Wins a 
Round,” 01 June 2000,  The New York Times, 21 Jan. 2008, 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9807E0D6153CF932A35755C0A9669C8B63>; Kessler, 
Glenn, “Rice, Headed to See Putin, Cites „Worrying‟ Trends in Russia,” 20 Apr. 2005, The Washington Post, 
21 Jan. 2008, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A1069-2005Apr19.html>;  Parsons, Robert, 
“2005 in Review: Russia‟s Centralization Gathers Pace,” 12 Dec. 2005, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 21 
Jan. 2008, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/ace0524f-7ade-4a60-be05-ccf14183ae07.html>;  
Trenin, Dmitri, “The Legacy of Vladimir Putin,” 10 Oct. 2007, The Carnegie Moscow Center,  21 Jan. 2008, 
<http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/76874.htm>;  Associated Press, “Rice Criticizes Putin‟s Concentration 
of Power,” 13 Oct. 2007, International Herald Tribune, 21 Jan. 2008, 
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/13/europe/13subrice.php>.  
 
3 Strictly speaking, there are at least four different titles used for the regional executive official, depending on 
the individual Russian subject in question: governor, head of administration, mayor, and president. The official 
wording employed by federal legal documentation (vysshee dolzhnostnoe litso sub’ekta Rossiiskoi Federatsii or 
rukovoditel’ vysshego ispolnitel’nogo organa gosudarstvennoi vlasti’ sub’ekta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ) presents 
unwieldy translations (“highest official figure of a subject of the Russian Federation” or “leader of the highest 
executive organ of state power of a subject of the Russian Federation”) that are not conducive to practical use. 
Thus throughout this paper I will use the term “governor” in a general sense as has become the custom in 
discussing Russian politics. I will only use other titles when they are applied to a specific case. 
 
4 Petrov, Nikolai, “Naznacheniya gubernatorov: tri goda spustya,” July 2007, The Carnegie Moscow Center, 07 
Dec. 2007, <http://monitoring.carnegie.ru/2007/07/analytics/petrov-nikolaj-naznacheniya-gubernatorov-tri-
goda-spustya/>. 
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support my positions by utilizing an index and three case studies to evaluate gubernatorial 
appointment decisions of the past three years (i.e. following the abolition of gubernatorial 
elections in Russia). What I hope to demonstrate is that while Putin is now able to appoint 
governors, undoubtedly a real accomplishment from his point of view, he is still constrained 
in who he may replace with these powers. Furthermore, even in cases where he may replace 
governors, there is still another level of distinction between governors who must be extended  
a “golden parachute” and governors who have such weak standing that they may be forced 
out without any sort of compensation. Despite the gains made on behalf of the federal center 
in the past eight years, the Russian president – whether it is Putin, or soon, Medvedev, being 
discussed – is still faced with three distinct tiers of governors‟ strength, which dictates to the 
Kremlin who it may deal with and how it may deal with them. In this way, Moscow is in a 
position not unlike during the 1990s, when it was faced with dealing with a wide range of 
subjects which possessed varying levels of power and autonomy. I consider the new 
gubernatorial selection mechanism produced by recent legislative reforms as a useful lens 
through which to we may view not only successful centralization of power but the restraints 
that exist upon the federal government‟s powers as well. 
 
Project Sourcing 
 The data in this project was acquired from a wide range of academic and media 
sources, primarily based on online access. Given the recent nature of these reforms, this 
project required a great deal of emphasis on evolving situations and sources. The Internet has 
proved invaluable in this task, permitting a researcher to access information on a scale that 
would have been unimaginable only a few years ago. Here I should mention some of the 
most useful resources that I utilized in this task. Grigorii Belonuchkin‟s website – actually 
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registered as an electronic periodical publication with the Russian government – proved 
indispensible in accruing gubernatorial election results of the past decade and a half.
5
 
Belonuchkin‟s data is vast, but not complete in all cases; in these instances the Independent 
Institute of Election‟s website proved useful in filling out missing data.6 In compiling the 
gubernatorial appointment decisions, the chart provided by J. Paul Goode
7
 supplemented 
another Russian website operated by the late Vadim Yakushov.
8
 This information was then 
brought up to date by using Russian media outlets, primarily the “tagging” sections of 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta
9
 and Ekspert,
10
 as well as the Kommersant family of publications.
11
 
Though a relatively late find, the Russian version of Google News appears to be one of the 
most promising sources of this data for future research.
12
   
 Once I directed my attention at the cases of individual governors, I used the typical 
resources one might expect – mainstream search engines such as Google and Yandex.13 
Yandex also provides a news search function akin to Google News, which proved helpful in 
                                                             
5 Belonuchkin, Grigorii, “Politika: Vybory,” 29 Mar. 2005, 10 Nov. 2007, 
<http://politika.su/vybory/vybory.html>. 
 
6 “Rezul‟taty vyborov,” Mar. 2008, The Independent Institute of Elections, 11 Feb. 2008, 
<http://vibory.ru/election.htm>. 
  
7 Goode, J. Paul, “The Puzzle of Putin‟s Gubernatorial Appointments,” Europe-Asia Studies, 59.3 (2007): 365-
399. 378. 
 
8 Yakushov, Vadim, “Gubernatory, naznachennye po novoi skheme,” Aug. 2007, 12 Nov. 2007, <http://proekt-
wms.narod.ru/states/gubernators1.htm>. 
 
9 “Naznachenie gubernatorov,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, <http://www.rg.ru/plus/gubernatory>. 
  
10 “Naznachenie gubernatorov,” Ekspert, <http://www.expert.ru/topics/150257/>. 
 
11 “Kommersant,” Kommersant, < http://www.kommersant.ru>. 
 
12 “Novosti Google,” Google, < http://news.google.com/news?ned=ru_ru>. 
 
13 “Yandex,” Yandex, <http://www.yandex.ru>. 
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obtaining both biographical information and following developments.
 14
 Biografiya.ru
15
 and 
Russia Profile‟s “Who‟s who?” resources16 also aided in the development of governors‟ 
backgrounds. The official websites of regional executive and legislative branches proved 
useful as well. I supplemented the usual Russian newspaper sources (including Kommersant, 
Ekspert, Vedomosti,
17
 Novaya Gazeta,
18
 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
19
and Argumenty i Fakty
20
) 
with IA Regnum‟s regional press roundups,21 which were helpful in fleshing out regional 
political developments (particularly in the Saratovskaya Oblast). Also beneficial in this vein 
were the Russian Regional Report
22
 and the Russia Analytical Digest.
23
 Finally, this project 
would have proved virtually impossible if not for the information published by Russian 
government agencies. The Kremlin‟s website was useful in obtaining presidential decrees, 
speeches, and other information.
24
 Goskomstat provides some of the core economic and other 
                                                             
14 “Yandex: Press Portrety,” Yandex, <http://news.yandex.ru/people/>. 
 
15 “Biografiya.ru: Biograficheskaya entsiklopediya,” Unified State Register of Legal Persons, 
<http://www.biografija.ru/default.aspx>.  
 
16 “Who‟s Who?,” Russia Profile, <http://www.russiaprofile.org/resources/whoiswho/>. 
 
17 “Vedomosti,” Vedomosti, <http://www.vedomosti.ru/>. 
 
18
 “Novaya Gazeta,” Novaya Gazeta, <http://www.novayagazeta.ru/>. 
 
19 “Nezavisimaya Gazeta,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, < http://www.ng.ru/>. 
 
20 “Argumenty i Fakty,” Argumenty i Fakty, <http://www.aif.ru>. 
 
21 IA Regnum, “Novosti Rossii,” <http://www.regnum.ru/>. 
 
22 Orttung, Robert, Russian Regional Report, 1996-2006, The Russian and Eurasian Security Specialized 
Network for Research on Security Related Developments, 20 Feb. 2008, 
<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/index.cfm>. 
 
23 Neumann, Matthias, et al., Russian Analytical Digest, 2006-2008, The Russian and Eurasian Security 
Specialized Network for Research on Security Related Developments, 20 Feb. 2008, 
<http://www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/rad/index.cfm>. 
 
24 “Prezident Rossii,” The Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, <http://kremlin.ru/>. 
6 
 
statistics the reader will encounter here.
 25
 The Central Election Commission‟s website was, 
unfortunately, used primarily (when available), to check results found elsewhere.
 26
 Electoral 
Geography,
27
 Belonuchkin, and the Independent Institute of Elections provided many of 
initial sources of these results. 
 
Plan of the Paper 
Arguably, we are have entered a new phase of Russia‟s federal development, one in 
which the regional elites no longer contest their basic relationship with the federal center as 
they did in the 1990s. Rather than disputing their status as subjects of the Russian Federation, 
they now seek to maximize their gains within the Federation.
28
 The federal center is 
dominant, but not all-powerful and the balance of power is constantly shifting. Furthermore, 
the balance of power between individual regions and the federal center varies depending on 
the region in question. I therefore argue that Moscow still faces restrictions on its ability to 
act, and one area where these restrictions still exist is the governor‟s post. In late 2004, the 
Russian government adopted new legislation that abolished the popular election of regional 
governors, and in the place of elections substituted a presidentially-directed appointment 
                                                             
 
25  “Federal‟naya sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki,” The Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian 
Federation, <http://www.gks.ru/>. 
 
26  “Svedeniya o provodyashchikhsya vyborakh i referendumakh,” The Central Election Commission of the 
Russian Federation, <http://www.izbirkom.ru/izbirkom.html>. 
 
27 “Elections in Russia,” Electoral Geography 2.0, 
<http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/r/russia>. 
  
28 Goode has argued as much in his article. See also Kimitaka Matsuzato‟s introductory chapter in which he 
states that regional and sub-regional authorities now view their interests as coinciding with the central elite. 
Matsuzato attributes this to the cultivation of a “clannish” party at the same time as program-oriented parties are 
in crisis.  This chapter is in Matsuzato, Kimitaka, ed. Fenomen Vladimira Putina i rossiiskie regiony, Moscow: 
Materik, 2004. Nikolai Petrov in“Tri goda spustya” also briefly touches upon this, writing that the new system 
has “definitely promoted the restoration of a single elite space.”  
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process. In spite of the reforms of gubernatorial selection processes, the center remains 
unable to affect change to the full extent permitted by the law and is unable to project its 
power on a uniform basis. I will argue that the extent to which the regional leaders have 
established their power is directly related to the outcome of these gubernatorial appointment 
decisions. The political standing of the governors, I argue, can be assigned to one of three 
tiers, with each tier having a different set of possible outcomes when a governor‟s seat comes 
up for consideration of appointment. The tiers are populated by considering four different 
regional indicators: the retention of significant regional enterprise control following 
privatization processes, gross regional product, the length of the governor‟s tenure at the 
point of the appointment decision, and whether or not a region possesses republic-level status 
within Russia‟s varied framework of subject types.  I hold that the differences in the 
governors‟ capacity to navigate the political playing field in pursuit of their jobs are a result 
of the political standing conveyed by these indicators. Those regional governors that were 
endowed with positive results when evaluating these factors substantially improved their 
bargaining position when dealing with the center.  
In order to further substantiate my claims, I introduce three case studies, one of which 
is a republic; the other two examples are oblasts.
29
 The first case study is the Republic of 
Tatarstan which is a “strong” region, receiving the highest of ratings due to its economic and 
political qualities. I maintain that such regions make their executives invulnerable to 
replacement. The second case study is the Saratovskaya Oblast, which serves as a “moderate 
                                                             
29There are actually six different types of federal subject, but in practical terms, the republic-oblast 
differentiation is the one of the most substance. The federation also has two “federal cities” (Moscow and St. 
Petersburg), a single “autonomous oblast” (nominally an ethnic Jewish entity), with the remainder of subjects 
consisting of okrugs (which typically were carved out of a region and ethnic in character) and krais (essentially 
large, but sparsely populated, oblasts). The okrugs have largely been targeted for abolition by Putin‟s 
administration, to be incorporated into the regions from which they were circumscribed. 
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strength” region with a mixed set of economic and political qualities. In this type of region, 
the governor may be removed or he may retain his seat. In the former instance, he is 
considered to “pact” with the center for a federal appointment to a position elsewhere – this 
is precisely what the former governor of the Saratovskaya Oblast did. The last case is a 
“weak” region, the Sakhalinskaya Oblast, where the lack of the region‟s assets means that the 
governor‟s fate is wholly dependent on Moscow‟s wishes. These governors may retain their 
posts or may be pushed aside – in which case they are not positioned to demand any 
compensation. What I hope to show with these examples is the variation of regional political 
power, and thus the variation in possible outcomes when a governor‟s seat is under review. 
To recap, in the above outlined case studies, three basic levels of regional political power, 
and corresponding levels of bargaining power, are demonstrated. 
The organization of my paper will proceed in the following fashion. In Chapter 2, I 
will give some historical background relating to the gubernatorial appointment system and 
discuss some of the previous work that has been done in related areas. In Chapter 3, I will 
then turn to my project, explaining the creation of the model, discussing the indicators I 
noted above in greater detail and analyzing the results. The next three chapters are then 
devoted to in-depth analysis of what has transpired in three regions of great importance. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to Tatarstan, Chapter 5 will discuss Saratovskaya Oblast, and Chapter 6 
will complete the case study portion of the paper by covering the Sakhalinskaya Oblast. Each 
of these case study chapters will begin with a discussion of the indicators in these particular 
regions. Having provided this regional “snap-shot,” I will then turn to the next component of 
each chapter: an analysis of the appointment outcome that took place.  I conclude with 
Chapter 7, where I will restate my findings, as well as provide some final thoughts on 
9 
 
predicting appointments, the significance of the reforms, and the future of the system in 
Russia.
CHAPTER 2 
 
A TRAGEDY AND A NEW ERA 
 
 
“Which criteria do you follow in the selection of a candidate for the highest executive post of a subject of the 
Federation?”  
– Sergei Borisovich Tarasov, Samarskaya Oblast. 
 
“Sergei Borisovich, above all else I am guided by personal and managerial qualities. A person who will occupy 
such a high post as leader of a region – and we have huge regions –  a person with real authority, should be 
above all a respectable person in the most straightforward, humane sense of that word. Of course, this should 
be a professional with good practices of managerial work. And thirdly, and not the least important detail 
comprising this whole packet which is reviewed during the resolution of this question, this is a person who 
should be passable and acceptable for the region and for the legislative corps of one or another region. We 
have had cases when we have submitted candidacies which were not acceptable to the regional assemblies. And 
this didn’t provoke negative reactions from me. On the contrary, I consider it to mean that the mechanism, 
under which a candidate for governor should be vitally connected with the nationwide interests and sensitive to 
regional problems, works. And in the event which I referred to, we have occasion to propose another candidate 
– and he passes. I consider that all of these components are equally important. These are what guide the 
decision.” 
–Putin, “Direct Line” phone-in show, 25 October 200630 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
30
 “Stenogramma „Pryamoi linii c Prezidentom Rossii,‟” 25 Oct. 2006, State Television Channel “Rossiya,” 18 
Mar. 2008, <http://www.liniya2006.ru/>. 
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Less than two weeks after the Beslan school massacre in North Ossetia, President 
Vladimir Putin responded with a series of proposed political reforms aimed at increasing the 
state‟s capacity to deal with the problem of terrorism. “We need to act,” he said in an 
address, “to raise the effectiveness of governing bodies in solving the whole compound of 
tasks facing the country.” 31  One revision that was supposed to increase this effectiveness 
was the abolition of the existing system of elections of regional executives by their populace. 
Citing Article 77 of the Russian Constitution, Putin claimed that the regional executive 
branches had failed to function alongside their federal counterpart in a coordinated fashion. 
This failure was totally unacceptable, as the problem of terrorism “demanded the 
mobilization of all resources.” It was “obvious,” Putin continued, “that the cohesiveness of 
action of all executive branches here should be guaranteed above all and unconditionally.”  
The solution to the problem as Putin saw it was to bring the regions and Moscow together: 
what was needed was “the joint participation of the Federation and its subjects in the 
formation of executive organs of power in the territories of Russia.”32 In essence, regional 
authorities had not acted in a competent manner in addressing the attack on the school – a 
view echoed in a recent textbook approved by the Ministry of Education, which cites as a 
reason for the abolition of the electoral process the “unpreparedness of executive authorities 
to effectively act in crisis situations.”33 The solution was thus to appoint governors – hardly a 
new idea. A review of the events of 1998 – before Putin became either prime minister or 
                                                             
31 Dolgov, Anna, “Putin Urges Changes to Centralize Power,” 14 Sep. 2004, The Boston Globe, 21 Jan. 2008, 
<http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2004/09/14/putin_urges_changes_to_centralize_power/>. 
 
32 Putin, Vladimir, “Vstupitel‟noe slovo na rashirennom zasedanii Pravitel‟stva s uchastiem glav sub‟ektov 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” 13 Sep. 2004, The Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, 20 Nov. 2007, 
<http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2004/09/13/1514_type63374type63378type82634_76651.shtml>. 
 
33
 Razuvaev, Jr., Vladimir, “Skandal‟naya „Istoriya‟ doidet do shkol,” 25 Dec. 2007, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 
Jan. 2008, <http://www.ng.ru/politics/2007-12-25/1_uchebnik.html?mthree=1>. 
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president – in the Russian Regional Report noted that, “Although Yeltsin and his associates 
debated the possibility of once again appointing governors, regional elections continued 
across the country.”34 Putin has seemingly changed his position as well, but in the opposite 
direction. In a set of interviews early in his presidency, Putin told his interlocutors:  
I think that we have to preserve both the local self-government and a system of election for governors. 
But all of these connections have to be more balanced. While preserving the system of electing 
governors, for instance, we should consider applying sanctions against them. To remove them from 
office, for example.35 
 
In September 2004, a legal project establishing a new process of selection of regional 
executives was drafted, and was then passed by both houses of the legislature and signed by 
Putin; within six months of its first Duma reading, the new legislation entered into force. 
Russia‟s final gubernatorial election took place in January-February of 2005. On January 28, 
Putin sent his nomination of Sergei Dar‟kin to the Primorskii Krai‟s legislative assembly for 
confirmation. In a special session one week later, the regional deputies agreed to Putin‟s 
choice with a 35-1 confirmation vote.
36
 The second round of the final gubernatorial election 
in Russia, for the head of the Nenetskii Autonomous Okrug (AO), took place two days later.  
The reformed system functions in this manner: the head of the government (the 
Russian president) proposes a candidate to the regional legislature. The legislature in turn 
votes on whether to approve the appointment of the nominee. If a presidential nominee twice 
fails to be confirmed, then a month long period of “consultation” with the regional 
                                                             
34 Shklyar, Natan, “Russian Regions 1998: Year in Review, Economic Crisis Strengthens Governors,” 14 Jan. 
1999, Russian Regional Report, 18 Feb. 2000, 
<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/details.cfm?lng=en&id=14234>. 
 
35 Putin, Vladimir, et al., Translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-
Portrait by Russia‟s President, New York: Public Affairs, 2000. 183. 
 
36 “Naznachenie glav regionov v 2005-2006 gg,” 2006, Institute of Regional Politics, 15 Jan. 2001, 
<http://regionalistica.ru/monitoring/rotation/appointments/>; “Sergei Dar‟kin utverzhden Zakonodatel‟nym 
Sobraniem Gubernatorom Primorskogo Kraya,” 04 Feb. 2005, The Administration of the Primorskii Krai, 14 
Mar. 2008, <http://www.primorsky.ru/content/?a=642&s=72&p=1>. 
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legislatures is led by the president. After this month, the president may appoint a temporary 
executive official and dissolve the regional legislature.
37
 The legislature would thus seem to 
be at a severe disadvantage in these confirmation proceedings. In previous confirmation 
votes, this assumption would appear to be borne out, since in no vote yet has a Putin 
appointee failed to be accepted by a regional legislature (or even come close to being 
rejected, judging by voting records).
38
  Such a fundamental change in law, providing for such 
a seemingly large transfer of power, would seem poised to meet with fierce opposition.  Yet 
this was not the case, as will be discussed later.
39
  
Figure 2.1: Gubernatorial Turnover Rates, 1992-2007 
(Does Not Include Interim Governors) 
 
 Sources: Turovsky, Belonuchkin, Media Reporting 
                                                             
 
37 “Federal Law of the Russian Federation of 11 December 2004, Number 159-FZ, on the enactment of changes 
to the Federal Law „On the general principles of the organization of legislative (representative) and executive 
organs of state power of subjects of the Russian Federation‟ and to the Federal Law „On basic guarantees of 
electoral rights and the right to participation in referendum of the citizenry of the Russian Federation‟,” 15 Dec. 
2004, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 15 Nov. 2007, <http://www.rg.ru/2004/12/15/gubernatory-dok.html>. 
  
38
 Many of these results may be viewed at the Institute of Regional Politics mentioned above. 
 
39 This is much the position that Goode takes. 
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Though there had been many instances of federal and regional political conflict over 
the past decade, the abolition of gubernatorial elections was not used obtusely as a house-
cleaning mechanism (see Figure 2.1). A review of the turnover rates shows that the average 
number of new governors per year, not including interim governors, from 1992 to 2007 was 
9.44.
40
 Once delineations are made on the basis of era, the replacement rate of governors in 
the abolition-period is the lowest figure of all – below both the average for post-Soviet 
Russia as well as against the Yeltsin and early Putin-era figures. After January 2005, when 
the new law went into affect, the average is just 7.06 new governors per year (See Table 
2.1).
41
  
 
Table 2.1: Average Annual Turnover, by Era (Does Not Include Interim Governors) 
All Years (1992-2007) Yeltsin (1992-1999) Putin: Pre-Abolition  
(2000 - February 
2005) 
Putin: Post-Abolition 
(February 2005 - 2007) 
9.44 10.88 8.52 7.06 
Sources: Turovsky, Belonuchkin, Media Reporting 
 
 
Why Governors? 
In order to gain a better understanding of the state of the center-periphery relationship 
in Russia at present, I have elected to focus this paper on a single political office, the regional 
                                                             
 
40 These figures are based on those found in Turovsky, Rostislav, “Vlast‟ i biznes v regionakh Rossii: 
sovremennye protsessy obnovleniya regional‟nykh,” originally published in Regional‟naya elita sovremennoi 
Rossii, Moscow: Fund Liberal‟naya Missiya, 2005, 143-178, and republished on the website of the Institute of 
Regional Politics at <http://regionalistica.ru/library/articles/rft16/>. These numbers were supplemented with 
those figures found at Grigorii Belonuchkin‟s website Politika.su, “Gubernatorskie vybory – 2005,” 29 Mar.  
2005, 04 Jan. 2008, <http://politika.su/vybory/rre05t.html>, as well as other media reporting. Note also that the 
numbers do not include interim governors who gained their post in a temporary capacity – for instance, as the 
result of the death of a governor. In any effort to maintain the maximum continuity, for the Post-Abolition 
figures I have omitted the five cases I discuss later. If these governors are included, then the Post-Abolition 
figure reaches 8.67, which makes it only slightly higher than the Putin Pre-Abolition period. In either case, the 
number is a significant departure from the Yeltsin era.  
 
41 Due to the lack of data on the early gubernatorial retention rates, it was not possible to perform tests of 
statistical significance on these figures across eras.  
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executive official.  Though this is restrictive in some ways – it does not allow for a deep 
investigation of regional legislatures or courts, for instance – it is nevertheless the most 
important office at the regional level. As Goode writes, “In centre-regional and centre-local 
relations, the elected governor represented the whole range of interests based on the region‟s 
territory, and was therefore capable of bargaining and negotiating to a greater extent than any 
other political actor.”42 Stoner-Weiss has shown that in the past, governors were important 
not only to their constituents, but to the federal government as well through such measures as 
simultaneous employment by regional and federal agencies, and the regional authorities‟ 
provision of housing  to federal employees. More generally, the importance of enlisting the 
aid of governors to achieve federally prescribed goals was indicated by federal officials 
themselves.
43
  This was not only the case in Stoner-Weiss‟s interviews in late 1999, but later 
as well, at least in the view of the population. In late June 2004, the Russia Public Opinion 
Research Center (VTsIOM) asked over 1,500 respondents across 39 regions: “Which 
authority in your region matters most of all in the real state of affairs today?” Most frequently 
cited were governors, by 38 percent of those polled (“the president, the government, other 
federal organs” collectively accounted for 25 percent; “mayor, raion head of administration” 
accounted for 16 percent). Furthermore, when broken down based on the respondent‟s 
income, the lowest percentage remains at 38 percent – and peaks at 52 percent for those 
respondents with incomes over 5,000 rubles. Clearly, governors were still regarded as the 
most important officials in the lives of Russians in the regions.
44
  This centrality to all levels 
                                                             
42 Goode, 380. 
 
43 Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn, Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post Soviet Russia, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 83-88. 
 
44 “Press-Vypusk No. 100: Ot kogo zavisit zhizn‟ v regionakh?,” 09 July 2004, Russia Public Opinion Research 
Center,  01 Mar. 2008, <http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/848.html>. 
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of politics means that not only is the governor‟s political power substantial, but it also means 
that the office is a focal point in the political tensions between different interests both inside 
and outside of the government. The position of a governor therefore renders his office as an 
ideal point of examination in understanding the changes that have taken place in the center-
periphery relationship over the past eight years.  
 
Testing the Governors 
The way that I test the strength of a governor‟s bargaining position is by assessing the 
success with which he keeps his job. Admittedly, this can be somewhat problematic. First, it 
assumes that a particular governor only seeks self-aggrandizement – it rules out the “good” 
governor who seeks the advancement of the interests of his constituency rather than personal 
advancement. Furthermore, it assumes that the only way in which a governor can “win” is if 
he retains his position – it does not allow for a “gray-area.” On the former shortcoming, I can 
offer no evidence to prove what a “good” governor is or to assess whether he accomplished 
his goals – this is a purely subjective evaluation. On the second point, however, I have 
included a third option in addition to “winning” or “losing” a position outright in the form of 
a “pacted withdrawal.” This variant arises from the fact that in many instances in Putin‟s 
tenure, governors were effectively able to negotiate their way out of office since they had 
substantial political authority. To put it another way, this third group of regional executives 
had insufficient power to retain their offices, but enough authority to either cause political 
headaches for the Kremlin or to be of value to the Presidential Administration in some other 
capacity. Thus they had to be bought out of office with a political appointment elsewhere. 
This may not provide a complete picture of a negotiated settlement, since the only visible 
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concession is this political position. Nevertheless, I will show that a general trend can be 
established. 
 
Related Literature 
Russian regional executives have been the focus of considerable attention in the post-
Soviet period, and the transition to the system of appointments should stimulate a new set of 
literature in this area. Previously, some authors have demonstrated the importance and 
influence of governors in a variety of spheres. The idea that the regions and their leadership 
engage in bargaining with the federal government is hardly new. Daniel Treisman, for 
instance, has previously demonstrated that a strategy of “selective fiscal appeasement” was 
adopted by Moscow to maintain the country‟s territorial integrity.  Treisman argues that 
those regions which presented the center the most potential problems (in the form of 
separatism, strikes, protest votes, etc.) received the most generous budgetary transfers from 
the center. Weaker regions, meanwhile, were not only unable to partake of these more 
lucrative financial terms, but effectively subsidized the more powerful regions.
45
  Treisman‟s 
arguments were specific to the 1990s, in which regions were able to negotiate the terms of 
their incorporation into the Russian Federation. Though this is no longer the case, bargaining 
still very much exists in different forms in Russia. 
 Soderlund has identified some of the levers of influence with which governors exert 
influence over the federal center; this paper essentially reverses the directionality, so that 
rather than asking how the center is affected, I ask how the center affects the periphery.  
Soderlund examined influence exercised on the federal center by regional governors against 
                                                             
45
 Treisman, Daniel, After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1999. 
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their bargaining power. By utilizing the bimonthly ratings of 2003 of Turovsky, et al.,
46
 he 
then operationalized the federal influence of regional executives, and then compared this 
against a series of independent variables, many of which were similar to those used in 
compiling the index used in my project. His research found that bargaining power was a 
function of several factors, including electoral support, regional economic standing, and 
republic status.
47
  
 Robertson has also assessed gubernatorial bargaining power, though in a different 
area: labor activity. He compares measures of “political loyalty” and “bargaining resources” 
against strike activity in the Russian regions. This article demonstrates that both of these 
measures influence levels of strike activity in certain conditions. When a region lacked 
bargaining resources, it was considered weak, and thus vulnerable to a test of political 
loyalty. If the governor was politically loyal to Yeltsin, the number of strikes was restricted. 
On the other hand, if a governor was both weak and at odds with the Yeltsin administration, 
then there was a marked increase in the number of strikes – an indication of a governor using 
one of his few bargaining chips in relations with the center.
48
 Robertson was able to 
operationalize both political allegiance and vulnerability; in my paper I am primarily 
concerned with only the latter due to the lack of transparency in politics that exists today. 
                                                             
46 The ratings are similar to those discussed below, but are for the year 2003 and are thus a bit more dated. 
Furthermore, they assess two qualities – governor‟s political influence and governor‟s federal influence – and 
do not address the question of “probability of appointment” since this was well before the new appointment 
system was adopted. 
 
47 Soderlund, Peter J. “Electoral Success and Federal-level Influence of Russian Regional Executives,” Europe-
Asia Studies, 57.4 (2005): 521-541. 
 
48
 Robertson, Graeme B., “Strikes and Labor Organization in Hybrid Regimes,” American Political Science 
Review, 101.4 (2007): 781-798. 
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When a governor lacks bargaining resources, this lack of insulation makes him vulnerable to 
the center‟s intervention. 
 Already, just three years into this new era, a few articles have been published that 
examine various aspects of the gubernatorial reforms.
49
 Goode has provided some useful 
insight into the origins and intentions behind the new system. He asserts that the Putin 
administration has adopted “Soviet-era institutional practices” as a shortcut in the place of a 
more conventional institutionalization. This entails efforts to build up a vertikal of power 
through rotation of cadres, patronage, and “concession prizes” for “losers.” Goode considers 
that the reasons for the acceptance of the reforms by regional elites were two-fold. First, 
governors were offered a better position from which to keep their jobs. Second, governors 
considering Putin‟s strength were confronted with a sense of the “inevitability” of the 
adoption of the reform, which was a function of the success enjoyed by “Putinism.” It is 
interesting that in Goode‟s interpretation of events, the regional executives are beneficiaries 
of the reforms and the regional legislatures, already feeble, are further undermined.
50
 His 
position on the significance of legislatures stands in contrast to Chebankova‟s arguments. 
 Chebankova takes the position that the new reforms have ushered in changes that may 
not be desirable for the Presidential Administration. These “unintended consequences” 
                                                             
49 Throughout the paper I will use “reforms” in the plural form, since there have been at least four changes 
affecting gubernatorial appointments over the past few years. The major alterations, of course, took place 
following the Beslan school massacre. Later, as discussed by Goode in fuller detail, a pair of presidential 
decrees (ukazy) specified the nomination process to be used, and another federal law provided that majority 
parties in regional assemblies could nominate gubernatorial candidates. At the end of 2006, another law, as 
outlined by Belonuchkin‟s blog, was set to enter force that stipulated resignations would no longer be accepted 
by the regional legislatures but by the Russian president himself. See Belonuchkin, Grigorii, “Sekretnyi nomer 
„Rossiiskoi Gazety,‟” 12 Jan. 2007, 10 Mar. 2008, <http://di09en.livejournal.com/2007/01/12/>. These legal 
document designators are as follows: N 159-FZ (11 Dec. 2004), N 202-FZ (31 Dec. 2005), and N 258-FZ (29 
Dec. 2006) for the federal laws; N 1603 (27 Dec. 2004) and N 756 (29 June 2005) for the presidential ukazy. 
 
50
 Goode, 380-3. See also Hough, Jerry, The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-
making, Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1969. 
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include decentralizing trends, such as increasing not only the importance of regional 
legislatures but their inclination towards resisting both the Kremlin and governors as well. 
Chebankova cites several instances in which the regional legislatures have either threatened 
to reject the Kremlin‟s nominees or have impeached sitting executives. The appointment 
reforms, teamed together with earlier federal statutes ordering that the at least of one-half of 
regional assemblies‟ seats be determined by party lists rather than single-mandate districts, 
have restructured politics in the regions to more closely resemble parliamentary systems of 
governance rather than the presidential-style variant that has dominated thus far. Ultimately, 
this may also spark a democratizing trend at the regional level, as opposition parties shift 
their focus to competing in races in which they have realistic chances of winning.
51
  
 Analysis of the governors has not, of course, been confined to Western authors. One 
of the most prominent Russian scholars in this sphere, Rostislav Turovsky, has not only 
published articles that focus on Russian regional executives, but for several years headed a 
project that provided detailed ratings for all of Russia‟s governors. Unfortunately, Turovsky 
appears to have ceased publishing these ratings after 2004, at the end of which he also 
published a list that ranked the probability of a governor losing his seat once the appointment 
system was adopted. The means for acquiring all of these rankings involved a group of expert 
assessments (18 Russian observers, including Turovsky, primarily from academic 
institutions, non-governmental organizations, and media outlets). Indeed, Turovsky and his 
co-panelists did an impressive job of predicting the dismissal of the weakest of governors – 
of these they only appear to miss four of 18 outright (two others were removed outside the 
normal operation of the appointment system; one was a last minute scratch from running in 
                                                             
51 Chebankova, Elena, “The Unintended Consequences of Gubernatorial Appointments in Russia, 2005-6,” 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 22.4 (2006): 457-484. 
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the final gubernatorial election, the other died in office). Yet there are several governors 
further up the list that they failed to identify: Oorzhak (Republic of Tuva, 52
nd
), Sovmen 
(Republic of Adygea, 37
th
), and Prusak (Novgorodskaya Oblast, 17
th
) and Alkhanov 
(Chechnya, 14
th
). Two others also highly rated lost their positions, though arguably these are 
unfair to add since they are outside the system of appointments: Kokov (Kabardino-Balkariya 
Republic, 16
th
 – poor health) and Sobyanin (Tyumenskaya Oblast, 10th – promoted). Overall, 
these ratings are quite strong in their validity. Yet, they suffer from two shortcomings. The 
ratings at this point are more than three years old – which means a large number of 
gubernatorial appointment decisions have already occurred. Moreover, while Turovsky and 
his peers have performed admirably, there is little in the way of tangible measurement – these 
figures are based wholly on the opinions of the experts. The panelists evaluated three 
different components (the influence a governor has over federal level authorities and 
business, influence over local authorities and business, and the governor‟s popularity 
amongst the populace), with each component graded on a five-point scale. These three 
components were then combined to provide an overall rating on a five-point scale.
52
  A 
model that is more up-to-date as well as based on providing some concrete statistical basis 
thus helps to further illuminate the state of the gubernatorial appointment system at present. 
This is what I try to contribute with the model I outline in the next chapter.
                                                             
52
 Turovsky, Rostislav, “Regional‟nye lidery v dekabre 2004 goda,” 29 Dec. 2004, Politcom.ru, 20 Feb. 2008, 
<http://www.politcom.ru/2004/reiting15.php >. 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE MODEL: ESTABLISHING VULNERABILITY AND TRANSITION TYPES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“…A person, who submitted this question to us, recalled how once on “Direct Line,” just as today, the 
question was twice raised about the distress of the city of Ust’-Kut. And then this year, you nominated 
Aleksandr Tishanin to replace Boris Govorin for the governor’s post of Irkutskaya Oblast. This was such a 
fresh political development. Is this a result of “Direct Line?” 
 
 
“No. This is more than anything else, of course, the result of an evaluation of the situation in the region and a 
result of the fact that Boris Aleksandrovich Govorin had already served out two terms in the capacity of 
governor. For such a region as Irkutskaya Oblast, this is quite a solid term. He has a great deal of experience 
in both state and managerial assignments. I hope that we will find for an opportunity to put his knowledge and 
strengths to work in some other area. But I want a person to emerge in this region, who on one hand knows the 
problems of Irkutskaya Oblast, but all the same, has a fresh view on how to solve the problems, in the resolution 
of which people who live in that oblast are interested. And the proposed candidate is exactly that administrator 
who has already worked for one and a half or close to two years in the region, who worked in the capacity of 
head of the regional subunit of the stock company “Russian Railways,” who knows practically the entire 
economy, who knows the region’s problems, but at the same time is a person who is not connected by any sorts 
of obligations – pardon me, I’ll say it bluntly – to the local bureaucracy, which should solve some problems 
much more effectively than has been done previously. 
–Putin, “Direct Line” phone-in show, 27 September 200553 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
53
 “Stenogramma „Pryamoi linii c Prezidentom Rossii,‟” 27 Sep. 2005, State Television Channel “Rossiya,” 19 
Mar. 2008, <http://www.liniya2005.ru/>. 
 
23 
 
The following chapter is dedicated to reviewing the relationships between a 
governor‟s standing and his fate both at the time of the gubernatorial appointment decision 
and in the period that follows thereafter. I will first discuss some of the assumptions 
involved, and then I will discuss some of the background of the project design. Having done 
this I will explain the five cases I have omitted from the overall process.
 54
 Next, the four 
factors on which I assessed the regions, and the relationship between these factors and 
appointment decisions and outcomes will be discussed individually. Finally, I will review the 
composite results, which will demonstrate that governors can be distributed into one of three 
tiers. These tiers have had a strong impact on the fate of the incumbent governor. 
 
Definitions and Processes 
 This project revolves around an event I call a “gubernatorial appointment decision.” 
This activity takes place in one of seven cases (see Table 3.1). First, it takes place when a 
governor‟s term expires; the date of termination is counted not from the adoption of the new 
system, but from the point at which the governor in question was last elected. The term 
length is set at either four or five years, depending on the regional statutes concerning the 
chief executive. An appointment decision can also take place in five other instances in which 
a governor leaves office prematurely. The governor may be formally fired due to the loss of 
the president‟s confidence; this has proven to be a quite rare occurrence (only three of 78 
cases through 2007). Far more frequently, the governor resigns “by personal decision” and 
triggers an appointment decision prior to the legally prescribed termination of his authority. 
These resignations can be described in one of three ways: the governor is forced out, the 
                                                             
54 These are Mikhail Evdokimov (Altai Krai), Valerii Kokov (Kabardino-Balkariya Republic), Sergei Sobyanin 
(Tyumenskaya Oblast), Alu Alkhanov (Chechnya), and Viktor Shershunov (Kostromskaya Oblast). 
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governor seeks an early resignation to apply for the president‟s vote of confidence,55 or the 
governor genuinely no longer desires to retain his office (for health reasons or due to a 
promotion, for example). A governor may die in office, thus prompting an appointment 
decision (this has happened twice, in both cases as the result of automobile accidents). 
Finally, regional consolidation also triggers appointment decisions. For instance, the merging 
of the Permskaya Oblast with the Komi-Permyatskii Autonomous Okrug produced the 
Permskii Krai. This new subject required a governor, who in this case was the governor of 
the erstwhile Permskaya Oblast, Oleg Chirkunov.  
Table 3.1: Gubernatorial Appointment Decision Types 
Categorization 
Example (Region in 
Parentheses) 
Possible Outcome(s) 
Expiration of Term 
Dmitrii Ayatskov 
(Saratovskaya Oblast) 
Reappointment, Loss of 
Office 
Loss of President‟s Confidence 
Vladimir Loginov 
(Koryakskii AO) 
Loss of Office 
Resignation 
Vote of Confidence 
Attempt 
Mintimer Shaimiev 
(Republic of Tatarstan) 
Reappointment, Loss of 
Office 
Forced Out 
Ivan Malakhov 
(Sakhalinskaya Oblast) 
Loss of Office 
Retirement 
Valerii Kokov  
(Kabardino-Balkariya 
Republic) 
Loss of Office 
Death 
Mikhail Evdokimov 
(Altaiskii Krai) 
Loss of Office 
Creation of New Subject 
Oleg Chirkunov  
(Permskaya Oblast/ 
Permskii Krai) 
Effective Reappointment 
of One of the Merged 
Territory‟s Governor, 
Loss of Office by Both of 
These Governors 
 
 
                                                             
55 An interesting note regarding the early appeals method: while it would seem the Kremlin enjoyed making use 
of it, having accepted five candidates as of mid-March 2005, the populace was less enthusiastic about this 
mechanism. Despite a majority of respondents backing the new system of appointments (54% in March 2005 
either “fully agreed” or “most likely agreed” that new system was necessary – up from 38% just the previous 
September), the same 54% felt this new tactic was “most likely negative” with just 23% believing it to be “most 
likely positive.”  See: “Press-Vypusk No. 178: Rossiyane o naznachenii i otstavkakh gubernatorov,” 28 Mar. 
2005, Russia Public Opinion Research Center, 01 Mar. 2008, <http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-
arkhiv/item/single/1149.html>.  
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 These gubernatorial appointments constitute the first half of my project. The other 
major component is what I term the “Vulnerability Index.” The index is an unweighted 
composite score of four different components that are measures of the standing of the region 
and its executive.  Measures utilized include the gross regional product of the subject in 
question, the length of a governor‟s tenure in office at the time of the appointment, whether 
or not the subject has republic status, and whether or not the regional administration retained 
significant control over enterprises created during the privatization processes of the 1990s. 
Thus a governor is awarded a score of zero to four points, which in turn generates three 
different types of governors of different strength (see Appendix A). These scores are then 
compared against the gubernatorial appointment decision outcomes, which produces a pair of 
important conclusions. First, governors of the strongest type are effectively invulnerable to 
losing their seats. The remaining two tiers of governors can lose their offices, which leads to 
the second conclusion: those governors occupying the middle tier reached “pacted” removals 
from office, operationalized here as an appointment to a political office in the federal 
government. This is a reflection of the political standing and power of these governors, who 
can be viewed as having sufficient power to either be assets to the Kremlin elsewhere or to 
present a sufficiently credible threat to obstruct the federal government‟s policy preferences 
that they must be “bought out.” This leaves the weakest tier of governors, who are considered 
to be wholly at the mercy of the Kremlin; when these governors have been ousted, they 
typically have faded from the political scene altogether. 
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Case Population and Selection 
In setting up this project, I populated a list of 78 gubernatorial appointment decisions 
from 2005 to 2007. I then converted this into a revised set that consists of 73 cases. This 
revised set omits two governors who died in office (Mikhail Evdokimov of the Altai 
Republic and Viktor Shershunov the Kostromskaya Oblast), a governor who resigned for 
what appear to be legitimate health reasons (Valerii Kokov the Kabardino-Balkariya 
Republic) and two special cases (Alu Alkhanov of the Republic of Chechnya and Sergei 
Sobyanin of Tyumenskaya Oblast). The reasons for the first two omissions is evident, but the 
final three instances merit a discussion of why the have been deleted from consideration in 
my model. 
 I considered Kokov‟s resignation to be forced by non-political concerns: that is, his 
health. Though a resignation may be publicly described as occurring for “health reasons,” it 
can be difficult to distinguish genuine instances of political resignations for health reasons 
from those which were undertaken as a result of more dubious, Khrushchevian machinations. 
In Kokov‟s case, however, it seems clear that he resigned for purely personal reasons: the 
governor died just a month and a half after leaving office, from a “prolonged illness,” 
reported to be cancer by one media outlet.
56
 I have also chosen to omit Chechnya on the basis 
of the events that have transpired there over the past two decades. Alkhanov‟s service came 
in the only region to be forcibly retained into the Russian Federation, at the cost of not one, 
but two, wars that altered all facets of life there, not least of all the political landscape.  
Sobyanin‟s exclusion arises from his promotion to a political office with real 
influence.  Though coming from outside the St. Petersburg or security service circles often 
                                                             
56 “Kreml‟ prishel k vyvodu: khoroshii gubernator – staryi gubernator,” 06 Dec. 2006, Novyi Region – Nizhnyi 
Novgorod, 19 Jan. 2008, <http://www.nr2.ru/nn/95116.html>; RIA-Novosti, “V Nal‟chike zavershilas‟ 
tsermoniya proshchaniya s Valeriem Kokovym,” 30 Oct. 2005, 19 Jan. 2008, 
<http://www.rian.ru/society/20051030/41937083.html>. 
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attributed with influencing Putin,  one reporter observed that he “…always was absolutely 
loyal to Vladimir Putin, and publicly demonstrated this,” and was one of the first governors 
to join the party of power, United Russia. The same piece even speculated that Sobyanin may 
have an opportunity to succeed Putin.
57
 Even though this did not come to fruition, it is worth 
noting that Sobyanin‟s current position as the chief of staff of the Presidential Administration 
is the same that President-elect Dmitrii Medvedev occupied prior to his promotion to first 
deputy prime minister; moreover, the man Medvedev tapped to lead his election campaign 
was none other than Sobyanin.
58
 Sobyanin‟s transition to the federal level of government, in 
sum, appears to have little to do with removing a problematic governor: his elevation appears 
to have far more to do with staffing an important presidential position with a competent 
official. 
 
Constructing the Model 
The basic design of my model proceeds as shown in Figure 3.1. I do not believe that 
there is a literal “formula” to determine the fates of petitioning governors – though a 
presidential decree last June ordered the establishment of an “evaluation” regime to assess 
the effectiveness of regional executives in 43 areas.
59
  It does, however, show some key 
                                                             
 
57Melikova, Natal‟ya, “Stanet li Sobyanin preemnikom Putina? Fenomen Sobyanina: Na byvshem gubernatore 
Tyumenskoi oblasti Putin otrabotal osnovnye elementy spetsoperatsii „Preemnik‟,” 13 Nov. 2006, 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 Jan. 2008, <http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2006-11-13/7_sobianin.html>.  
 
58 Nowak, David. “Sobyanin to Manage Medvedev Campaign,” 21 Dec. 2007, The Moscow Times, 18 Jan. 
2008, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/12/21/011.html>. 
 
59 Samigullina, Aliya, et al. “Gubernatorov razlozhat po  43 punktam,” 29 June 2007, Gazeta.ru, 18 Jan. 2008, 
<http://www.gazeta.ru/2007/06/29/oa_243164.shtml>.  The order may be viewed at “Ukaz Prezidenta 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Ob effektivnosti deyatel‟nosti organov ispolnitel‟noi vlasti sub‟ektov Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii,” No. 825, 28 June 2007, The Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, 08 Feb. 2008, 
<http://document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID=040264>.  Perhaps this is also done with Yeltsin‟s early 
misadventures in mind:  On page 310 of “Russia: Managing Territorial Cleavages under Dual Transitions,” (in 
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factors that may insulate governors from federal influence.  I first analyze four factors, which 
will be discussed in more detail in the subsections below, including how they were 
operationalized. These fours factors are converted into a point score of either zero or one 
point, and these four indicators are then compiled as a Vulnerability Index with scores 
ranging from zero to four points. Having obtained this composite score, the regional 
executive can be categorized into one of three tiers of strength: strong governors are those 
who received three or four points; moderate strength executives received scores of one or two 
points; the final set of governors, the weakest and most vulnerable to federal influence, are 
those who received ratings of zero points. 
These different categorizations prove to be very important in determining the 
outcome of a gubernatorial appointment decision. Strong governors (eight of 73 cases) have 
only one possible path: the retention of their position. The moderately empowered governors 
(48 of 73 cases) have a pair of possible outcomes. They can either retain their position or 
they can be “bought out” of office with another federally appointed post. In sum, these 
governors therefore are somewhat vulnerable to federal pressures, but also possess sufficient 
standing to receive something in return for retirement from their post. The weakest governors 
(17 of 73 cases) have a pair of potential paths as well: they can retain their position, like all 
the other incumbents, or they can be ousted without any concessions made to them. In either 
instance, they are wholly at the mercy of the center: if they retain their post, they will be 
expected to be the most malleable of governors; if they are sacked, they do not present a 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Bermeo, Nancy and Ugo M. Amoretti, eds. Federalism and Territorial Cleavages, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2004) Kathryn Stoner-Weiss writes that “in some cases, Yeltsin appointed so many 
individuals at the same time that his administration lost track of exactly who was coming to power in the 
provinces.” 
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sufficiently credible threat to the Kremlin in other spheres.
60
 All of this is to say that the 
center, despite successfully increasing its control over the regions in the past eight years, is 
forced to deal with different regions and leaders, who possess varying degrees of strength, 
and this in turn produces different outcomes.  
 
Figure 3.1: Gubernatorial Appointment Process Model 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
60 For a full breakdown of the different outcomes, see Appendix B. 
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Indicator I: Substantial Regional Economy (GRP) 
The most basic economic indicator for a given region is its gross regional product 
(GRP).
61
 This figure provides an understanding of the size of the overall economy and proves 
to be a powerful indicator of a governor‟s vulnerability (see Appendix C). In order to provide 
for a comparison of those governors on the basis of their success in retaining their position, 
these cases were partitioned into two tiers, and were awarded a point for being in the higher 
output tier, while the other half of cases that fell in the lower tier did not receive a point (due 
to an odd number of cases, 37 cases constituted the lower tier, only 36 were in the upper tier). 
Sixteen of the 21 governors (76.19 percent) who were replaced were located in the lower half 
the of GRP bracket; this translates to 43.25 percent of governors in the lower bracket losing 
their positions, while just 13.89 percent of governors in the upper bracket were ousted – in 
other words, a governor was more than three times as likely to keep his job if he was from 
one of wealthier regions reviewed. In terms of the relationship between GRP and bargaining 
outcomes later, three of the five cases (60.00 percent) where the incumbent hailed from an 
upper tier region were successful in obtaining a federal appointment, and both of those who 
did not obtain federal posts received other political positions. Conversely, just five of 16 
governors (31.25 percent) in the lower tier instances managed federal posts after they left 
office. The average GRP of a retained governor was nearly three times as high as his 
unseated counterpart. 
 
                                                             
61 The figures cited here and used for this analysis are drawn from the official data provided by Russia‟s Federal 
State Statistics Service (often referred to the name of its Soviet predecessor, Goskomstat, or Rosstat). Though 
ideally the figures used in my research would be drawn from the year of the appointment decision, statistics 
have only been publically disseminated for the years through 2005. Nevertheless, given the limited scope of the 
appointment cases (less than three years), it is doubtful that these figures would have drastically changed or 
altered the relative standings between regions. The GRP figures can be viewed at: Federal‟naya sluzhba 
gosudarstvennoi statistiki, “Valovoi regional‟nyi produkt,” 2006, State Statistics Service of the Russian 
Federation, 02 Nov. 2007, <http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b01_19/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/i-vrp.htm>.  
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Indicator II: Retention of State Control of Enterprises 
Not only is leading a large economy important, but the ability to take control of that 
economic apparatus is beneficial as well. In cases where the regional government retained 
control over significant shares of privatized stock corporations, this form of economic 
autonomy proved to be an extremely strong insulator against being ousted by Moscow (see 
Appendix D). In order to define this level of control, I have incorporated the definition and 
data compiled by Aleksandr Radygin and Georgii Mal‟ginov of the Institute for the Economy 
in Transition.
62
 Radygin and Mal‟ginov calculated that seventeen regions retained a 
significant share (15 percent of all created companies) in stock companies that were 
privatized between 1993 and 1999. A significant share is held to mean either a controlling 
packet or a “golden share” which confers controlling rights greater than the actual percentage 
of stock owned would normally allow.  In 20 of 21 cases (95.23 percent) in which a head of 
administration did not retain his position, he governed a region in which the administration 
did not retain a significant level of control over enterprises in his region. The sole exception 
to this rule was North Ossetia (governed by Aleksandr Dzasokhov), where the region only 
barely crossed the 15 percent threshold (it retained 16 percent of released firms).  In terms of 
those regions where the regional administration did retain significant shares, 13 of 14 
candidates (92.86 percent) kept their position.  Only 38 of 58 (65.52 percent) of those 
regional leaders who lacked this degree of control were able to retain their positions. In sum, 
this economic control component has been shown to provide the incumbent with a 
considerable level of insulation. 
 
                                                             
62 Radygin, Aleksandr D., and G.N. Mal‟ginov, “Gosudarstvennaya sobstvennost‟ v rossiiskikh korporatsiyakh: 
problemy effektivnosti upravlenie I zadachi gosudarsstvennego regulirovaniya,” Mar. 2001, Institute for the 
Economy in Transition, 07 Dec. 2007, < http://www.nasledie.ru/politvnt/19_19/article.php?art=8>.  See section 
“2.1 Kolichestvennyi aspekt problemy,” particularly Table 3 and the accompanying text. 
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Indicator III: Regional Ethnic Stability 
Another possible factor constricting the Russian president‟s decision is the ethnic 
stability of a region. Given Russia‟s ethnic diversity, as well as its historical delineation of 
geographic and political power on the basis of ethnic identity, this is no small consideration. 
The best known instances of volatility along these lines are the Chechen Wars, of course, but 
other examples exist as well. In order to evaluate the strength of this variable, I assessed the 
appointment of governors on the basis of whether or not they represented a republican-level 
subject of the federation (see Appendix E). Fifteen heads of republics were subjected to 
gubernatorial appointment decisions since the new system was established. In six of these 
cases (40.00 percent), the incumbent failed to retain his job.  Of these rejections, three (50.00 
percent) received a federal appointment, two (33.33 percent) received other government 
positions, and one (16.67 percent) received no political office. Perhaps somewhat counter-
intuitively, republics were actually more likely to have their governors replaced, in spite of 
what additional autonomy those regions did in fact enjoy due to their special status. The 
retention level for all other subjects was 74.13 percent; for republics, it was just 60.00 
percent. In terms of post-removal success rates of being offered a federal job, republican 
heads were somewhat more successful, with three of the six (50.00 percent) receiving federal 
positions, compared with just five of 15 (33.33 percent) non-republican bosses receiving 
federal posts. 
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Indicator IV: Tenure 
Another restriction upon Moscow‟s decision-making process was the extent to which 
the regional executive had managed to become entrenched and was able to build up a 
regional political base. In order to test for the incumbent‟s level of regional penetration, the 
length of a governor‟s tenure at the time of the appointment decision was reviewed (see 
Appendix F).
63
 There is a relationship between the retention of one‟s position and tenure: just 
four rejected governors belonged to the upper tier; the remaining 16 belonged to the lower 
tier. In looking at all governors, those in the top tier were slightly more likely to keep their 
posts on the basis of tenure: 28 of 36 (77.78 percent) kept there seats at that level compared 
with 24 of 36 (66.67 percent) at the lower level.  There is a minor difference in the average 
tenures of those governors who kept their jobs (a 101.18 month mean average) and those who 
lost them (a mean average of 95.28 months). What is more noteworthy, however, is that there 
is a clear split within the group of governors who did not retain their positions: at the bottom 
half of this group, only two received federal positions after they lost their gubernatorial posts; 
moreover, all three governors that were officially sacked belonged to this group. At the top 
half of this group, five of these officials received federal positions and three received other 
political posts.  The mean average was also a significant difference between those who 
bargained and those who were forced out completely: 122.14 months of experience versus 
80.82 months (a 37 percent difference).  
 
The Vulnerability Index and Outcomes 
The comprehensive results which form the Vulnerability Index show strong patterns 
in comparing the point system totals and the results of gubernatorial decisions. Moreover, 
                                                             
63
 In this instance I did not include Dagestan‟s Magomedov, since due to his region‟s unusual political structure 
it is not clear when he should be considered to be the highest executive official. 
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there is a strong relationship between point totals and bargaining power within the group of 
governors that was dismissed. In only one case (14.28 percent) in this set of dismissals did a 
governor who received zero points receive a federal appointment.
64
 Moreover, none of the 
remaining six is known to have received any sort of governmental position at any level 
following their dismissal. All three of the heads of administration that were formally sacked 
belong to this ill-protected group. In the top half of this bracket, the figures are completely 
different. For those 13 heads of administration that received scores of one or two points and 
were replaced, seven of them (53.80 percent) received federal positions (see Table 3.2 and 
Appendix B). Of the remaining six who did not receive federal appointments, five received 
other political appointments at the regional level: four joined the federal legislature; the fifth 
took a position in the mayor‟s office in Moscow. What this demonstrates is that there is a 
clear advantage in bargaining position for those governors who received moderate levels of 
points. They did not retain sufficient power to hold their offices outright, but they were able 
to secure employment in political positions after their resignation. Those extremely weak 
governors, conversely, were largely forced into non-political or marginal political roles (i.e. 
within a party, as Vasilii Starodubtsev of the Tul‟skaya Oblast did, or in competition for 
another position, as Vladimir Tikhonov of the Ivanovskaya Oblast attempted to do in a Duma 
bid, unsuccessfully). In a pair of the more drastic fates that ex-governors met with, one ended 
up in prison (Aleksei Barinov, Nenetskii AO),
65
 while another is now an 11
th
 grade 
schoolteacher (Leonid Korotkov, Amurskaya Oblast).
66
  
                                                             
64 That sole case was Mikhail Mashkovtsev of Kamchatskaya Oblast, who does not appear to have ever 
assumed his duties in this position – he is currently living in St. Petersburg, and overseeing the construction of 
his apartment, following the death of his wife.  Thus the decision to include his case here may be debated, but I 
have chosen to err on the side of caution. 
 
65 “Byvshii gubernator Nenetskogo okruga prigovoren k trem godam uslovno,” 06 Sep. 2007, Polit.ru, 20 Jan. 
2008, <http://www.polit.ru/news/2007/09/06/barinov.html>; IA Regnum, “Prigovor po delu eks-gubernatora 
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An Alternative Demonstration of Regional Tiers: The “Varangian Factor” 
The arrival of “Varangians” (or “outsiders” in less dramatic terms),67 as one magazine 
has take to labeling new arrivals, has attracted attention in the past few years.
68
 Indeed, this 
appears to be a deliberate Kremlin strategy, the benefits of which are two-fold. As Joel 
Migdal has written, by utilizing personnel decisions as a political instrument – what he terms 
“the Big Shuffle” – the leader seeks to move officials from their original territorial domain or 
professional competencies, and thus prevent them from manifesting a strong political base or 
gaining a dangerous level of expertise.
69
 The drawback to this approach, of course, is a likely 
loss of efficiency. There is a second advantage in that such appointments may be 
simultaneously used to hollow out the political capacity of some of the stronger Russian 
regions by depriving them of some of their best politicians.
70
 Two regions in particular stand 
out – both of which not coincidentally are belong to this strong tier: the federal city of 
Moscow, which lost a trio of its deputies to this promotion strategy (Valerii Shantsev, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Nenetskogo AO ostavlen bez izmenenii,” 26 Oct. 2007, 20 Jan. 2008, 
<http://www.regnum.ru/news/905749.html>; “Ya rasschityval na polnoe opravdanie,” 26 Oct. 2007, Rosbalt 
Sever, 20 Jan. 2008, <http://www.rosbalt.ru/2007/10/26/425906.html>.  
 
66 Palei, Natal‟ya, “Leonid Korotkov sobiraetsya posvyatit‟ pedagogike novyi etap svoei zhizni,” 3-9 Oct. 2007, 
Teleport, No. 40, 21 Jan. 2008, <http://www.amur.info/news/2007/10/09/22.html>. 
67The term is refers to the Scandinavian Varangians, who were supposedly “invited” to rule over the “native” 
Slavic and Finno-Ugric peoples.  
 
68See for instance articles discussing  the arrivals of Shantsev, Boos, and Nagovitsyn in these terms: Kravtsova, 
Maria, “„Varyagi‟ nastupayut ostorozhno,” 29 Aug. 2005, Ekspert, 09 Jan. 2008 
<http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2005/32/32ex-polit4/>; “Georgii Boos: „Klany rynok kontrolirovat‟ ne 
budet‟,” 12 June 2006,  Ekspert, 15 Jan. 2008, <http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2006/22/qa_boos/>; 
“Varyagom bol‟she,” 11 June 2007, Ekspert Sibir‟, 10 Jan. 2008, 
<http://www.expert.ru/printissues/siberia/2007/22/news_zamestilel_gubernatora/>;  Popova, Ol‟ga, 
“Proshchanie s epokhoi,” 03 Sep. 2007, Ekspert Volga, 15 Jan. 2008, 
<http://www.expert.ru/printissues/volga/2007/32/noviy_gubernator/>. Nikolai Petrov also uses the term in 
discussing Shantsev in “Incoming Outsiders,” 09 Aug. 2005, The Moscow Times, 10 Jan. 2008, 
<http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/73015.htm>. 
 
69 Migdal, Joel, Strong Societies and Weak States, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, 206-226. 
  
70 Petrov, “Incoming Outsiders.” 
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Table 3.2: Ex-Governors’ Fates 
Region Incumbent Date Points 
Federal 
Appointment? 
Current 
Employment 
Nenetskii Aleksei Barinov 8/06 0.00 No 
Sacked; currently 
serving three-year 
prison term 
Ivanovskaya Vladimir Tikhonov 11/05 0.00 No 
Ran in 2007 Duma 
elections; lost 
Amurskaya Leonid Korotkov 6/07 0.00 No 
Sacked; high school 
teacher 
Kaliningradskaya Vladimir Egorov 9/05 0.00 No 
Heads lumber 
company 
Koryakskii Vladimir Loginov 4/05 0.00 No 
Sacked; head 
administrator for 
tariffs, 
Kamchatskaya 
phone company  
Sakhalinskaya Ivan Malakhov 8/07 0.00 No 
Forced to resign 
after natural disaster; 
no known 
employment 
Kamchatskaya Mikhail Mashkovtsev 6/07 0.00 Yes 
Supposedly on 
Consultative 
Commission to the 
State Council of the 
Russian Federation 
(CCSCRF); does not 
appear to be active  
Novgorodskaya Mikhail Prusak 8/07 1.00 Yes CCSCRF 
Tul‟skaya Vasilii Starodubtsev 3/05 1.00 No 
Active in the KPRF 
and Agro-Industrial 
Union of Russia 
Nizhegorodskaya Gennady Khodyrev 8/05 1.00 Yes 
Ministry of Regional 
Development?; 
CCSCRF  
Altai Republic Mikhail Lapshin 12/05 1.00 No 
Federation Council; 
Died 
Adygea Khazret Sovmen  12/06 1.00 No 
Advisor to Mayor of 
Moscow 
Samarskaya Konstantin Titov 8/07 2.00 No Federation Council 
Saratovskaya Dmitri Ayatskov 3/05 2.00 Yes 
Promoted to Amb. to 
Belarus; then 
CCSCRF member 
Irkutskaya Boris Govorin 9/05 2.00 Yes 
Ambassador to 
Mongolia 
Buryatiya Leonid Potapov 6/07 2.00 Yes 
Presidential Aide; 
CCSCRF  
North Osetiya-Alaniya Aleksandr Dzasokhov 6/05 2.00 No Federation Council 
Tuva Sherig-ool Oorzhak 4/07 2.00 Yes CCSCRF 
Dagestan Magomedali Magomedov 2/06 2.00 Yes 
Presidential 
Commission on the 
Strengthening of the 
Russian State and 
Federal Relations 
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Mikhail Men‟, and Georgii Boos), and Tatarstan, which lost Nikolai Kolesov to Amurskaya 
Oblast.
71
 By utilizing this policy of alienation, the Kremlin is provided with a lever with 
which to exert some influence over the most autonomous of regions in the long term. In 
assessing the relationship between this Varangian factor, the data set shows that as the point 
total rises, so does the probability that the region in question will be able to send a local 
official to the governor‟s post. I reviewed the successors for the 21 cases in this project (See 
Table 3.3), and used the newly arriving governor‟s previous geographic political base as the 
determinant for his classification. I should note that in two cases, Vitalii Potapenko and 
Aleksandr Tishanin, the individual‟s preceding work placed him in the region he was 
appointed. I chose to consider them Varangian nevertheless. This was so determined because 
the former was a federal inspector posted there for less than two full years – previously he 
had spent long periods in of time in KGB/FSB service in Tajikistan and St. 
Petersburg/Leningradskaya oblast.
72
 The latter, the reader may remember from the epigraph 
at the beginning of this chapter, worked for Russian Railways and had been in the Irkutskaya 
Oblast for less than two years as well. For those regions that received no points on the 
comprehensive Vulnerability Index, only half of them (four of eight regions) escaped a 
Varangian invasion; this increased to a 60 percent success rate (three of five regions) for the 
regions which were awarded one point, and was capped by a 75 percent success rate (6 of 8 
regions).  
                                                             
71See the following article for more details. The piece also notes that one of the republics most influential 
political figures, the mayor of the capital city of Kazan, Kamil‟ Iskhakov was appointed as Putin‟s presidential 
representative to the Far East Federal District. The district is headquartered in Khabarovsk, some 3,500 miles 
from Kazan. See “Gubernator iz Kazani,” 29 May 2007, Ekspert Online, 11 Jan. 2008, 
<http://www.expert.ru/newsmakers/2007/05/29/kolesov/>.  
 
72 “Novyi gubernator NAO Valerii Potapenko: biografiya,” 21 July 2006, Pravda.ru, 19 Mar. 2008, 
<http://www.pravda.ru/districts/northwest/naryan-mar/21-07-2006/191403-nao-0>. 
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In light of a Nikolai Petrov article, I also considered a timing element to the 
Varangian appointments. Petrov, writing about the appointment of Varangian Valerii 
Shantsev in the Nizhegorodskaya Oblast in August 2005, noted that this choice set a 
precedent that “…promises to be important because it signals that the rotation principle, 
which the Kremlin has revived in recent years and used for regional security and law 
enforcement heads, may now be applied at the gubernatorial level.”73 After a brief spurt of 
Varangian appointments started by Shantsev‟s selection, these outsider nominations subsided 
and became more sporadically applied. Moreover, they were evenly distributed in terms of 
the point totals – in the first wave there were two weak regional occurrences, one moderate 
regional occurrence, and one strong regional occurrence – which was mirrored in the second 
phase). As these results show, Varangian replacements have a tendency to reflect the strength 
of the former governor and the region as calculated in the Vulnerability Index. This helps to 
substantiate the broader case that this standing has consequences in the center-periphery 
bargaining process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
73 Petrov, “Incoming Outsiders.” 
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The Limitations of the Model 
As the reader may have noted, there are several instances in which the model fails to 
accurately predict the pacted transitions of governors. I attribute this to several shortcomings 
in its construction as well as the general limitations of this approach. First, and arguably 
foremost, the Vulnerability Index is populated with only four factors and this is done so in an 
Table 3.3: “Varangians” and Vulnerability Index Point Totals 
Region 
Subject 
Type 
New Governor (Former Region) Date Points 
Local 
Replacement 
or Outsider? 
Nenetskii Okrug 
Valerii Potapenko 
(St. Petersburg/Leningradskaya FSB) 
8/06 0 Outsider 
Ivanovskaya Oblast 
Mikhail Men‟ (Moscow – Regional 
Government) 
11/05 0 Outsider 
Amurskaya Oblast 
Nikolai Kolesov (Tatarstan – Regional 
Government) 
6/07 0 Outsider 
Kaliningradskaya Oblast 
Georgii Boos (Moscow – Regional 
Government) 
9/05 0 Outsider 
Koryakskii Okrug Oleg Kozhemyako 4/05 0 Local Official 
Sakhalinskaya Oblast Aleksandr Khoroshavin 8/07 0 Local Official 
Kamchatskaya Oblast Aleksei Kuz'mitskii 6/07 0 Local Official 
Smolenskaya Oblast Sergei Antuf‟ev 12/07 0 Local Official 
Novgorodskaya Oblast 
Sergei Mitin (Moscow – Federal 
Government) 
8/07 1 Outsider 
Altai Republic Republic Aleksandr Berdnikov 12/05 1 Local Official 
Tul‟skaya Oblast Vyacheslav Dudka 3/05 1 Local Official 
Nizhegorodskaya Oblast 
Valery Shantsev (Moscow – Regional 
Government) 
8/05 1 Outsider 
Adygea Republic Aslancherii Tkhakushinov 12/06 1 Local Official 
Irkutskaya Oblast 
Aleksandr Tishanin (Irkutskaya – 
Russian Railroads) 
9/05 2 Outsider 
Saratovskaya Oblast Pavel Ipatov 3/05 2 Local Official 
Dagestan Republic 
Mukhu Aliyev 
 
2/06 2 Local Official 
Samarskaya Oblast Vladimir Artyakov 8/07 2 Local Official 
Buryatiya Republic 
Vyacheslav Nagovitsyn (Tomskaya  – 
Business) 
6/07 2 Outsider 
North Osetiya-
Alaniya 
Republic Taimuraz Mamsurov 6/05 2 Local Official 
Tuva Republic Sholban Kara-ool 4/07 2 Local Official 
Yaroslavskaya Oblast Sergei Vakhrukhov 12/07 2 Local Official 
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unweighted fashion. If the index were to be expanded sufficiently to include a larger number 
of factors (and even this would be complicated to some extent by availability of desired 
data), I contend that a high rate of success would become a nearly perfect rate of success.
74
 
Yet even if this revision were to take place, there would always be the prospect of cases that 
could not be explained by tangible statistical factors alone – the timing dynamics I discuss in 
the final chapter come to mind. Another potential shortcoming is the distinction between 
federal posts and other governmental posts (particularly federal legislature posts). I have 
considered the former to be superior professional assignments in this paper; I think this is, in 
fact, typically the case. However, given Russia‟s regional variation, as well as the differing 
goals of individual politicians, it is not unlikely that in some circumstances a legislative post 
might be more desirable to a governor. In some cases, an ex-governor might find that being a 
federal senator allows him to spend time in both Moscow and in his home region (three of 
the four senators represented the region they formerly governed). This could be interpreted as 
either an exercise in rationalism (they felt they were better positioned politically to “bridge” 
the federal and regional levels) or a decision based on non-material goals (retaining a place in 
the community, remaining with a family, etc.). 
On the other side of the pacted transitions, why was a former governor like Mikhail 
Mashkovtsev of the Kamchatskaya Oblast, who received a minimum score, given an 
appointment that he did not merit based on this system? The first possible answer to this 
question is that it is unclear whether he has actually been appointed to the commission or not. 
                                                             
74 I would suggest adding, for example, measures for gubernatorial vote tallies prior to the abolition of elections 
when discussing political factors. If the focus shifted to strictly regional structural considerations, I believe that 
factors emphasizing structure and allocation of resources should be emphasized: the level of international trade 
linkage (ideally both in-flows and out-flows), the Hirfendahl Index, the regional relationship to the center in 
terms of tax distribution, the level of foreign enterprise presence, and the nature of regional enterprise types 
(based on the understanding that some types of enterprises are easier to extract taxes from than others). 
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The Kremlin‟s website does not provide these appointments – what we are essentially left 
with in many cases is simply the statements of the ex-governors themselves. Despite 
supposedly being tasked to his post in late May of 2007, as of late July of that year he still 
had not joined the commission since he was “on leave.” Interestingly, at that point he also 
claimed that members of the commission also receive parallel appointments to presidential 
aide posts – which the Presidential Administration press service denied.75  Mashkovtsev 
seemed to be in no hurry to accept whatever appointment he may have received; indeed, in 
January 2008 Mashkovtsev had still not become active in the commission, instead saying that 
a place had been reserved for him – but that he had refused it, since for the time being, he 
wished to live in St. Petersburg. True to his labor roots, the Communist member wistfully 
observed that he wouldn‟t mind returning to his previous work as a lathe turner:  “…it 
wouldn‟t be so bad to be settled into a small private enterprise, and a modest entrepreneur 
would be proud that he has an active member of the State Council working on his staff!”76 It 
is unclear at this point if he has ever actually joined this body, or if this is another instance in 
which rumors of “impending appointments” and non-binding discussions between political 
figures have combined with a non-transparent federal executive branch to produce an 
“appointment” where none exists. Assuming that Mashkovtsev has in fact been posted to the 
federal commission, then there is one other possible explanation: in doing so he would be the 
first member of the commission from the Far Eastern Federal District (all others are also 
represented, save the Central District) to become available for appointment. This would 
mirror the State Council itself, which consists of one governor representing each Federal 
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District on a rotating basis. In other words, with all three of the other unemployed governors 
who came from the Far Easter Federal District belonging to the ranks of the sacked (formally 
in two instances, informally in Malakhov‟s case) perhaps Mashkovtsev was the first and only 
choice for the post.  
With all this being said, I still strongly believe that the model as outlined here firmly 
establishes the linkage not only between strength and retention of the governor‟s post, but the 
relationship between this authority and the office one receives after leaving his seat. All 
governors in this model were positioned correctly in terms of establishing their vulnerability 
– admittedly, this is done with the aid of hindsight. It conforms to the federal appointments 
with 87.5 percent accuracy (or perfectly, depending on how Mashkovtsev is treated). The 
difference in average point scores between federal appointees and non-federal appointees is 
clear: the former were rated at 1.50 points, the latter at only .69 points. I consider there to be 
by the harshest calculations, seven “failures” (yielding a success rate of 66 percent). Of these, 
one was an “overachiever” (Mashkovtsev); six were “underachievers,” meaning that their 
moderate strength status should have positioned them for federal appointments: Starodubtsev 
(Tul‟skaya Oblast), Dzasokhov (North Ossetia), Mikhail Lapshin (Altai Republic), Sovmen 
(Republic of Adygea), Konstantin Titov (Samarskaya Oblast), and Anatolii Lisitsyn 
(Yaroslavskaya Oblast). Three of these were appointed as senators, two gained other political 
offices (one in the Moscow mayor‟s office, the other in the State Duma), and one, a 
dedicated communist, is working in his party. Perhaps the model did not fully capture these 
individual cases‟ strengths (or lack thereof), perhaps it does not pay enough attention to the 
non-federal political posts, or perhaps it simply does not take proper heed the fact that the 
involved agents are human beings who in some cases pursue non-rational goals or who have 
43 
 
personal problems they must address. Having acknowledged these shortcomings, I would 
like to emphatically state that I believe that this model has proven the twin trends for which it 
was created: regional standing not only affects a governor‟s vulnerability, but his career 
options in those cases in which he leaves his post. In doing so, I have demonstrated that 
though the Kremlin has achieved some political gains versus the periphery, it is still limited 
in its ability to exercise its powers there. 
 
Conclusion 
I have demonstrated that there exists a strong relationship between a Vulnerability 
Index score and the fate of a politician in two related instances. At the point that the 
appointment decision is being made, the center is faced with restrictions upon whom it may 
replace. In those cases in which a replacement is possible and is desirable, and is then made, 
this bargaining position once again becomes relevant in determining the fate that awaits an 
ousted governor in the form of his post-governorship employment opportunities. This is 
further substantiated by an ancillary measure, the comparison of the Vulnerability Index 
scores against the Varangian appointments. I will now proceed to the second half of this 
paper, a set of case studies. I hope to use these instances to illustrate in fuller detail how a 
governor‟s standing translates into his bargaining power. The first case, Tatarstan, shows a 
governor with the strongest level of standing, which he has used to protect his seat.
CHAPTER 4 
 
STILL TOGETHER AFTER ALL THESE YEARS 
 
THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN & MINTIMER SHARIPOVICH SHAIMIEV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“You are the lead horse. And we are your harness.” 
  
–Shaimiev, at a gathering of regional 
 executives, to Putin, 200277 
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I will begin this case study by discussing the four different indicators on the 
Vulnerability Index, as they apply specifically to President Mintimer Shaimiev and the 
Republic of Tatarstan (RT), and demonstrating how these qualities have been used to the 
Shaimiev‟s advantage. President Shaimiev and his region received the maximum score of 
four points, indicating that he is a “strong governor.” Strong governors, the reader will recall, 
are considered to be invulnerable to replacement by the federal center. This neither means 
that they do not conflict with Moscow, nor that they have not suffered political defeats in the 
past eight years, but that they are secure in the most important of ways: their executive 
position. Indeed, such a mixed set of developments, with some losses to the central 
government and some successful repulsions of its encroachment, was the case in Tatarstan 
during Putin‟s years in office, as is detailed by Mukharyamov and Mukharyamova.78  In the 
final two sections, I will discuss Shaimiev‟s third term – which I consider to be his “first 
reappointment,” as well as his official reappointment in 2005. I will conclude the chapter by 
briefly looking forward to the future of the post of president of Tatarstan. 
 
Tenure 
First taking office on June 12, 1991, Shaimiev is one of the longest-serving governors 
in all of Russia. Even more impressive is the fact that he was elected to this post rather than 
relying on an official stamp of approval from Moscow. This lack of appointment can be 
viewed as evidence of his political might even before the Soviet Union formally dissolved. 
Of the remaining 10 governors reviewed in this paper who obtained their governorship in 
1991, Shaimiev is the only one who was did so through a process which involved at least the 
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trappings of popular legitimation – all the others were appointees.79 He received dominating 
tallies in the three elections that took place in the region in 1991, 1996, and 2001, in which 
he took 70.16 percent, 97.14 percent, and 79.52 percent of the vote, respectively. Thus 
Shaimiev was seemingly able to build up a substantial political network. This is confirmed 
by Kimitaka Matsuzato, who detailed a “caciquismo” political system in which Shaimiev 
leads an oligarchic apparatus that thrives off of a robust political machine. This system is one 
that weds appointment of “meso-elites” at the city and raion executive levels with their 
election to a seat in the regional legislature. In doing so, it provides Shaimiev with a means 
of verifying the political credentials of his appointments – in other words, their ability to 
create winning electoral campaigns. Failure to attract these votes and gain popular election to 
the legislature results in their dismissal from their executive duties as well. For those who are 
successful in gaining both offices, they are admitted to the republican oligarchy. Having 
created a successful political instrument, they are then expected to utilize that tool to 
mobilize (or block mobilization) upon Shaimiev‟s request. 80  The republican center is thus 
able to exert pressure over the federal center, which was just as true in 1993 with Yeltsin‟s 
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constitutional referendum
81
 as it was in 2000, when Shaimiev delivered 68.89 percent of the 
vote – the fifth highest total in all of Russia – to Putin. Not coincidentally, just four days 
before the election, Putin visited the republican capital of Kazan and lavished praise on 
Shaimiev: 
Today President Shaimiev proposed an absolutely acceptable variant of both inter-budgetary and 
federative relations; they are in line with the Russian state. I have already said, and will once again 
repeat, that the President of Tatarstan is one of the founders of the modern Russian state. He stood at 
the fountainhead of the formation of the Federation.82  
 
Shaimiev would remain a backer of Putin, delivering him 82.60 percent of the vote in the 
2004 presidential race.  
The vote totals are not the only evidence of machine politics. Nikolai Petrov‟s 
assessment of democratization in the regions in the ten year period from 1991 to 2001 is in 
agreement with a level of authoritarianism. Tatarstan ranks a less-than-inspiring 69
th 
of all 
regions in Russia. It is one of only six regions to get the minimal score in elite turnover, and 
had very low scores in such relevant categories as openness, free and fair elections, political 
pluralism, and local self-government.
83
 Finally, Tatarstan shares many of the same 
characteristics of a region that participated in “machine politics” by Henry E. Hale. Hale 
finds that a successful machine is the product of both Soviet legacies and gubernatorial 
characteristics. In Tatarstan, there are key similarities to a region with machine politics as 
described by Hale: in terms of legacy, Tatarstan has republic status, a substantial agricultural 
population, and a significant overall population. With regard to gubernatorial characteristics, 
its leader belongs to the titular ethnic group and has previous leadership experience in the 
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agriculture sector.
84
 To restate these findings, Shaimiev has been able to stay in office for an 
extraordinary lengthy of time, and has used that entrenchment to construct a political 
apparatus with which to exert pressure over the federal center. 
 
Regional Economy 
Both Matsuzato, and Mukharyamov and Mukharyamova have assessed Tatarstan‟s economy 
as being quite diverse. A review of the GRP by sector as well as the Hirfendahl Index bears 
this out. It ranked twenty-seventh most diverse of all regions, with a score of 1611.58. The 
top five sectors are Mineral Extraction (30.6 percent), Manufacturing Activity (16.7 percent), 
Wholesale and Retail Trade (11.7 percent), Construction (10.3 percent), and Agriculture, 
Game and Forestry (7.8 percent). With a GRP of 488,609.1 million rubles, it has the fifth 
largest economy in Russia after the two federal cities, the Moscow oblast, and the 
hydrocarbon-rich Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug. It ranks 15
th
 when GRP is adjusted 
per capita. It only rates 45
th
 in terms of the average wage – likely in part due to the 
agricultural sector. 
 
Enterprise Control 
A retention of significant shares of enterprises proved to be a very strong factor in 
improving the resistance of the republic to the federal center, as I have shown in the third 
chapter.
85
  Privatization in Russia proceeded unevenly; in the majority of cases it was 
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coordinated by the federal government though the State Property Committee 
(GosKomImushchestvo, or GKI), but in some instances, including Tatarstan, this authority 
was delegated to the regional administrations. In Tatarstan, the regional authorities did not 
divest themselves wholly of the property, instead retaining sizable control of “privatized” 
enterprises. Considering the enormous size of the economy as discussed in the preceding 
section, this meant that the regional authorities had considerable direct political leverage over 
the Russian economy as a whole. The precise extent of enterprise control is difficult to 
ascertain, but the regional government‟s dominance is evident. The figures provided by 
Radygin and Mal‟ginov for the 1993-1999 period position the republic as having the fifth 
highest total (36.8 percent) of the share of retained state enterprise control in Russia. This 
strong figure does not tell the full story, however, as the state also retained a “golden share” 
in another 31.4 percent of the created companies in the republic (second only to the 
neighboring Republic of Bashkortostan, which had a figure of 55.2 percent). In other words, 
68.2 percent of created enterprises were within the republic‟s control (second in total overall 
after Kabardino-Balkariya Republic (80.2 percent)). It should, of course, be emphasized that 
this covers only privatized enterprises, and not business start-ups or outside firms. This high 
figure compares favorably with the figure provided by Julia Kusznir, who writes that, 
[b]y introducing its own privatization vouchers and excluding regional companies from federal 
auctions, Tatarstan‟s administration secured control of the regional economy. In early 2000, about 65% 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
allowing the incumbent to remain – rather than declaring war on these regional executives and fighting for 
complete control of the regional economic apparatus. In doing so, the Kremlin not only reduces its costs but 
avoids the chance of losing some of this ground to Russian Big Business. Though this argument is not entirely 
invalid, it seems to be of secondary importance based on the findings of this paper. The Kremlin is interested in 
more than simply vote totals, particularly insofar as the Kremlin is not of a single institutional mindset but 
consists of competing clans and interests. The primary reason, I contend later in this chapter, that Tatneft has 
not been parceled out and sold to non-republican firms is the strong regional standing of the political leadership. 
See Turovsky, Rostislav, “The Influence of Russian Big Business on Regional Power: The Models and Political 
Consequences,” in Gill, Graeme, ed., Politics in the Russian Regions, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 
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of the region‟s wealth was under the control of the governing political elite, which thus also constituted 
the region‟s economic elite.86 
 
 Finally, in at least one important case in which a firm was privatized and sold off, the 
regional administration was still able to gain control. Solnick describes how the KamAz 
automotive factory was privatized and shares were sold to international investors. The 
regional government (in collusion with federal authorities) then reacquired blocking stakes in 
the firm (the government of Tatarstan actually did so on not one, but two occasions) and thus 
reduced the share of the international investor to just 11 percent.
87
 
 The main vehicle through which the republican government exercises control is the 
holding company Svyazinvestneftekhim, owned fully by the administration.  Within this 
company there are currently shares in 22 other firms, owning stakes ranging from 2.796 
percent of shares (the commercial bank Ak Bars) to 100 percent of the shares (the 
pharmaceutical company  Tatkhimfarmprepaty). Also within this portfolio are corporations 
in the chemical, energy, and telecommunications sectors. Perhaps most importantly, the 
republic controls 33.60 percent of the company Tatneft which produced about 5.1 percent of 
Russian total production in crude oil in 2007 (25 million tons).
88
 The company also 
participates in ventures outside the republic (both within Russia and abroad). The 
government presence is evident on the 15-member board of directors, as Kusznir observes. 
The composition has changed a bit since Kusznir wrote, but the same number of board 
members (five) concurrently hold seats in the Tatarstan republican government: the prime 
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minister (and chairman of Tatneft), the minister of land and property relations, the minister of 
finance, and the advisor to the president on mineral resources, oil and gas, and the head of the 
department on issues of the oil-gas complex of the cabinet ministry of the RT.
89
 Though the 
majority of the company may be owned by ostensibly non-governmental actors, the “golden 
share” provision allots to the regional government more corporate control than its voting 
stock would normally confer based on percentages alone.
 90
 The republic has not been loath 
to use the corporate enterprise to political ends, as at least two cases illustrate. In the first 
instance, the company forgave a loan to a state-run company and issued two other loans to 
state enterprises, in one case at no interest and in the other at a .01 percent interest rate. This 
led to one investment group analyst to warn that, “The relationship between Tatneft and 
Tatarstan has traditionally been incestuous and it is likely to continue to be so.”91 And in a 
less serious vain, the company-sponsored Ak Bars Kazan hockey club decided to take 
advantage of the 2004-2005 National Hockey League lockout to assemble an all-star roster – 
with a supposed payroll of $50 million (for reference, the NHL salary cap the following 
season was $39 million).
92
  Their mission, as was any team‟s goal, was to win the 
championship cup, but in this case it was special, as it was meant to coincide with the 
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millennial anniversary of the founding of Kazan, and the accompanying celebration for 
which the capital city had been renovated for several years. The team reached finished fourth 
and promptly lost in the first round of the playoffs. 
 The point of this, of course, is not to bemoan excessive spending on free agents in 
hockey. It is to illustrate how economic control can be (mis-)used to the political aims and 
benefit of the regional political elite. In Tatarstan this is clearly the case. Bashkortostan‟s 
energy giant, Bashneft came under fire from the federal government for just this reason. In 
that region, President Murtaza Rakhimov‟s son Ural controlled a significant stake in the firm, 
but after a battle with federal officials, Bashneft is in the process of being forced out of the 
younger Rakhimov‟s hands, despite his efforts to have it parceled out into “charitable 
foundations.”93 This assertion by the federal government is currently being met with 
resistance by the region and it is not clear at this point the extent to which the federal courts 
can (or will) enforce their decision.
94
 Both the larger size of Tatneft and the fact that its 
ownership was distributed amongst a combination of regional political elite, regional 
business interests, and international investors probably account for the failure by the federal 
government to do the same in the republic. To conclude, Shaimiev exerts substantial control 
over a major regional economy, and in doing so, he possesses an important bargaining chip 
in any dealings with the federal center. 
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Republic Status 
As cited in Matsuzato, Indus Tagilov observed that “republics are not mere 
administrative units but cells of culture and traditions.”95 Tatarstan is the “homeland” of the 
Tatar nationality, despite the fact that only approximately 36 percent of Tatars reside there. 
Nevertheless, they constitute nearly 53 percent of the residents of the republic (compared to a 
39.5 percent share for ethnic Russians).
96
 This large Tatar population, taken together with a 
Soviet tradition of promoting ethnic minorities to leadership positions within autonomous 
regions, has led to a situation in which Tatar influence is amplified, as Julia Kusznir 
describes: 
About 90 percent of the regional elite was recruited from the Soviet nomenklatura, with 60 percent of 
top politicians even retaining the same positions that they already had during the Soviet era. According 
to a study of ruling groups in Tatarstan, ethnic Tatars made up 80 percent of the governing elite in 
2003. The majority of ruling politicians was of rural descent, between 40 and 60 years old, and had 
completed a degree in higher education, mainly in the agricultural sector.97 
 
Yet, this privileged genesis for the Tatar elite did not translate into the same drive for 
national independence as it did elsewhere.  As Matsuzato writes, “Tatar official nationalism 
is not based on a national liberation model. Rather it tries to affect Russia‟s state building as 
a legitimate historical component.”98 Shaimiev‟s actions during the early 1990s, then, did not 
constitute the same sort of threat as Chechnya in the eyes of the Kremlin.  The mainline 
politicians in Tatarstan, including Shaimiev, sought as their ultimate goal a bilateral treaty 
rather than simply being incorporated by the multilateral Federal Treaties as just another 
ordinary subject. To the extent that there was some separatism in the region, it was restrained 
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by Shaimiev.
99
 Put simply, Tatarstan‟s elite were content to remain within the Russian 
Federation, but wanted to be treated differently from ordinary oblasts. Their demands, as well 
as their threats, were sufficiently restrained that given their strong bargaining position and the 
weakness of the federal center in the early 1990s, they were able to obtain the maximum 
level of autonomy. A series of bilateral agreements concluded in early 1994 were unique at 
that point in the country‟s history. Though there has been some debate as to the real 
significance of the treaties themselves,
100
 the two parties were treated as mutually consenting 
equals rather than as superior and subaltern: the delegation of authority was between the 
organs of state power of the RF and the RT; the quartet of signatories consisted of the 
presidents and premiers of the two entities. Furthermore, the final text of the treaty spoke to 
the republic‟s unique juridical standing, with the preamble stating that the treaty is agreed to 
considering that: 
…the Republic of Tatarstan as a state united (gosudarstvo ob’edinena101) with the Russian Federation 
by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, and 
agreements on the delineation of subjects of competencies and mutual delegation of authority between 
organs of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state power of the Republic of Tatarstan, 
engaging in international and foreign economic relations, agree to the following…102 
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This special status was further confirmed by Aleksei Vashchenko, described as an expert on 
international affairs, who rejected the “state united with the Russian Federation” passage, 
exclaiming that this was “on the whole, a terrible phrase,” and that the significance of it was 
that “there are two states – there is the Russian Federation, there is Tatarstan, and they have 
concluded between them alliance obligation.”103  In sum, the republic was awarded powers 
that were well outside the jurisdictional scopes of all other Russian regions at the time. Given 
these better terms, this obviously created an incentive for other regions to follow suit, and 
indeed dozens did just this.  
After coming to power, Putin took aim at these sorts of bilateral agreements on the 
whole; yet in the summer of 2007, he signed just such a document, once again, with 
Tatarstan. This time, the economic, resource, and foreign privileges in the 1994 treaty were 
not present; it was, from the RT‟s point of view, a weaker agreement. Nevertheless, it was 
exceptional, as it accorded special status to the republic. And there remained some notable 
concessions in terms of the republic‟s political uniquity. Citizens would carry the standard 
internal passport of the RF, but they would also be permitted to include a Tatarstan passport 
“insert” as well. Tatarstan was not recognized by Moscow as having sovereignty, but the 
republic was still labeled a “state” (gosudarstvo) which possessed “full state authority 
beyond the competence of the Russian Federation.”104 These may have been largely symbolic 
gestures, but they were not small concessions coming from Putin. There was one other 
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interesting article of the treaty, which applies directly to the subject this paper is concerned 
with: the office of the president of Tatarstan. Article 2, point 5, provides that: 
For nominees to fill the highest executive office of the Republic of Tatarstan, introduced in accordance 
with the procedure stipulated by the federal law, an additional requirement is established, stipulating 
competency in the state languages of the Republic of Tatarstan. The competence in the state languages 
of the Republic of Tatarstan is established in a declarative way.105  
 
In other words, the president of Tatarstan must be proficient in both Russian and Tatar. 
Given that a very low number of ethnic Russians speak Tatar, this effectively blocks a 
Varangian candidate from entering on the job following Shaimiev‟s presidency.  
 
Shaimiev’s “Two Reappointments” 
 Shaimiev, as I have noted, has enlisted Putin‟s help twice in retaining his office. 
Though only the latter instance is technically an appointment, the first was essentially an 
appointment as well, since by the letter of the law, Shaimiev should have been forced to step 
down. This arose from the fact that the federal government passed a law limiting all 
governors to two terms in 1999. However, it was not clear in the accepted text of the law 
whether or not it applied retroactively or not.
106
 Shaimiev had at this point been elected 
twice. As a result, if he wanted to retain his seat, it was necessary to undertake some political 
maneuvering through which to circumvent the legislation. Mukharyamov and 
Mukharyamova provide a detailed recreation of the events that followed. Initially, the first 
two attempts to amend the federal law to clarify that the term limit should start not from the 
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initial point of election, but after the law‟s 1999 induction met with failure. The third effort, 
on October 29, 2000, which actually consisted of not one, not two, but three votes, was 
successful. The first vote failed. Deputy Vladimir Zhirinovsky called for a revote, but it once 
again failed, this time by three votes. Fate would intervene, however, as a “computer glitch” 
permitted a third vote. In the interim, deputies spilled out into the lobby, where they were 
met by Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov. Miraculously, the 
number of deputies in support of the amendment immediately shot from 223 to 282. 
Shaimiev could stand again for not just a third, but a fourth term (this point was rendered 
moot by the shift to the appointment system). The consequence of doing this, however, was 
that the law applied to all heads of administration, and thus nearly 20 other governors, who 
would have automatically been cashiered, were given new political life.
107
 Thus, it appears 
that Putin was willing to pay a substantial price to aid Shaimiev.  
 Shaimiev‟s third term was set to expire in the spring of 2006; yet he appeared before 
Putin a full year early to ask for his vote of confidence. In doing so, he was just the 12
th
 
governor to put an appointment decision before Putin, and set a precedent for other leaders to 
submit to Putin. As Aleksei Titkov of the Carnegie Moscow Center said when questioned on 
Putin‟s motivations: 
I believe from Putin's side, there was a very strong desire to have such a strong regional leader as 
Shaimiev set an example for other regional heads on how to transfer to the new system of relationship 
with the federal authority," Titkov said. "Because so far, the first 10 governors who got or, in a few 
cases, didn't get reappointed as governors were either weak politicians with unstable positions in their 
regions who simply wanted to secure themselves [by getting the president's support] or those whose 
term was about to expire.108 
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Interestingly, Shaimiev claimed that he was content to retire, but he remained at Putin‟s 
request to guarantee stability.
109
 Normally, this could be seen as simple political bluster, 
particularly in comparisons to governors like Dmitrii Ayatskov of the Saratovskaya Oblast, 
who made a similar claim. Yet, in this instance, there may well be some substance to it, since 
Putin had been on relatively good terms with a leader who operates a robust political 
machine in a region with substantial economic concerns and a large ethnic population that 
has been privileged in the halls of government. Indeed, there appears to be at least one other 
instance in which Putin successfully “convinced” a governor to remain in office despite his 
intentions to the contrary. Roman Abramovich of the Chukotskii AO had signaled his intent 
to leave the position;
110
 he was reappointed by Putin anyway. The reason for this was 
relatively straightforward: it kept Abramovich and his wealth, at least partially in service of 
Russia, rather than of the United Kingdom, where he owned substantial property holdings. 
As Andrew Osborn wrote in The Independent: 
He has tried politics, and it is not for him," a source close to the oligarch told The Independent on 
Sunday. But the $1.5bn his staff say he has ploughed into the remote area has transformed its 
infrastructure and standard of living - a recent poll found that 20 percent of the locals viewed him as "a 
god."111 
 
In this light, Shaimiev may well have remained in part due to Putin‟s desire. Even if this was 
not the case, however, it still suggests an exercise in collusion with the federal center, since 
to do so technically required Shaimiev to resign prematurely and then be “appointed.” If 
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Shaimiev did not believe that he could trust Putin to reappoint him, he would have no 
incentive to effectively forfeit the final full year of his tenure. 
 
Looking Ahead 
One other point remains: Tatarstan after Shaimiev. If he remains in power until the 
expiration of his fourth term, this will likely mark a new period in Tatarstan‟s leadership.  At 
that point he will be 73 years of age and it is not clear whether he would face a new battle 
due to term limits. Article 91, point 5 of the Constitution of Tatarstan states that, “One and 
the same person may not be elected (or “selected?”) to the position of president of Tatarstan 
more than two terms in a row.”112 Due to the vagaries of the language employed (the term  
“elected” and “selected” (izbran) are one and the same in Russian political literature and the 
new laws on appointing governors), the kinds of tactics Russian political figures have used in 
the past (including in Tatarstan), and the strong standing of Shaimiev, it is not clear just what 
this means. Assuming however, that Shaimiev does decide to step aside – or is forced to step 
down for health considerations – he is well-situated to have significant input into who his 
successor is, based on his influence as well as the language competency provision that the 
president of RT must possess. This will be the final testament to Shaimiev‟s power, as it may 
demand a pacted transition, rather than simply installing a “Varangian.” In the past, some 
governors have been able to effectively select successors in addition to determining their own 
fate – two of the highest profile examples of this are Evgenii Nazdratenko of the Primorskii 
Krai and Mikhail Nikolaev of the Republic of Sakha-Yakutiya. Nazdratenko was “bought 
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out” of his seat by Putin with the post of head of the State Fisheries Committee (and later, 
when he wore out his welcome at this job, the title of deputy head of the Security Council).
113
 
Nazdratenko‟s deputy served as acting governor, and was then followed by Sergei Dar‟kin, 
with Nazdratenko‟s backing won the seat in 2001.114 Nikolaev was able to select as his 
successor, Vyacheslav Shtyrov, the chairman of Alrosa (the government-held diamond-
extracting powerhouse in Sakha, which Nikolaev himself had previously led) – over the 
preferred Kremlin candidate, and was thereafter appointed to the Federation Council, 
apparently against the Kremlin‟s wishes.115 One of the benefits of the new system of 
appointing governs has been reducing the costs for the center in terms of the “buy-out” (with 
a position on the State Council commission, which is discussed in fuller detail in the next 
chapter) rather than a plum position from which to pillage and wreak havoc such as 
Nazdratenko‟s, while at the same time reducing the influence that ex-governors can retain in 
their region by tapping successors. Shaimiev may be the first real exception to this inability 
of a governor to select his successor: it will be interesting to see what sort of succession 
processes surrounds the “strong” governor-types as whole in the coming years. Though the 
Presidential Administration can undermine this process by offering jobs elsewhere to 
members of regional heavyweights‟ staffs, it can only remove some of the strongest protégés 
(and possible successors) – not all of them. 
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Conclusion 
I have show that Shaimiev is a “strong” governor. His strong regional standing has 
insulated him from the being removed, despite the fact that his region is one that would be a 
very lucrative entity to take control over. The region has retained substantial control over 
enterprises, it has the interwoven factors of regional autonomy and ethnic diversity, and its 
leader is one whose tenure as regional executive predates the Russian Federation itself, which 
has allowed for the construction of a dominating political machine. It remains to be seen 
what will happen to Tatarstan once Shaimiev steps aside, but it is likely that he will have a 
major role in shaping the selection of his successor. This situation is in contrast to the next 
case study, in which the incumbent governor possessed only moderate strength, and had to 
surrender his post – though at a cost to the federal center.
CHAPTER 5 
 
REJECTIONS, INSURRECTIONS, AND RESURRECTIONS 
 
THE SARATOVSKAYA OBLAST & DMITRII FEDOROVICH AYATSKOV 
 
 
 
 
 
“It’s difficult to break Lukashenka, very difficult. He has very firm footing. Of course, he needs to get a hold 
of himself and realize that Russia is Russia, Belarus is Belarus, Putin is Putin, and Lukashenka is 
Lukashenka. And in no case should he pout, and say that he has worked there for a long time and that 
someone should run errands for him.”  
 
– Ayatskov, prior to his departure to Minsk 
as Russia’s ambassador to Belarus116 
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 Based on his attendance at the 1998 G-8 Summit, Dmitri Ayatskov is known outside 
of Russia for two things. He was introduced by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to his 
American counterpart, Bill Clinton as the future president of Russia. And, following his 
encounter with Clinton, he was so impressed with this “cool guy,” that he remarked to 
journalists, “I envy Monica Lewinsky.”117 These two incidents, one sober yet positive, the 
other outlandish and lacking real substance, nicely sum up Ayatskov‟s nine years in office. 
They also speak to the middle-tiered standing Ayatskov received in the four-point 
Vulnerability Index. Ayatskov‟s negative characteristics were many: his comments were 
legendary, his performance left something to be desired, and he was a Yeltsin-era official at a 
time when it was not fashionable to be so. Yet, he was also a savvy politician, governed a 
region with a strong regional economy, and had managed to evade prosecution efforts.  
Based on these mid-range scores, Ayatskov was a “pacted” governor in my model. 
He was rated at two points on the basis of his region‟s substantial economy and his long 
tenure.  He also had liabilities: he did not govern in a region with significant ethnic 
considerations and his regional government did not retain substantial enterprise control in the 
post-Soviet privatizations. I will begin by briefly discussing each of these four points with 
more specificity to the Saratovskaya Oblast and Ayatskov. This constitutes the first portion 
of this chapter. Having then outlined why Ayatskov was rendered vulnerable to federal 
intervention, I will then address why Ayatskov was rejected by the Putin administration, 
since vulnerability does not necessitate dismissal in and of itself as demonstrated by many 
other cases. Finally, I will cover the “buy-out package” that Ayatskov received. His case is 
one that illustrates either the sorts of potential threats that strong ex-governors may pose or 
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the assets they may put to use for the administration. In either instance, they thus require 
settlements rather than unceremonious ouster. In the course of this chapter, a picture of the 
region in a broader focus will emerge as well, showing how chaotic and contentious politics 
at the regional level can still be in Russia. 
 
Regional Economy  
 Saratovskaya Oblast, situated in the Volga Federal District and lying on the border 
with Kazakhstan, possesses one of the stronger economies as a whole in terms of gross 
regional product (GRP) in Russia, ranked 28
th
 in 2005. On the other hand, it also had a per 
capita GRP figure that was well under both Federation and Federal District standards. It 
ranked 53
rd
 in this category, with a figure of 64,634 rubles per person; the Volga district 
average, which ranked higher than only the Southern Federal District, had a figure of 92,055 
rubles per capita, while the country as a whole had an average of 125, 773.7 rubles per 
capita. The average wage paid out was also relatively low compared to other regions: it 
ranked 65
th
 with an average monthly wage of 5439.3 rubles; this positioned it below the 
averages of all federal districts and the country as a whole. In reviewing Hirfendahl Index 
scores, which measure concentration of the economy by sector, Saratovskaya Oblast has the 
seventh lowest score of all Russian regions, which means it has one of the most diversified 
economies by sector. In fact, of the lowest eight scores, only two regions managed to retain 
their governor. This would suggest that having an extremely diversified economy may fuel 
alternative bases of power from which to oppose the incumbent. In a case such as 
Saratovskaya Oblast with a strong economy, this would seem to amplify the incentives for 
striving to take over the incumbent‟s seat.  The economy, then, was fairly strong, but was 
spread across many sectors and thus allowed for many alternate bases of support to exist. 
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Tenure 
 Ayatskov‟s tenure was another strong suit. Tenure can be thought of as a strong 
measure of both the incumbent‟s ability to build a political support network as well as his 
ability to navigate political crises successfully. He was appointed by then-President Boris 
Yeltsin in April of 1996, and then elected to office in March of 2000. Thus, at the point of his 
appointment decision in March of 2005, Ayatskov had approximately 106 months of 
experience in the governor‟s seat (28th longest of the reviewed governors in this paper). It 
should also be noted that in another measure – election results – Ayatskov returned a very 
strong tally: 67.32 percent of the total in 2000, compared to just 9.66 percent for his nearest 
competitor, Igor Karaulov. As a result of this majority, a second round of voting was not 
required. Voting totals, of course, can be problematic measures of actual popular support; 
after all, vote totals can be the result of a muscular political machine that coerces the 
populace to vote favorably or they can be falsified outright. As far as this project is 
concerned, however, whether vote tallies accurately reflected the will of the people or not is 
not crucial as it is nevertheless a testament to the governor‟s ability to maintain political 
control. Ayatskov was thus a) genuinely popular, b) in control of a robust political apparatus, 
or c) capable of retaining the allegiance of sufficiently powerful authorities to falsify the vote 
on his behalf – all of which speak to his strength as a political figure.  
 
Republic Status  
 The Saratovskaya Oblast lacked republic-level status in the Russian Federation. It has 
neither a history of strong regional autonomy nor a significant minority population: the top 
three ethnic minority constituencies are Kazakhs (2.93 percent), Ukrainians (2.52 percent), 
and Tatars (2.16 percent). Thus, though it shares an external border with Kazakhstan, it 
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nevertheless is dominated by ethnic Russians, a group that constituted 85.94 percent of the 
region‟s population.118 
 
Enterprise Control 
Regarding state enterprise control, the region simply did not retain high stakes in state 
enterprises during the main privatization period of 1993-1999. Liberal policies seem to have 
prevailed in the region. For instance, land liberalization took place during Ayatskov‟s tenure, 
in 1997, which permitted the purchase and sale of land parcels for the first time (particularly 
important in a region where agriculture, at 15.4 percent of total GRP, was the second leading 
sector after manufacturing activity).
119
 
 
The Pitfalls Facing a Middling Governor: Ayatskov’s Replacement 
As I have noted earlier, obtaining a low score on the Vulnerability Index is necessary 
for the center to remove a governor but it does not compel this action. After all, there are 
other possible reasons to keep a weak governor in place: personal loyalty, shared political 
views, or good performance in certain areas that are important policy goals for the 
presidential administration. Furthermore, weak governors would seem to be more open to 
manipulation from the federal level of government. So, the question regarding Ayatskov is 
thus: why was he not reappointed to office? In this case, I argue it is likely the result of a pair 
of factors. First and foremost, he cultivated powerful enemies at the federal level. Secondly, 
his performance and behavior as governor left something to be desired.  
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 In retrospect it certainly seems Ayatskov made crucial mistakes in his personnel 
decisions – an error that he of all people should not have made since he obtained his office 
largely by undermining his own boss, the then-vice-governor of Saratovskaya Oblast.
120
 He 
made not one, but two appointments that potentially figured in his demise. In fact, two 
current vice speakers of the State Duma are former vice governors of Saratovskaya Oblast: 
Vyacheslav Volodin and Lyubov Sliska, both of whom were “exiled” to Moscow by 
Ayatskov. Volodin is also the secretary of the presidium of United Russia (ER). Both were 
said to be interested in leading the region, and Volodin in particular exercised considerable 
control in the region. According to one newspaper account announcing Pavel Ipatov‟s 
appointment to governor, Volodin was cited as one of the leading candidates to succeed 
Ayatskov. Indeed, he apparently began his “campaign” some time earlier, if not in 
participating in the attempts to prosecute Ayatskov, then in May of 2004, when he cut the 
regional branch of ER out from underneath of Ayatskov by filling the party conference with 
his own supporters.
121
 However, in February 2006, just a few weeks before the appointment 
decision was made public, he lamented that his party would not “let him go into governing,” 
since, it pleaded, he was needed in the Duma. A newspaper piece cites sources in the 
Presidential Administration and the Duma as saying the non-appointment was rather less 
theatrical: Volodin had simply changed his mind.
122
  Another explanation simply may be that 
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Volodin did not have a sufficiently close relationship with Putin personally.
123
 To make 
matters even worse, Ayatskov appeared to alienate a substantial portion of his legislature 
when he tried to ram through a new slate of regional political appointees, causing several 
deputies to pledge their support for Volodin should he seek the gubernatorial post.
124
 Once 
vulnerable due to the new powers accrued by the center, it was only a matter of time before 
Ayatskov would be confronted.  
 Yet for all his weakness, Ayatskov was something of a survivor – he had successfully 
fended off one of the most overt tactics used by political opponents – the criminal inquiry. In 
fact, it was not only Ayatskov who has been targeted by the prosecutor‟s office, but his wife 
as well on another occasion. The true source of these attacks may never be fully known – and 
the list of people with whom Ayatskov conflicted is substantial – but as one publication 
noted, it‟s hardly likely that there was not, at the very least, tacit federal approval of the 
action, since such an important political position was involved. Regardless of the source of 
the attacks or the strength of the case against him, what is noteworthy is that Ayatskov was 
not forced out via this method, but possessed sufficient political standing to retain his post.
125
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A Region Divided 
Saratovskaya Oblast, at what should have been the apex of centralization of power in 
Putin‟s Russia, remained a region of political fragmentation, both between federal and 
regional levels of government, as well as within what was ostensibly the party of power, ER. 
In the first case, for instance, just last year a conflict over hunting rights led to a situation that 
was nothing short of bizarre, with competing regional and federal agencies issuing their own 
permits, fining holders of the other‟s permits for failing to hold proper documentation, and 
declaring open season on different game: woe to the poor hunter who wanted to pursue wild 
boar with a license from the regional agency; with the purchase of a license from the federal 
agency, however, he was wished ni pukha, ni pera and sent on his merry way.
126
 Such a 
situation illustrates a serious problem faced in Russia today with ill-defined delineations of 
power. In the second type of conflict, there arose fractures within United Russia, as will be 
discussed below. This confused and fluctuating environment provides a fascinating backdrop 
to Ayatskov‟s return to politics.   
Having been deprived of his office, Ayatskov now faced the prospects of finding a 
new place of employment. The Presidential Administration sought to avoid ousting Ayatskov 
outright because of the considerable influence he still wielded. As a result, shortly after his 
request for the president‟s nomination to the governorship was rejected, Ayatskov was 
appointed as the new ambassador to Belarus, which was no small consolation prize.  
Unfortunately for Ayatskov, however, his outlandish behavior would soon cost him this job 
as well. Speaking prior to his departure to Minsk, Ayatskov issued statements attacking 
Aleksandr Lukashenka personally, as the reader will recall from this chapter‟s epigraph. 
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Lukashenka, for his part, was irritated for obvious reasons, and notified Moscow that Belarus 
would not accept Ayatskov as the new ambassador. At this point, Ayatskov found himself 
out of work.
127
 
 The unemployment of their former governor was a boon to the rumor columns of the 
Saratovskaya press. There were repeated predictions as to where Ayatskov would land a new 
job. At various points he was said to be on the verge of being sent to Moscow as a member of 
the Federation Council representing some Far Eastern region (sometimes specified as the 
Amurskaya oblast),
128
 at others he was said to soon be appointed as an aide in the 
Presidential Administration or a deputy presidential representative to a federal district,
129
 and 
was even mentioned to be considered for the rector of the regional college.
130
 Yet Ayatskov 
apparently remained out of the sphere of officialdom for the next year and a half. On one 
hand, it appeared that the former governor had fallen on hard times. His opponents claimed 
he had split up with his wife and that he spent his time repairing roofs. Ayatskov for his part 
claimed to occupy his time with more scholarly pursuits, writing a book and giving 
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lectures,
131
 while confessing that he had, in fact, done a bit home remodeling – but only for 
himself and the mother of his main rival, Volodin (the balcony on Volodin‟s neighboring 
apartment constituted such an eyesore, that Ayatskov felt compelled to help, according to his 
account). In the same interview, he also saw fit to share this bit of information with the 
journalist: he had actually been offered his old job once again, but unfortunately, he had to 
turn down this offer since he was beyond that point in his political career – and besides 
people would likely view his return more negatively than positively.
132
 Whatever the case 
may have been, it seems he was still involved sufficiently in regional politics to irritate his 
opponents. Ayatskov answered a question regarding his fate with this response:  “I am 
grateful to President Putin that he did not appoint me to the next term as governor of the 
oblast. I shall always remain the first and only popularly elected governor of the 
Saratovskaya Oblast.”133   
In spite of his loss of one federal post, Ayatskov was set to return to the political 
scene with another federal appointment. Before discussing this new position in fuller detail, it 
is worth examining the political environment in the region in the two years between 
Ayatskov‟s ouster and his second federal appointment, since it is important to explaining 
why a seemingly beaten and irrelevant ex-governor was activated for political service. There 
are three possible reasons why the Kremlin would offer a new post to Ayatskov. The first 
explanation, that Boris Yeltsin interceded on his “old friend” Ayatskov‟s behalf is not 
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convincing since Yeltsin had become politically irrelevant and suffered from ill health – and 
would, in fact, die just three weeks after Ayatskov‟s second federal appointment.134 The other 
two possibilities, both of them revolving Ayatskov‟s role in United Russia‟s disintegration in 
Saratovskaya Oblast, are more realistic, but it is not possible to discern which one is more 
accurate. The first variant holds that such a decision was made in light of the threat to the 
Kremlin‟s policy preferences that Ayatskov could pose. The second possibility is that such a 
decision could have been undertaken due to his experience and connections, and thus it was 
wise to enlist him to serve the Kremlin. Regardless of whether this was a forced decision or a 
willful choice on behalf of Moscow, it nevertheless fully supports the notion that Ayatskov 
retained substantial political authority in the region, with or without his executive seat, and 
thus merited a pacted transition type, rather than an unceremonious dumping. I will now 
discuss the two variants in fuller detail, since they provide some critical understanding as to 
the motives behind the appointment – which reflect the ex-governor‟s political power – and 
only then turn to discussing the new post specifically. 
In the first scenario, it can be suggested that Ayatskov made trouble for Moscow. 
Ayatskov appears to have been involved in stirring up dissent at the regional level in late 
2006, in what one journalist referred to with the title of “The Saratovskii Insurrection” in 
October of that year.
135
 In a November 16 online conference sponsored by a business 
consulting firm, in which Internet users submitted questions to Ayatskov, he claimed that 
while in his opinion there was real opposition to Moscow in the oblast legislature, he did not 
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have anything to do with the defections. 
136
 Just a few days earlier, he told a journalist that he 
had not been offered a proposition to lead a unified opposition on the regional level, but he 
would consider any such offer. He added “…I will help the leader of Rodina, Vladimir 
Pozharov, regardless of the fact that I myself am a member of United Russia.” After all, he 
said, “all wise people will leave the regional branch of United Russia. And I don‟t discount 
that they will join Rodina.”137  Rodina would, in fact, eventually merge with other parties 
into Just Russia (SR).  As Olga Popova wrote in Ekspert, the demarche announcing the split 
was “in part (or in full) explained by the fact that three of the named deputies were close to 
former governor of the Saratovskaya Oblast, Dmitri Ayatskov” – one of whom, Vladimir 
Titaev, was his brother-in-law.
138
 Popova went on to note that two of the disgruntled deputies 
had lost seats in regional government corporations since Ipatov came to power. What 
Ayatskov appears to have done then, is made use of his ties to beneficiaries of the old regime 
who had reason to revolt against the new powers-that-be.  Indeed, this “centralization” of 
power by Moscow actually initiated a process of fragmentation at the regional and capital 
levels. Where before there stood an overwhelming United Russia majority, power was 
diffused so that opposition parties constituted nearly half the deputy‟s posts.139 
The second scenario has Ayatskov leading the charge on behalf of nascent Just 
Russia, the Kremlin‟s left-wing party of choice. This would be of particular value, since it 
would not only potentially increase the seats available to pro-Kremlin parties, but it would 
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concurrently erode the support of the few non- Kremlin parties that remained.  Since the 
oblast was in Russia‟s “rust belt” of industry and had a significant agricultural base, these 
conditions meant that voters were more left-leaning than in other regions of Russia and, as 
such, a left-wing pro-Moscow party would be more appealing to these groups. Such an 
assumption is borne out by a review of previous regional legislative elections. As recently as 
1999, the Communist Party (KPRF) was the leading vote getter in the region with 30.4 
percent of the vote, as compared with the 22.7 percent share the runner-up, Unity, received. 
In 2003, the KPRF‟s share shrank dramatically (as it did throughout Russia) but it still 
received a respectable 16.8 percent of the vote. The 2007 elections resulted in the KPRF‟s 
share dwindling even further to 12.34 percent, and the newly founded SR taking in 9.19 
percent at the expense of the KPRF (and aided by the abolition of the “against all” candidates 
option that voters had previously been allowed to use as a protest). Though seemingly paltry 
– certainly in relation to ER‟s 64.81 percent – this figure was nevertheless significant.140 Not 
only did SR‟s vote tally move a few more seats out of the KPRF‟s column, but it did so after 
the party was essentially officially abandoned by Putin‟s choice to lead ER‟s ticket. In sum, 
by building up SR in the Saratovskaya Oblast, the Kremlin would effectively be giving itself 
greater political control – and it was all the better that this benefit would come directly at the 
expense of the KPRF.   
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Ayatskov Ascendant 
Initially the defections appear to have worked out well for both the individuals and 
party itself. The ranks of SR swelled to nine members (of the 35-member Oblast Duma), and 
as late as the end of October 2007, the party seemed to be doing well. The authors of one 
article wrote that the status of SR in Saratovskaya Oblast was unique in Russia. In spite of 
the fact that the federal level party was providing minimal support to its regional offices, the 
Saratovskaya office was thriving: it had theretofore avoided intra-party divisions and had 
enlisted the support of some important regional business figures. And in the background of 
these newfound gains, rumors –but no evidence – of Ayatskov‟s involvement were 
present.
141
 The previous July, the regional press spoke of Ayatskov as a real power broker in 
the region, at the center of attempts to reconcile departed party members. One newspaper 
wrote of Ayatskov being “paid his due” since he was influential on the decision of two of the 
deputies; another opined that Ayatskov “remained one of the key players in the political 
scene of the oblast; moreover, he was a more predictable, strategically rational, and desirable 
player for the federal center than local clans and groups, which were too easily given to 
arranging and carrying out only mercenary aims.”142 Though SR was still inferior in number 
to 18 deputies on ER‟s part, it was nevertheless no small feat for a party which had not 
officially existed just a few months previously – this essentially positioned the party within a 
few defections of robbing ER of its majority in the legislature. Yet, it would soon end in 
shambles.  
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The regional elections, postponed from March of 2007 to December of that year for 
“technical reasons,” such as failure to pass electoral laws with sufficient haste, would deal an 
overwhelming defeat to SR – and all other opposition parties as well: 19 seats grew to 32 for 
ER; SR and KPRF each received a paltry pair of seats.  Part of this may well have been the 
lack of federal party support, as well as Putin‟s effective disavowal of SR when he agreed to 
headline ER‟s party list, but regional bickering seems to have shifted its focus as well. A 
battle between Volodin on one side, and Sliska and Ipatov on the other, concluded with 
Volodin losing some ground as well as a key ally in a regional leadership position.
143
 
Volodin had also managed to lose a comrade-in-arms in the federal inspector, Viktor 
Budylev, who was replaced by a “clean federal” (that is, he supposedly had no regional 
connections or interests), Pavel Grishin. As the same article notes, the Saratovskaya elite by 
this time had effectively split into three factions: Volodinites, Ipatovites, and the opposition, 
which included the members of SR and KPRF (and who, according to the author, were not 
unlikely to bloc with Ipatov in some votes).
144
 An Ipatov ally took the job as the head of the 
executive committee of ER in Saratovskaya Oblast, and as such increased the power of Ipatov, 
who just two years previously was an enterprise manager, not a politician. This in turn meant 
there was a sufficiently strong governor now in place to rally around, and as such it seems 
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ER‟s power increased dramatically.145 Put briefly, politics in the Saratovskaya Oblast were 
not politics as usual.
 146
 Ayatskov, at the very least, was able to exploit a volatile political 
situation in Saratovskaya Oblast – if not drive it himself. 
Whatever the case may have been, all of this culminated in Ayatskov being offered 
another federal appointment the following spring of 2007 – which certainly did not sit well 
with some figures. Sliska saw fit to scold Ayatskov:  “He doesn‟t need to go to extremes, he 
doesn‟t need to occupy himself with populism that‟s no longer serious at this age.” The same 
piece cited an unidentified “colleague” of Ayatskov as issuing a more scathing reaction: 
“You remember: first he closed the sobering-up stations, then he declared prostitution legal, 
then he proposed to build a business center on an island in the middle of the Volga and an 
airstrip for large planes. It‟s plain that these are boys‟ fantasies. But for a man in the state 
service to do such things is simply frivolous.”147  In early April of 2007, the former governor 
was appointed to the Consultative Commission to the State Council of the Russian 
Federation (CCSCRF) that had been formed by a presidential decree less than two months 
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earlier.
148
 Little concerning the new body‟s tasks or goals is outlined in the ukaz; the order 
simply states that the body was created 
…for the rendering of consultative assistance to members of the State Council, presidium of the State 
Council on questions, included in the plan of operation of the State Council, a consultative commission 
of the State Council is formed. The personnel composition of the consultative commission of the State 
Council is determined by the President of the Russian Federation. By decision of the President of the 
Russian Federation, in the composition of the consultative commission of the State Council may be 
included persons having experience in public (state or social) activities. Members of the consultative 
commission of the State Council participate in the work of the State Council. Members of the 
consultative commission of the State Council participate in its work on a pro bono or paid basis.149 
 
The level of actual political influence the body may have at the federal level of government is 
in probably minimal and Ayatskov is but one of several former governors who sit on this 
commission. The CCSCRF is an advisory body, not binding the government to in any way, 
shape, or implement the policy prescriptions of the ex-governors. Yet, the positions are 
nevertheless beneficial to their holders in a few key ways. First and foremost, the posts keep 
the former governors politically active, giving them the prospect of continuing and/or 
elevating their political careers in the future. It is after all, an official title, granting access to 
political elites (in Moscow no less). This potentially gives them access to a different set of 
officials, in addition to those regional and local officials with whom they had worked in the 
past. In other words, it allows them to “keep their irons in the fire,” and provides them with 
hope for the future. Additionally, and importantly to some governors, it provides a set of 
material benefits. According to media reporting, this consists of a modest salary 
(approximately 6,000 rubles per month), a car and driver, and perhaps most importantly, an 
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office on Staraya Ploshchad‟ in central Moscow.150 For his part, the ever flamboyant 
Ayatskov responded to his appointment with an exclamation to the press that he was willing 
to work for free since he was not really interested in privileges or financial compensation.
151
 
A few months later it seems he had changed his mind. He told a newspaper that he not only 
received a modest salary but “bonuses” as well, which served to inflate his salary to 
approximately the same amount he had earned as governor.
152
 In sum, the positions the 
former governors received appear to be fairly minor. Even if the roles played by the 
commission are inconsequential, it nevertheless serves as a pacted exit for a strong political 
figure, one that despite having been out of office for two years, having been harassed by the 
procurator, and having made powerful enemies, nevertheless retained such political power as 
to compel compensation rather than being simply tossed aside as some weaker governors had 
been. 
 
Conclusion 
 Saratovskaya Oblast is a vivid depiction of all the dimensions surrounding federal-
regional relations and the gubernatorial office in Russia today. It not only shows the 
limitations placed on the center (the need to issue a buy-out package to Ayatskov to ward off 
a regional political revolt or the need to enlist him in a party-building project), but it shows 
the precarious situation facing the Russian president even in situations in which he manages 
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to seemingly achieve a victory. While initially Putin may have been able to offset some of 
Volodin‟s power in the region by appointing Ipatov, he in turn made an enterprise manager, 
who should have been weak and malleable from the center‟s point of view, into a polit ician 
in his own right. The new governor‟s political development, combined with a pair of State 
Duma deputies – from the same party no less– who battled for control in the region led to a 
situation in which politics went from a mundane ER majority to a state of affairs in which 
things quickly spiraled out of control and parties at regional and municipal levels fractured. 
Either the Kremlin saw a renewed threat from Ayatskov and sought to make him a new deal, 
or saw in him the clout to rally another base of power to check the feuding deputies and 
governor and lead a start-up party. In any event, things ended badly for the members of SR, 
with their humiliating defeat in December 2007; the same can not be said for Ayatskov, who 
traded his home in Saratov for an office in downtown Moscow. As the reader will see in the 
next chapter, not all former governors were so fortunate.
CHAPTER 6 
 
A DEPARTURE INTO OBSCURITY 
 
THE SAKHALINSKAYA OBLAST & IVAN PAVLOVICH MALAKHOV 
 
 
 
“I want you to report to me why people with children are sleeping on concrete.” 
 
–   Putin, to Far Eastern Presidential Representative Kamil’ Iskhakov 
 following an earthquake in Nevel’sk on Sakhalin, August 2007153 
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 Sakhalinskaya Oblast represents the final tier of governors in this study: the “weak” 
governors who are most vulnerable to federal appointment whims. These governors, the 
reader will remember, received scores of zero points in the Vulnerability Index, which has 
two important implications in this paper‟s framework. First, unlike the “strong” governors, 
this set of leaders is totally exposed to being removed or failing to be reappointed by the 
federal government. Secondly, unlike the medium-strength governors, these leaders do not 
even possess sufficient bargaining position to merit a federal appointment following their 
departure from office. In this case, the incumbent, Ivan Malakhov, was unceremoniously 
dumped following a natural disaster in his province. Malakhov did not receive a federal 
appointment – nor does he appear to have obtained employment in any other sort of political 
capacity. I argue that this is a reflection of his weak standing.  
 
Regional Economy 
 As bluntly stated by Russia Profile, “[o]ther than hydrocarbons, Sakhalinskaya has no 
effective industrial base.”154  Another way of putting this is to use Daniel Goler‟s term: 
Sakhalinskaya Oblast is one of Russia‟s “resource-based peripheries.”155 By the Russia 
Profile report‟s calculations, 57.5 percent of industrial output in 2000 was derived from oil 
and gas sectors; in 2006 this figure had leapt to 80 percent.
156
 According to the data acquired 
from Goskomstat, the situation is similar based on the GRP by sector. At first glance the 
“minerals extraction” category appears to be relatively modest – just 21.8 percent of all GRP 
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for 2005. Yet the figure for “construction” is the largest in the Russian Federation by far – 
29.6 percent. Some of this is probably due to the distortion deriving from the relatively small 
size of the population and the fact that the island is so remote and is positioned in a harsh 
climate (second in construction, though ten percentage points back, for example, is the 
similarly remote and severe climate of the Chukotskii AO).
 157
 Yet, a substantial portion of 
this construction sector is directly related to the development of these energy projects. 
Beyond this there is little else in the way of other prominent sectors. Fishing is one of the 
strongest sectors versus others in the Russian Federation, at 6.9 percent, but the other 
numbers are astonishingly weak: just 4.4 percent in manufacturing activity, 17
th
 lowest in 
Russia; a paltry 7.7 percent for retail and wholesale trade, which ranks the region 11
th
 lowest 
in the country.  
 In terms of scale of the economy, the Sakhalinskaya Oblast ranked 38
th
 in Russia in 
2005, which is even more impressive when it is taken in to consideration that it is the 20
th
 
smallest region by population in the country. Yet, as will be discussed further in the next 
section, the nature of the economy is one that does not lend itself to benefiting the regional 
authorities, much less the regional population. Its 14
th
 highest GRP per capita does not 
accurately demonstrate this. The fact is that according to one working paper, in 2003 it had 
one of the four highest poverty rates in Russia (and it had the second largest percentage of 
people belonging to the severest level of impoverishment).
158
 The situation does appear to 
have improved somewhat in the past few years, but even so, it is still being reported on as a 
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real problem (particularly given the inflation that is wrought by the large-scale outside 
investment).
159
  
 
Enterprise Control 
 Sakhalinskaya Oblast did not retain significant shares of state enterprises by Radygin 
and Mal‟ginov‟s definition. More importantly in this case is the fact that so much of the 
region‟s most lucrative sector – hydrocarbon extraction – not only failed to be formally 
retained by the regional administration but actually was dominated by outside influences, at 
the obvious expense of the region itself.  Robert Orttung, in classifying the nature of the 
economic structure of Russian regions labeled Sakhalinskaya Oblast a “foreign-influenced 
region.” It was the sole region to earn that distinction exclusively (three others had 
significant influence, but were nevertheless members of other classifications), which should 
give the reader an idea of the importance of foreign investment in the regional economy.
160
  
As far as this paper is concerned, these outside influences consist of a trio of actors: federal 
officials, Russian energy companies, and foreign energy actors.  I will briefly discuss these 
three players individually below as they relate to economic control in the Sakhalinskaya 
Oblast. 
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Pursuant to the Russian Constitution, any resource rights beyond twelve miles from 
shore are assigned to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.
161
 Since much of 
the deposits lie outside of this zone, they were presumably not available to regional 
authorities. Federal authorities therefore exercised considerable leverage over these 
hydrocarbons (unlike continental deposits, such as those in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan). 
Furthermore, land-based reserves do not require the same level of investment or expertise to 
extract as do offshore reserves. And in 2005, the Sakhalinskaya Oblast‟s position became 
even weaker, with the passage of new federal legislation that no longer propagated the “rule 
of two keys,” as the earlier dual-jurisdiction clause of the constitution held. Rather than 
having to reach mutual agreement with the federal government as in the past, this was 
recrafted to hold that certain kinds of deposits were to be managed by the center and others 
by the regions. Needless to say, the former controlled the most lucrative sorts of deposits; the 
regions were assigned the right to regulate “wide-spread” minerals such as sand, gravel, 
etc.
162
 In sum, though the subsoil of Sakhalinskaya Oblast held immense value, very little of 
these resources were actually available to the regional administration. 
Russian energy companies are important in this case since both their motivations and 
their methods impact the region substantially. With regard to the first point, these firms have 
an obvious reason for seeking to develop and extract hydrocarbons in the Sakhalinskaya 
Oblast, since it possesses such huge energy resource bases. Secondly, in order to do so, they 
(like firms in other sectors) have not historically restrained themselves from getting involved 
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in regional politics, particularly after the 1998 economic crisis.
163
 In the energy sector this 
has included the most obvious type of political activity: a high-ranking oil official becoming 
a governor, which has happened in at least two cases (Roman Abramovich from Sibneft‟ who 
leads the Kamchatskii Krai, and Boris Zolotarev from Yukos who led the Evenkiiskii AO).
164
 
Similarly, a Yukos manager managed to become vice-governor of the Samarskaya Oblast.
165
 
As the reader will come to see, a similar change that was in corporate interests may have 
taken place in Sakhalinskaya Oblast.  
The international actors are important since they effectively act as a check against the 
regional administration. The failure to develop hydrocarbon fields in the Sakhalinskaya 
Oblast is undesirable for the federal government, but it is not absolutely critical to its 
functioning; the same cannot be said of the Sakhalinskaya regional authorities given their 
dependence on this sector. A similar situation in the Sakha – Yakutia Republic involving the 
state diamond monopoly Alrosa further illustrates this. The De Beers Diamond Company, 
which dominates that industry, insisted that any deal struck had to be officially sanctioned by 
both the federal and regional authorities prior to any purchase of diamond assets. Given the 
overwhelming control over the diamond market exercised by De Beers, this was a powerful 
factor in forcing a settlement – one which, since the republic was so dependent on diamond 
revenues, gave the federal center an upper hand for much the same reason as in 
Sakhalinskaya Oblast‟s case.166   
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In sum, the regional authorities had minimal control over their energy assets, which 
given the position of prominence of this sector, meant they had little in the way of economic 
control at all. Even in one of the few remaining significant economic fields, fishing, they had 
essentially lost all regulatory control and were victimized by chronic overfishing and evasion 
of paying duties on those catches.
167
 Unlike in some cases, such as Tatarstan, where the 
regional administration had essentially captured business, Sakhalinskaya Oblast‟s authorities 
were unable to do so – and in fact, following the appointment of a new governor, Aleksandr 
Khoroshavin, it might even be argued that the regional government was captured by 
business. 
 
Tenure 
 Malakhov was the vice-governor when the incumbent Igor Farkhutdinov suddenly 
died in a helicopter crash in Kamchatskaya Oblast. As such he automatically became the chief 
executive on August 20, 2003. He would go on to win the special gubernatorial elections in 
December, but his performance in that race was anything but convincing. In a race with 13 
other candidates, he garnered 35.17 percent of the vote in the first round; in the second he 
managed just 53 percent. By comparison, in 2000 his predecessor won 56.29 percent in the 
first round. Unlike the other two governors discussed earlier, Shaimiev and Ayatskov, 
Malakhov lacked a long tenure at the point of his appointment decision – he had been in 
office less than 48 months. Indeed, the fact that he lasted as long as he did was probably 
more an issue of ensuring some regional political stability following a crisis in the top level 
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oblast leadership: not only had Farkhutdinov perished in the helicopter accident, but with him 
some other important figures, as Victor Yasmann writes:  
Among the dead were Farkhutdinov's press secretary; the oblast's chief financial specialist; its chief 
doctor; the head of the oblast's construction department; the head of the oblast's health, housing, and 
communal-services department; the heads of the oblast's transportation department; and the head of its 
fuel and energy department; as well as the directors of three private companies.168 
  
Malakhov‟s leading opponent, Fedor Sidorenko, was Farkhutdinov‟s main rival in the 2000 
election as well. This lack of a viable alternative probably contributed to the decision by the 
Kremlin to throw United Russia‟s support to Malakhov for the time being. 
 
Republic Status 
  The region does not have republic status. This is a function of its history: the islands 
were disputed and the subject of a series of agreements between Russia and Japan, which at 
various points in time shared ownership of the territory or occupied partitions of it.  
Following World War II, the entire territory was annexed by the Soviet Union and a policy of 
“Russification” was initiated. The ethnic Japanese population that remained after the wartime 
evacuations was repatriated;
169
 Japanese toponyms were replaced by Slavic names as 
befitting of “innately and inherently Russian lands.”170 This is readily apparent in the 2002 
census numbers: respondents identifying themselves as Japanese totaled 333 (or .06 percent 
of the population) in a territory where they had previously been 300,000 strong prior to 
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Second World War. The population today is 84.28 percent Russian. The largest minority 
group is ethnic Koreans (5.41 percent of the 2002 population), who were themselves victims 
of forced population transfers (on behalf of the Imperial Japanese regime which dispatched 
them to the island as laborers).
171
 Thus, Sakhalinskaya Oblast lacked either the history of 
political autonomy or the diverse ethnic makeup that was the grounds for republic-level 
status. 
 
Malakhov’s Fall: Bad Performance or Energy Intrigue? 
Following a major earthquake that took place in Nevel‟sk in August 2007, the 
response of the regional authorities came under fire by the federal government. Shortly after 
the disaster, an irate Vladimir Putin called his federal representative to demand of him: “I 
want you to report to me why people with children are sleeping on concrete.”172 The federal 
representative, Kamil‟ Iskhakov, turned his attention to Malakhov. As he recounted to the 
press, he arrived at the scene of the disaster the following day, and contacted Malakhov to 
see why he was not present himself, despite the fact that he was supposedly only an hour‟s 
drive away.
173
  “I‟m already here,” he told Malakhov, who responded, “How are you already 
here?”174 Five days after the disaster, Malakhov resigned by “personal decision.”  The poor 
performance in the aftermath of the disaster was the immediate stimulus of Malakhov‟s exit, 
but determining whether this was the real cause of his dismissal or just a pretext is difficult. It 
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is worth saying that there were certainly many players who stood to benefit from his demise. 
In any case, it is obvious that Malakhov‟s weak standing rendered him totally dependent on 
remaining in the good graces of the Kremlin and did not even provide him with sufficient 
positioning to merit compensation. Having not met with Moscow‟s approval, Malakhov was 
replaced.
175
 
 
A Native (and Sympathetic?) Son 
Malakhov‟s replacement, Aleksandr Khoroshavin was previously a mayor in the 
region. Khoroshavin‟s previous employment seems significant, since the Kremlin has for the 
most part preferred to bring in Varangians from the outside, as well as the fact that 
Sakhalinskaya Oblast was not an ethnically defined region. This appointment decision would 
seem to hint at some remaining insecurity about the loss of leadership in 2003 and the desire 
to retain some continuity. As discussed further below, Khoroshavin also had some ties to 
Rosneft by virtue of a regional headquarters of that company being present in Khoroshavin‟s 
city, Okha. 
 Within 45 days of assuming his new post, Khoroshavin signed for the first time a 
five-year agreement with Rosneft, in which the company seemingly promised to be a “good” 
company in line with the Putin‟s goals of corporate “social responsibility.”176 The company 
concluded a deal in September 2007 which pledged to invest one billion rubles 
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(approximately $41.85 million at the time of writing) in the region‟s social programs over 
five years.
 177
 The scope of the agreement is very broad according to Rosneft:  
In particular, the agreement envisions measures in the creation of favorable conditions for the elevation 
of the quality of life of the populace, including by way of the investment of funds by Rosneft in the 
social sphere, as well as by means of philanthropic and sponsorship activity. Furthermore, the 
company intends to promote the elevation of the employment level in the oblast, and also the 
development of physical culture and sports.178 
 
 For Rosneft‟s part, it does not appear that Khoroshavin‟s appointment hurt the company‟s 
interest in the region‟s reserves.  According to some observers, the appointment of the new 
governor may play to Rosneft‟s benefit, given his earlier ties to the company. This is 
particularly important, since the Sakhalinskaya-3 and Sakhalinskaya-4 fields are currently 
being contested by Rosneft and Gazprom.
179
 
 
Conclusion 
 I have shown that Ivan Malakhov represents the third and lowest tier of the 
gubernatorial ranks. This tier, as result of their weakness, receives neither protection against 
the center‟s decisions against them nor a “golden parachute” following their dismissal. It 
should be emphasized once more, however, that a governor of this tier, like a governor of the 
middle tier, does not necessarily face dismissal. They may well retain their post, on the basis 
of several reasons, including but not limited to their perceived loyalty, shared ideological 
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convictions, or the lack of a suitable replacement. Indeed, there are nine such cases in which 
these governors did successfully retain the governor‟s powers at the point of their 
appointment decision. On this Kremlin decision-making component and other remaining 
aspects of the process, let us now turn to the final chapter of this paper.
CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Host: Pensioner Lyudmila Karachentsova from the hamlet of Degtyarevskii of the Kochubeevskii raion of 
Stavropol’skii Krai complains to the president that in her village there is no water. “Alas, we have no water,” 
Lyudmila Alekseevna glumly told us, – this is a statement from Komsomol’skaya Pravda –“although I heard 
that in Stavropol’ the money for the water supply had been received. Where did it get lost? Residents of the 
village are walking 200 or 300 meters with buckets for water.” 
 
 
“All and all, I understand that naturally, Lyudmila Karachentsova, a pensioner from this hamlet, is not satisfied 
in the solving of this problem , or to be precise, the non-solving of this problem. I should tell you that just these 
past few days the question of the submission of the candidacy to the governor’s position of Stavropol’skii Krai 
has been decided. The documents concerting the acting governor have been prepared by me, but they will not 
be sent to Stavropol’ until this problem is solved.”180 
 
–Putin, “Direct Line” phone-in show, 27 September 2005181 
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In this final chapter, I have several goals in mind. I would of course like to first 
restate my findings as is customary. I will then to expand the scope of the discussion a bit 
and address several points regarding the broader issues at stake here. To this latter end, I will 
first examine some of the possible factors that are considered in making the appointment 
decision in the cases in which a governor is vulnerable. Vulnerability, after all, does not 
mean the center is compelled to dismiss a governor. I will then address what these reforms 
have actually meant to three different groups. Finally, I will briefly look ahead to the “post-
Putin” era, insofar as it may exist, and discuss the outlook in those terms. 
 
Results 
I have shown that despite the de jure appointment powers that have been acquired by 
the Russian executive branch, these powers are still constrained in their application. These 
constraints are defined by the political standing of the region and its governor, which in this 
project has been operationalized through the Vulnerability Index. In practice, there exist three 
tiers of governors, with different levels of bargaining power versus the federal center, and 
these three tiers directly contribute to the outcome of a gubernatorial appointment decision. 
In the strongest of tiers, the governor is considered invulnerable to replacement by the 
president. I will reiterate again that this does not mean that the governor and the center do not 
conflict, that the governor wins all battles versus the center, or that the federal government 
has not made significant inroads in consolidating central authority in the Russian Federation 
over the past eight years. However, it does conclusively demonstrate that there still exists a 
set of constraints on this centralizing effort. The analysis of the mid-tier governors 
corroborates this set of constraints. Though these governors may be subjected to removal 
from their posts, they nevertheless possess sufficient political authority to typically demand a 
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“buy-out” package, a pre-emptive political maneuver. For the purposes of this project, this 
settlement was considered to be an appointment to a federal position in the government.  
Finally, the weakest set of governors is considered to be completely dependent on the good 
will of the Presidential Administration. This group of governors may be ousted at Moscow‟s 
discretion. Again, it should be stressed that by belonging to either of these lower two tiers, a 
governor does not necessarily face being fired or not reappointed. They may well keep their 
positions. In other words, belonging to the lower two tiers is necessary for dismissal, but does 
not demand it. 
 
Establishing Vulnerability vs. Predicting an Appointment Decision 
Determining gubernatorial vulnerability is comparatively easy when we turn to 
attempting to explain why a governor, if vulnerable, is in fact replaced. One of the major 
arguments surrounding gubernatorial appointment decisions is that these are simply a product 
of “delivering the vote” to the appropriate Kremlin candidates. Turovsky for example writes 
that, “The most important thing for the Kremlin is the governors‟ ability to organize federal 
elections in its interest ...”182 This may well be the case in some instances: the last two 
gubernatorial changes in 2007 (Anatoly Lisitsyn of the Yaroslavskaya Oblast and Viktor 
Maslov of the Smolenskaya Oblast) did appear to be the result of poor State Duma election 
performances.
183
 Lisitsyn and Maslov, after all, had the third and fourth lowest vote 
percentage totals (53.17 percent and 53.92 percent, respectively). Yet there were two other 
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governors with lower yields who kept their seats (Valentina Matvienko of St. Petersburg and 
in dead last, Valerii Potapenko of the Nenetskii AO, who did not even cross the 50 percent 
threshold in his region).  Furthermore, there are 26 other governors who failed to cross the 60 
percent mark (the Russian Federation had a figure of 64.26 percent). In looking at the cases 
as a whole, the averages are stunningly similar regardless of whether a governor delivered 
the vote for Putin in the presidential race or for United Russia in the Duma races (see Table 
7.1). Poor performance at the ballot box may be a factor in some cases (either the sole factor 
or one of several as discussed below) but it does not mean that a governor is automatically 
doomed. 
 
Table 7.1: Relationship between Retention of Post and Electoral Performance 
 
Average Vote for 
ER in Duma 2007 
Change in Vote for 
ER in Duma from 
2003 to 2007  
Average Vote for 
Putin in 2004 
Change in Vote 
for Putin from 
2000 to 2004 
Regions Where 
Incumbent Was 
Replaced during 
Putin (21 
instances) 
64.97% 
25.81 percentage 
points 
72.83% 
18.63 percentage 
points 
Regions Where 
Incumbent Was 
Not Replaced 
during Putin (52 
instances) 
64.73% 
25.91 percentage 
points 
71.28% 
17.75 percentage 
points 
Source: Electoral Geography. These intervals were not statistically significant at the .90 confidence level. 
 
I also consider a second set of factors that may be taken into account – the economic 
performance of the governor in question (see Table 7.2). Here I have compared the 
gubernatorial outcome against the per capita GRP change rates and the change in the average 
regional wages paid to workers. An examination of the results shows that there is a moderate 
relationship between the decisions. Interestingly, it is not a positive but a negative predictor: 
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governors with economies that operating more effectively are actually more likely to lose 
their posts.  
 
Table 7.2: Relationship between Retention of Post and Economic Performance 
 
% Change in GRP per capita 
between 2000 and Most Recent 
Full Year Prior To Appointment 
Decision (Not Available after 
2005) 
% Change in Wages between 
2000 and Most Recent Full Year 
Prior To Appointment Decision 
(Not Available after 2006) 
Regions Where Incumbent Was 
Replaced during Putin 
194.93* 299.01* 
Regions Where Incumbent Was 
Not Replaced during Putin 
176.16** 256.94** 
Source: State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation. These intervals were not statistically significant at the .90 confidence level. 
*Data was available for only 19 of 21instances (not included: Koryakskii and Nenetskii AOs). 
**Data was available for only 48 of 52 instances (not included: Evenkiiskii, Agino-Buryatskii, Yamalo-Nenetskii, and Khanty-Mansiiskii 
AOs).  
 
 
The third set, meant to assess quality of life of the population, is surprising in its 
results (see Table 7.3). The data selected was intended to measure two of the four major 
planks of Russia‟s National Priority Projects (housing and agriculture).184 I have also 
included the change in reported crime instances. These measures would seem to suggest that 
appointment decisions are in some way driven by performance in quality of life areas. It 
should be emphasized that calculations of the confidence levels for means in all measures in 
all of three of these factors sets, including those in Table 7.3, did not yield results in excess 
of the 90 percent confidence level, which may in part be due to the limited sampling size 
available at this point in time. While these figures may serve as prima facie basis for further 
research, they should be considered preliminary and subject to change entirely. It should also 
be stressed that these findings apply to the governors as a whole – and it cannot and should 
not be ruled out that they do or do not matter in individual cases. In sum, these findings are 
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included to show some initial general tendencies, and frankly speaking, to serve as a 
launching point for further research – they should not be interpreted as a conclusive 
declaration of determinacy. 
 
Table 7.3: Relationship between Retention of Post and Quality of Life Performance 
 % Change in Crime 
Rate between 2000 
and Most Recent 
Full Year Prior To 
Appointment 
Decision (Full 
Availability) 
% Agricultural 
Output vs. 
Preceding Year for 
Last Full Year 
Before 
Appointment (Not 
Available after 
2006) 
 
% Change in 
Installation of 
Living Space 
between 2000 and 
Most Recent Full 
Year Prior To 
Appointment 
Decision (Not 
Available after 
2006) 
% Change in 
Living Space 
Installed per 
capita between 
2000 and Most 
Recent Full Year 
Prior To 
Appointment 
Decision (Not 
Available after 
2006) 
 
Regions Where 
Incumbent Was 
Replaced during 
Putin (21 instances) 
3.86 2.17 33.90** 8.73 
Regions Where 
Incumbent Was Not 
Replaced during 
Putin (52 instances) 
6.59 3.13* 47.22*** 7.71 
Source: State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation. These intervals were not statistically significant at the .90 confidence level. 
*Data was available for only 50 of 52 regions (not included: federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg). 
** Data was available for only 19 of 21 regions (not included: Kamchatskaya Oblast and Koryakskii AO). 
*** Chukotskii AO was excluded as an extreme outlier, and thus only 51 of 52 regions are included for this figure.  
 
With regard to the individual cases of gubernatorial appointment decisions, based on 
the appointment decisions that constituted this project and the analyses, media reporting, and 
articles reviewed in researching these instances, I would contend that there are no fewer than 
five broad potential reasons that can contribute to a vulnerable governor‟s dismissal. These 
factors may function independently of one another in a case or may interact – that is to say 
that in a certain case there may be a single reason for failure to be reappointed, in another 
there may be several reasons. The broad factors consist of, but are not limited to political 
performance/identification (delivering the vote, supporting a regional merger, party 
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affiliation past or present), regional performance (achieving certain economic or standards of 
living goals, effective response to disasters), extraneous pressures – that is, actors that belong 
to neither the Kremlin or the regional executive (business interests, regional legislatures, 
regional clans), promotion to another position, and finally, timing dynamics (relative to either 
the reforms‟ entry into force or to elections).  
The first four factors should be fairly straightforward, but the fifth, timing dynamics, 
is an interesting one that merits some explanation for two reasons. First, it illustrates how 
difficult it is to base a determination exclusively on concrete performance indicators. 
Secondly, it allows us to understand the governors as being complex and active, rather than 
inanimate objects that are simply on the receiving end of the Kremlin‟s wrath or support. The 
governors are, in fact, dynamic and independent forces that seek to maximize their gains and 
actively seek to maneuver around the restrictions placed upon them. An article in the Russian 
version of Newsweek asserted that there was a certain “grace period” available to governors 
who acted quickly following the institution of the reform. These governors included officials 
who were considered to be at extreme risk of ouster by Putin – they consisted of individuals 
with mafia ties (Sergei Dar‟kin of Primorskii Krai), Communist Party membership 
(Aleksandr Mikhailov of Kurskaya Oblast), and employment by Yukos (Boris Zolotarev of 
the Evenkiiskii AO); another‟s main opponent was cousin of the head of ER, Boris Gryzlov 
(Leonid Korotkov of Amurskaya Oblast).
185
 And finally, Konstantin Titov (Samarskaya 
Oblast) was a rival of Putin‟s in the 2000 presidential race, yet he managed to be reappointed 
in 2005 (though he would be forced out in August of 2007). What seems to exist is a 
willingness to allow those governors who were some of the earliest to appeal to Putin for 
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reappointment to gain a reprieve. In doing so, Putin was able to signal that he was not going 
to fundamentally alter the governors‟ complexion as a whole. This indication allowed all 
governors to understand that they had a fair chance of retaining their posts and thus denied 
them any incentive to mount a collective resistance from the beginning.
186
 Such a hypothesis 
also may shed some light on a few seemingly perplexing instances: six incumbents have been 
involved in appointment decisions twice – and received different outcomes.187 In two of these 
instances this is quite straightforward: Viktor Shershunov (Kostromskaya Oblast) died in a 
car crash and Sergei Sobyanin was promoted to presidential chief of staff. Two others were 
the same who had poor Duma performances last December, Maslov and Lisitsyn. This leaves 
Titov and Korotkov – both of who can be argued to have submitted their requests for votes of 
confidence in the grace period. Yet a reprieve is not the same thing as a genuine vote of 
confidence: both were subsequently forced out (Titov lasted for about a year and a half; 
Korotkov for two years, four months). Interestingly, Korotkov‟s longer survival time did not 
denote a sign of political superiority: Titov ended up in the Federation Council; Korotkov is 
now teaching high school classes. 
There are also instances, similar to Malakhov‟s case in Sakhalinskaya Oblast, in which 
it can be difficult to distinguish the true intentions behind a governor‟s dismissal. Vladimir 
Loginov, labeled the “platinum king” when he was elected to office,188 was the governor of 
the Koryakskii Krai when the region faced a heating fuel crisis in which some 25,000 citizens 
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were said to be left without sufficient means of heating. The reasons for the shortage were 
reported to be the geographic position of the region and the extreme corruption that exists in 
the krai‟s government structures.189 With these details, it seems there may be some merit to 
dismissing Loginov on the basis of his performance. It would be easier to accept this 
hypothesis, however, if one does not consider the man Putin tapped to replaced Loginov: 
Deputy Governor Oleg Kozhemyako. Kozhemyako arrived from Primorskii Krai, renowned 
for the high level of corruption overseen by its then-governor Evgenii Nazdratenko.
190
 
Moreover, Kozhemyako made a fortune in the legendarily corrupt fishing sector.
191
 And 
finally, what makes the situation even more stunning is that Putin himself, then the 
president‟s head of oversight, was tasked by Yeltsin to investigate “out of control fishing” 
associated with Nazdratenko‟s staff, including Kozhemyako – though the results of the 
investigation were never made public.
192
  Finally, one other consideration is the push for 
regional mergers that has taken place in Putin‟s years in office. Loginov may have been 
blocking the merger, since it would put him out of a job; under Kozhemyako this regional 
merger was realized, with the Koryakskii AO being absorbed into the Kamchatskaya Oblast to 
form the Kamchatskii Krai (the referendum to do so took place about seven months after 
Loginov was dismissed). Thus, it is easy to see how muddled the picture can be surrounding 
a governor‟s dismissal. In this instance any or all of no fewer than three reasons exist for a 
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change of governors (poor regional performance, outside pressure to gain access to the 
resources, or the desire to achieve some political goal – here, a regional merger).  
 
Significance of the Reforms 
I would suggest that the significance of the new gubernatorial reforms depends on the 
political stratum in question. To this end I will briefly comment on three different parties: the 
Russian populace, the Russian elite, and the international community. The latter I think is 
fairly simple to assess, so I will address it first. For the international community, the 
significance was quite clear: appointing governors was one of the clearest signs that the Putin 
administration sought to centralize its authority by rolling back democracy and acquiring 
authoritarian qualities in the process. In this view, governors, oligarchs, and Moscow formed 
the trinity of power brokers in post-Soviet Russia; now that the first two have been brought 
into submission, this leaves the federal government to proceed unfettered and to do as it 
wishes. 
Russia‟s elite faces some real challenges in my opinion. The overwhelming 
dominance of Putin and his team has had an unfortunate side effect. The ranks of the political 
elite have stagnated, which is evident with the governors, the majority of whom keep their 
posts.
193
 This has been paralleled in the federal legislature as well. In a recent Kommersant 
Vlast‟ article, the author discusses the fates of the “victors.” Virtually all the deputies expect 
to rise in status in the parliament by gaining seats on committees and in leadership posts. 
However, with all deputies being “successful” there is limited room for advancement: the 
long-time deputies expect to keep their influential duties by virtue of their loyalty and tenure; 
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the relative newcomers can point to their performance, and services and funding rendered to 
the party. This pressure for advancement can be ameliorated to some extent by creating new 
committees and posts – the present convocation of Duma set records in both these ways.194 
Yet, it will ultimately force the Kremlin to face some very unhappy and potentially very 
influential deputies – to see the threats of which one need look no further than the 
Saratovskaya Oblast legislature with all of its splintering and chaos. By not allowing a 
natural, democratic cycle of political “death” and regeneration, it seems that it is creating a 
situation that will grow more unstable and more unmanageable.  
Yet, dominant parties in other regime types have successfully managed entrenched 
elites for extended lengths of time; one that comes to mind is the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI) in Mexico. In this case, however, the rigid application of the law of 
nonconsecutive reelection on all offices forced circulation of elites which translated into 
protection of the single-party dominance of the political playing field. Even if a politician 
was forced to accept a “demotion” to a lesser office for one term, there was always the 
prospect of advancing up another rung or two in the next batch of elections.
195
 The two assets 
of this system, in other words, were predictability and uniformity. In Russia, there is 
currently a similar dominance by one party, but the circulation of elites is anything but 
uniform and unpredictable. Term limits apply in only some cases, and then extremely 
unevenly, as I have noted throughout the paper. Relevant laws, the cornerstone of 
predictability, have been routinely circumvented, reinterpreted, or ignored as the situation 
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requires. All of this is not to say that success breeds eventual failure.  It would be a fairly 
shallow prediction to simply say that at some point ER will lose its dominance; this seems, 
on the basis of human history (and the PRI‟s eventual loss of its political monopoly), to be an 
inevitable occurrence.  One of the important considerations that will determine the durability 
and the effectiveness of the system while it does exist, however, is the way that it manages 
these personnel decisions. 
The most difficult question to answer, it turns out, is the one that I initially saw as the 
most simple to resolve: what does the new system of appointments mean to Russian society 
as a whole? I can offer the reader no definitive answer on this point, only some general 
thoughts. The obvious answer is that it is a purely negative development for the population – 
after all, the center, the governors (as Goode would say), and even regional legislatures (as 
Chebankova would submit) can be argued to have benefitted in some way – and presumably 
this is a zero-sum game of politics where some party has to be a “loser.” This would, of 
course, be the electorate, which was cut entirely out of the selection process. Based on 
Konitzer‟s work, there may well have been accountability of governors to their electorate in 
at least some of Russia‟s regions with gubernatorial elections – but this was far from 
universal.
196
 It would follow that with the deprivation of the right to elect regional heads of 
administration, there would follow a loss of accountability of governors to anyone other than 
the Russian president. Yet it is clear that the governor and president do not operate in a 
vacuum – there are several known avenues for injecting outside influence into the decision-
making process. The regional legislature in Nizhny Novgorod effectively stared Putin down 
in rejecting the reappointment of Gennady Khodyrev – and Chebankova provides several 
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other similar incidents as part of a chain of “unintended consequences.”197 Businesses have 
had no qualms about influencing gubernatorial outcomes in the past – and if we subscribe to 
the idea that Khoroshavin was very much the choice of Rosneft, a state energy juggernaut, 
then that remains the case.  Or if the corporate side is played down, then the Moscow clans 
aspect may be argued: it may be viewed as a battle between Kremlin clans – Sechin, et al. 
and Rosneft on one side; Medvedev, et al. and Gazprom on the other – in seeking control of 
Sakhalinskaya Oblast reserves. Finally, another sort of clan politics may be added, that of 
ethnic minority groups which is salient, in for example, Dagestan. In that instance, there is a 
traditional balance of regional government appointments based on which ethnic group an 
individual belongs to: the president is supposed to be from one group, the speaker of the 
parliament from another. 
 In the short term, Russian society may well have been cut out of decision process. 
Yet there are other means of influencing politics than voting. Taking away the right to vote 
merely channels political participation into different avenues – avenues that are more 
difficult to control. In doing so, it would seem that it may encourage the development of 
regional civil society groups that would then in turn direct their requests to Moscow.  One 
other point worth making is that while the Kremlin may have been able to inject some 
certainty into who decides gubernatorial selection, it has at the same time lost one of the 
strongest indicators of what the population‟s view of their regional political status is. This 
may encourage the Kremlin to accept, if not embrace, the emergence of such groups as a 
means of both gaining information and alleviating pressure from reaching such a point that 
the state of affairs in the regions spirals out of control. Another phenomenon is that the 
federal center has not been resistant to amending the system in the past few years – witness 
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the introduction of the right of majority parties in regional legislatures to nominate 
candidates, for instance. It is not unthinkable that the pool of input may be expanded further.  
It may sound outlandish to say so at this point in time, with democracy having seemingly 
beaten such a hasty retreat in Russia, but in some sense maybe this is precisely the sort of 
shakeup that is needed in a stagnated political system. It would seem that to some extent the 
greatest threats to regimes may not be in standing pat, but in introducing radical changes: as 
Migdal has so convincingly argued, states are quite good at inducing change; they possess 
much less impressive records in achieving their goals. All of this is to say that the situation is 
far more complicated and unpredictable than it may appear at first glance.  
 
Looking Ahead  
In conclusion, there remains much to be seen with regard to the reformed post of 
governor in Russia. This paper has demonstrated that there still exist varying degrees of 
vulnerability across Russia‟s regions and that strength of sitting governors has a direct impact 
on the outcome of a gubernatorial appointment decision. Furthermore, by investing so much 
potential power in the hands of a single individual, this means that when the occupant of this 
post changes, so too does his use of the appointment power. Dmitrii Medvedev may well 
follow Putin‟s course, or he may set out on his own, either attempting to use it to clean house 
on a wide scale or using it to dump unwanted governors only on occasion. And adding to all 
of this uncertainty are the governors themselves, who have resources to use against the center 
as well as the incentive to do so when their jobs are in jeopardy. In several cases, for 
example, governors have passed legal amendments to their regional statutes which allow 
them to serve five-year terms, rather than four-year terms (conveniently these provisions 
apply not only to future governors, but to the sitting executive as well). Another point to take 
107 
 
into consideration is the fact that the reforms are but three years old. New “interpretations” 
and amendments are not to be ruled out. After all, laws have a unique dynamic of their own – 
they reflect the balance of political power at a static point in time; as power shifts to one side 
or another, this opens up room for maneuver – the Duma‟s exercise in ramming through 
Shaimiev‟s right to seek a third term is evidence of this.  All of this is to say that Russian 
politics have not, as it turns out, become more predictable – they have become less so.
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 APPENDIX A  
Vulnerability Index Scores 
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Kamchatskaya Mikhail 
Mashkovtsev 
Aleksei 
Kuz'mitskii 
06/01/07 No 0 0 0 0 0 
Penzenskaya Vasilii 
Bochkarev 
N/A 05/14/05 Yes 0 0 0 0 0 
Kaluzhskaya Anatolii 
Artamonov 
N/A 07/26/05 Yes 0 0 0 0 0 
Kurskaya Aleksandr 
Mikhailov 
N/A 02/22/05 Yes 0 0 0 0 0 
Evenskii Boris 
Zolotarev 
N/A 03/03/05 Yes 0 0 0 0 0 
Amurskaya Leonid 
Korotkov 
N/A 02/24/05 Yes 0 0 0 0 0 
Tverskaya Dmitrii 
Zelenin 
N/A 07/10/07 Yes 0 0 0 0 0 
Smolenskaya Viktor 
Maslov 
N/A 06/24/05 Yes 0 0 0 0 0 
Bryanskaya Nikolai 
Denin 
N/A 10/15/07 Yes 0 0 0 0 0 
Ulyanovsk Sergei 
Morozov 
N/A 03/28/06 Yes 0 0 0 0 0 
Smolenskaya Viktor 
Maslov 
Sergei 
Antuf‟ev 
12/19/07 No 0 0 0 0 0 
Amurskaya Leonid 
Korotkov 
Nikolai 
Kolesov 
06/01/07 No 0 0 0 0 0 
Ivanovskaya Vladimir 
Tikhonov 
Mikhail Men 11/22/05 No 0 0 0 0 0 
Kaliningradskaya Vladimir 
Egorov 
Georgii Boos 09/16/05 No 0 0 0 0 0 
Koryakskii Vladimir 
Loginov 
Oleg 
Kozhemyako 
03/09/05 No 0 0 0 0 0 
Sakhalinskaya Ivan 
Malakhov 
Aleksandr 
Khoroshavin 
08/09/07 No 0 0 0 0 0 
Nenetskii Aleksei 
Barinov 
Valerii 
Potapenko 
08/07/06 No 0 0 0 0 0 
Novgorodskaya Mikhail 
Prusak 
Sergei Mitin 08/07/07 No 0 0 1 0 1 
Nizhegorodskaya Gennady 
Khodyrev 
Valery 
Shantsev 
08/08/05 No 0 1 0 0 1 
Evreiskaya Nikolai 
Volkov 
N/A 02/25/05 Yes 0 0 1 0 1 
Orlovskaya Egor Stroev N/A 04/23/05 Yes 0 0 1 0 1 
Agino-Buryatskii Bair 
Zhamsuev 
N/A 09/15/05 Yes 0 0 1 0 1 
Kostromskaya Viktor 
Shershunov 
N/A 04/21/05 Yes 0 0 1 0 1 
Vladimirskaya Nikolai 
Vinogradov 
N/A 02/18/05 Yes 0 0 1 0 1 
Moskovskaya 
Oblast 
Boris 
Gromov 
N/A 05/04/07 Yes 0 1 0 0 1 
Lipetskaya Oleg 
Korolev 
N/A 05/28/05 Yes 0 1 0 0 1 
Krasnodarskii Aleksandr 
Tkachev 
N/A 04/23/07 Yes 0 1 0 0 1 
Tambovskaya Oleg Betin N/A 07/13/05 Yes 0 0 1 0 1 
Orenburgskaya Aleksei 
Chernyshev 
N/A 06/15/05 Yes 0 1 0 0 1 
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Chukotskii Roman 
Abramovich 
N/A 10/21/05 Yes 1 0 0 0 1 
Krasnoyarskii Aleksandr 
Khloponin 
N/A 06/04/07 Yes 0 1 0 0 1 
Primorskii Sergei 
Dar'kin 
N/A 02/04/05 Yes 0 1 0 0 1 
Sankt-Peterburg Valentina 
Matvienko 
N/A 12/20/06 Yes 0 1 0 0 1 
Permskii Krai Oleg 
Chirkunov 
N/A 10/10/05 Yes 0 1 0 0 1 
Adygea Khazret 
Sovmen 
Aslancherii 
Tkhakushinov 
12/13/06 No 0 0 0 1 1 
Altai Republic Mikhail 
Lapshin 
Aleksandr 
Berdnikov 
12/22/05 No 0 0 0 1 1 
Tul‟skaya Vasilii 
Starodubtsev 
Vyacheslav 
Dudka 
03/30/05 No 0 0 1 0 1 
Dagestan Magomedali 
Magomedov 
Mukhu 
Aliyev 
02/20/06 No 0 0 1 1 2 
Tuva Sherig-ool 
Oorzhak 
Sholban 
Kara-ool 
04/06/07 No 0 0 1 1 2 
Buryatiya Leonid 
Potapov 
Vyacheslav 
Nagovitsyn 
06/15/07 No 0 0 1 1 2 
Saratovskaya Dmitri 
Ayatskov 
Pavel Ipatov 03/03/05 No 0 1 1 0 2 
Irkutskaya Boris 
Govorin 
Aleksandr 
Tishanin 
08/26/05 No 0 1 1 0 2 
Khabarovskii Viktor 
Ishaev 
N/A 07/09/07 Yes 0 1 1 0 2 
Tomskaya Viktor Kress N/A 03/10/07 Yes 0 1 1 0 2 
Yaroslavskaya Anatoly 
Lisitsyn 
N/A 11/02/06 Yes 0 1 1 0 2 
Sverdlovskaya Eduard 
Rossel' 
N/A 11/21/05 Yes 0 1 1 0 2 
Belgorodskaya Evgenii 
Savchenko 
N/A 06/16/07 Yes 0 1 1 0 2 
Rostovskaya Vladimir 
Chub 
N/A 06/14/05 Yes 0 1 1 0 2 
Samarskaya Konstantin 
Titov 
N/A 04/26/05 Yes 0 1 1 0 2 
Kalmykia Kirsan 
Ilyumzhinov 
N/A 10/24/05 Yes 0 0 1 1 2 
Chuvashiya Nikolai 
Fedorov 
N/A 08/29/05 Yes 0 0 1 1 2 
Vologodskaya Vyacheslav 
Pozgalev 
N/A 06/21/07 Yes 0 1 1 0 2 
Murmanskaya Yuri 
Evdokimov 
N/A 02/14/07 Yes 0 1 1 0 2 
Mordoviya Nikolai 
Merkushkin 
N/A 11/10/05 Yes 0 0 1 1 2 
Stavropol‟skii Aleksandr 
Chernogorov 
N/A 10/31/05 Yes 0 1 1 0 2 
Leningradskaya Valerii 
Serdyukov 
N/A 07/09/07 Yes 0 1 1 0 2 
Chelyabinskaya Petr Sumin N/A 04/18/05 Yes 0 1 1 0 2 
Kareliya Sergei 
Katanandov 
N/A 03/03/06 Yes 1 0 0 1 2 
Novosibirskaya Viktor 
Tolokonskii 
N/A 07/12/07 Yes 1 1 0 0 2 
Sakha-Yakutia Vyacheslav 
Shtyrov 
N/A 12/07/06 Yes 0 1 0 1 2 
Tyumenskaya Sergei 
Sobyanin 
N/A 02/17/05 Yes 1 1 0 0 2 
Ingushetiya Murat 
Zyazikov 
N/A 06/15/05 Yes 1 0 0 1 2 
Samarskaya Konstantin 
Titov 
Vladimir 
Artyakov 
08/29/07 No 0 1 1 0 2 
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North Osetiya-
Alaniya 
Aleksandr 
Dzasokhov 
Taimuraz 
Mamsurov 
06/07/05 No 1 0 0 1 2 
Yaroslavskaya Anatoly 
Lisitsyn 
Sergei 
Vakhrukhov 
12/19/07 No 0 1 1 0 2 
Omskaya Leonid 
Polezhaev 
N/A 05/24/07 Yes 1 1 1 0 3 
Moskva Yurii 
Luzhkov 
N/A 06/27/07 Yes 1 1 1 0 3 
Khanty-
Mansiiskii 
Aleksandr 
Filipenko 
N/A 02/24/05 Yes 1 1 1 0 3 
Yamalo-
Nenetskii 
Yurii Neelov N/A 03/11/05 Yes 1 1 1 0 3 
Kemerovskaya Aman 
Tuleev 
N/A 04/20/05 Yes 1 1 1 0 3 
Komi Vladimir 
Torlopov 
N/A 12/07/05 Yes 1 1 0 1 3 
Tatarstan Mintimer 
Shaimiev 
N/A 03/25/05 Yes 1 1 1 1 4 
Bashkortostan Murtaza 
Rakhimov 
N/A 10/10/06 Yes 1 1 1 1 4 
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APPENDIX B 
Governors by Strength and Fate 
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APPENDIX C 
Relationship between GRP and Retention of Office 
Region Subject Type Incumbent Retained 
Post? 
Upper 
Tier? 
GRP 2005 
(mln. Rubles) 
Evenkiiskii A.O. Okrug Boris Zolotarev Yes No 2,955.6 
Aginskii-Buryatskii A.O. Okrug Bair Zhamsuev Yes No 3,448.9 
Koryakskii A.O. Okrug Vladimir Loginov No No 5,276 
Ingushetiya Republic Murat Zyazikov Yes No 7,502.9 
Altaiskaya Respublika Republic Mikhail Lapshin No No 9,694.7 
Kalmykiya Republic Kirsan Ilyumzhinov Yes No 9,725.4 
Tyva Republic Sherig-ool Oorzhak No No 11,572.4 
Chukotskii A.O. Okrug Roman Abramovich Yes No 12,760.4 
Evreiskaya A.O. A. Oblast Nikolai Volkov Yes No 14,441.9 
Adygeya Republic Khazret Sovmen  No No 16,636.4 
Severnaya Osetiya-Alaniya Republic Aleksandr Dzasokhov No No 31,014.0 
Kamchatskaya Oblast Mikhail Mashkovtsev No No 38349.8 
Nenetskii A.O. Okrug Aleksei Barinov No No 44,577.3 
Kostromskaya Oblast Viktor Shershunov Yes No 45,092.0 
Ivanovskaya Oblast Vladimir Tikhonov No No 45,981.7 
Mordovia Republic Nikolai Merkushkin Yes No 46,000.3 
Orlovskaya Oblast Egor Stroyev Yes No 57,983.4 
Novgorodskaya Oblast Mikhail Prusak No No 60,960.2 
Tambovskaya Oblast Oleg Betin Yes No 64,538.7 
Bryanskaya Oblast Nikolai Denin Yes No 66,825.1 
Smolenskaya Oblast Viktor Maslov Yes No 68,383.1 
Smolenskaya Oblast Viktor Maslov No No 68,383.1 
Chuvashiya Republic Nikolai Fedorov Yes No 69,498.3 
Penzenskaya Oblast Vasilii Bochkarev Yes No 73,504.7 
Kaluzhskaya Oblast Anatoly Artamonov Yes No 74,506.7 
Buryatiya Republic Leonid Potapov No No 74,892.7 
Kareliya Republic Sergei Katanandov Yes No 76,313.2 
Amurskaya Oblast Leonid Korotkov Yes No 76,673.4 
Amurskaya Oblast Leonid Korotkov No No 76,673.4 
Kaliningradskaya Oblast Vladimir Egorov No No 80,768.2 
Ul'yanovskaya Oblast Sergei Morozov Yes No 82,534.1 
Kurskaya Oblast Aleksandr Mikhailov Yes No 87,211.4 
Vladimirskaya Oblast Nikolai Vinogradov Yes No 87,840.6 
Tverskaya Oblast Dmitri Zelenin Yes No 94,860.3 
Dagestan Republic Magomedali Magomedov No No 96,863.1 
Tul'skaya Oblast Vasilii Starodubtsev No No 108,726.7 
Sakhalinskaya Oblast Ivan Malakhov No No 121,146.3 
Yaroslavskaya Oblast Anatoly Lisitsyn Yes Yes 130,957.2 
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Yaroslavskaya Oblast Anatoly Lisitsyn No Yes 130,957.2 
Murmanskaya Oblast Yuri Evdokimov Yes Yes 141,886.8 
Lipetskaya Oblast Oleg Korolev Yes Yes 145,932.8 
Stavropol'skii Krai Krai Aleksandr Chernogorov Yes Yes 147,018.6 
Belgorodskaya Oblast Evgenii Savchenko Yes Yes 147,184.8 
Tomskaya Oblast Viktor Kress Yes Yes 158,218.7 
Khabarovskii Krai Krai Viktor Ishaev Yes Yes 161,306.1 
Saratovskaya Oblast Dmitri Ayatskov No Yes 169,148.5 
Komi Republic Vladimir Torlopov Yes Yes 172,992.7 
Sakha Republic Vyacheslav Shtyrov Yes Yes 185,172.9 
Primorskii Krai Krai Sergei Dar'kin Yes Yes 188,769.3 
Vologodskaya Oblast Vyacheslav Pozgalev Yes Yes 194,891.6 
Leningradskaya Oblast Valerii Serdyukov Yes Yes 212,091.7 
Orenburgskaya Oblast Aleksei Chernyshev Yes Yes 214,252.6 
Omskaya Oblast Leonid Polezhaev Yes Yes 223,433.2 
Novosibirskaya Oblast Viktor Tolokonskii Yes Yes 240,788.7 
Irkutskaya Oblast Boris Govorin No Yes 262,557.5 
Rostovskaya Oblast Vladimir Chub Yes Yes 264,067.2 
Kemerovskaya Oblast Aman Tuleev Yes Yes 296,164.6 
Nizhegorodskaya Oblast Gennady Khodyrev No Yes 296,929.7 
Permskii Krai Oleg Chirkunov Yes Yes 338,915.7 
Chelyabinskaya Oblast Petr Sumin Yes Yes 350,341.8 
Tyumenskaya Oblast Sergei Sobyanin Yes Yes 357191.9 
Krasnodarskii Krai Krai Aleksandr Tkachev Yes Yes 371,177.5 
Bashkortostan Republic Murtaza Rakhimov Yes Yes 381,431.0 
Samarskaya Oblast Konstantin Titov Yes Yes 402,308.6 
Samarskaya Oblast Konstantin Titov No Yes 402,308.6 
Krasnoyarskii Krai Krai Aleksandr Khloponin Yes Yes 433,510.6 
Yamalo-Nenetskii A.O. Okrug Yuri Neelov Yes Yes 445,732.6 
Sverdlovskaya Oblast Eduard Rossel' Yes Yes 481,690.4 
Tatarstan Republic Mintimer Shaimiev Yes Yes 488,609.1 
Sankt-Peterburg City Valentina Matvienko Yes Yes 667,905.4 
Moskovskaya Oblast Boris Gromov Yes Yes 704,390.1 
Khanty-Mansiiskii A.O. Okrug Aleksandr Filipenko Yes Yes 1,421,371.2 
Moskva City Yuri Luzhkov Yes Yes 4,005,883.0 
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APPENDIX D 
Relationship between Enterprise Control and Retention of Office 
Region Subject 
Type 
Incumbent Replacement Date of Putin 
Appointment 
Retained 
Post? 
Retained 
Enterprise 
Control? 
Evenkiiskii A.O. Okrug Boris Zolotarev N/A 03/03/05 Yes No 
Aginskii-Buryatskii 
A.O. 
Okrug Bair Zhamsuev N/A 09/15/05 Yes No 
Koryakskii A.O. Okrug Vladimir Loginov Oleg Kozhemyako 03/09/05 No No 
Ingushetiya Republic Murat Zyazikov N/A 06/15/05 Yes Yes 
Altaiskaya Respublika Republic Mikhail Lapshin Aleksandr Berdnikov 12/22/05 No No 
Kalmykiya Republic Kirsan Ilyumzhinov N/A 10/24/05 Yes No 
Tyva Republic Sherig-ool Oorzhak Sholban Kara-ool 04/06/07 No No 
Chukotskii A.O. Okrug Roman Abramovich N/A 10/21/05 Yes Yes 
Evreiskaya A.O. A. Oblast Nikolai Volkov N/A 02/25/05 Yes No 
Adygeya Republic Khazret Sovmen  Aslancherii 
Tkhakushinov 
12/13/06 No No 
Severnaya Osetiya-
Alaniya 
Republic Aleksandr 
Dzasokhov 
Taimuraz Mamsurov 06/07/05 No Yes 
Kamchatskaya Oblast Mikhail 
Mashkovtsev 
Aleksei Kuz'mitskii 06/01/07 No No 
Nenetskii A.O. Okrug Aleksei Barinov Valerii Potapenko 08/07/06 No No 
Kostromskaya Oblast Viktor Shershunov N/A 04/21/05 Yes No 
Ivanovskaya Oblast Vladimir Tikhonov Mikhail Men 11/22/05 No No 
Mordovia Republic Nikolai Merkushkin N/A 11/10/05 Yes No 
Orlovskaya Oblast Egor Stroyev N/A 04/23/05 Yes No 
Novgorodskaya Oblast Mikhail Prusak Sergei Mitin 08/07/07 No No 
Tambovskaya Oblast Oleg Betin N/A 07/13/05 Yes No 
Bryanskaya Oblast Nikolai Denin N/A 10/15/07 Yes No 
Smolenskaya Oblast Viktor Maslov N/A 06/24/05 Yes No 
Smolenskaya Oblast Viktor Maslov Sergei Antuf‟ev 12/19/07 No No 
Chuvashiya Republic Nikolai Fedorov N/A 08/29/05 Yes No 
Penzenskaya Oblast Vasilii Bochkarev N/A 05/14/05 Yes No 
Kaluzhskaya Oblast Anatoly Artamonov N/A 07/26/05 Yes No 
Buryatiya Republic Leonid Potapov Vyacheslav 
Nagovitsyn 
06/15/07 No No 
Kareliya Republic Sergei Katanandov N/A 03/03/06 Yes Yes 
Amurskaya Oblast Leonid Korotkov N/A 02/24/05 Yes No 
Amurskaya Oblast Leonid Korotkov Nikolai Kolesov 06/01/07 No No 
Kaliningradskaya Oblast Vladimir Egorov Georgii Boos 09/16/05 No No 
Ul'yanovskaya Oblast Sergei Morozov N/A 03/28/06 Yes No 
Kurskaya Oblast Aleksandr Mikhailov N/A 02/22/05 Yes No 
Vladimirskaya Oblast Nikolai Vinogradov N/A 02/18/05 Yes No 
Tverskaya Oblast Dmitri Zelenin N/A 07/10/07 Yes No 
Dagestan Republic Magomedali 
Magomedov 
Mukhu Aliyev 02/20/06 No No 
Tul'skaya Oblast Vasilii Starodubtsev Vyacheslav Dudka 03/30/05 No No 
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Sakhalinskaya Oblast Ivan Malakhov Aleksandr 
Khoroshavin 
08/09/07 No No 
Yaroslavskaya Oblast Anatoly Lisitsyn N/A 11/02/06 Yes No 
Yaroslavskaya Oblast Anatoly Lisitsyn Sergei Vakhrukhov 12/19/07 No No 
Murmanskaya Oblast Yuri Evdokimov N/A 02/14/07 Yes No 
Lipetskaya Oblast Oleg Korolev N/A 05/28/05 Yes No 
Stavropol'skii Krai Krai Aleksandr 
Chernogorov 
N/A 10/31/05 Yes No 
Belgorodskaya Oblast Evgenii Savchenko N/A 06/16/07 Yes No 
Tomskaya Oblast Viktor Kress N/A 03/10/07 Yes No 
Khabarovskii Krai Krai Viktor Ishaev N/A 07/09/07 Yes No 
Saratovskaya Oblast Dmitri Ayatskov Pavel Ipatov 03/03/05 No No 
Komi Republic Vladimir Torlopov N/A 12/07/05 Yes Yes 
Sakha Republic Vyacheslav Shtyrov N/A 12/07/06 Yes No 
Primorskii Krai Krai Sergei Dar'kin N/A 02/04/05 Yes No 
Vologodskaya Oblast Vyacheslav Pozgalev N/A 06/21/07 Yes No 
Leningradskaya Oblast Valerii Serdyukov N/A 07/09/07 Yes No 
Orenburgskaya Oblast Aleksei Chernyshev N/A 06/15/05 Yes No 
Omskaya Oblast Leonid Polezhaev N/A 05/24/07 Yes Yes 
Novosibirskaya Oblast Viktor Tolokonskii N/A 07/12/07 Yes Yes 
Irkutskaya Oblast Boris Govorin Aleksandr Tishanin 08/26/05 No No 
Rostovskaya Oblast Vladimir Chub N/A 06/14/05 Yes No 
Kemerovskaya Oblast Aman Tuleev N/A 04/20/05 Yes Yes 
Nizhegorodskaya Oblast Gennady Khodyrev Valery Shantsev 08/08/05 No No 
Permskii Krai Oleg Chirkunov N/A 10/10/05 Yes No 
Chelyabinskaya Oblast Petr Sumin N/A 04/18/05 Yes No 
Tyumenskaya Oblast Sergei Sobyanin N/A 02/17/05 Yes Yes 
Krasnodarskii Krai Krai Aleksandr Tkachev N/A 04/23/07 Yes No 
Bashkortostan Republic Murtaza Rakhimov N/A 10/10/06 Yes Yes 
Samarskaya Oblast Konstantin Titov N/A 04/26/05 Yes No 
Samarskaya Oblast Konstantin Titov Vladimir Artyakov 08/29/07 No No 
Krasnoyarskii Krai Krai Aleksandr 
Khloponin 
N/A 06/04/07 Yes No 
Yamalo-Nenetskii A.O. Okrug Yuri Neelov N/A 03/11/05 Yes Yes 
Sverdlovskaya Oblast Eduard Rossel' N/A 11/21/05 Yes No 
Tatarstan Republic Mintimer Shaimiev N/A 03/25/05 Yes Yes 
Sankt-Peterburg City Valentina Matvienko N/A 12/20/06 Yes No 
Moskovskaya Oblast Boris Gromov N/A 05/04/07 Yes No 
Khanty-Mansiiskii A.O. Okrug Aleksandr Filipenko N/A 02/24/05 Yes Yes 
Moskva City Yuri Luzhkov N/A 06/27/07 Yes Yes 
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APPENDIX E 
Relationship between Republic Status and Retention of Office 
Region Subject 
Type 
Incumbent Replacement Date of Putin 
Appointment 
Incumbent 
Retained 
Office? 
Evreiskaya A.O. A. 
Oblast 
Nikolai Volkov N/A 02/25/05 Yes 
Sankt-Peterburg City Valentina Matvienko N/A 12/20/06 Yes 
Moskva City Yuri Luzhkov N/A 06/27/07 Yes 
Stavropol'skii Krai Krai Aleksandr Chernogorov N/A 10/31/05 Yes 
Khabarovskii Krai Krai Viktor Ishaev N/A 07/09/07 Yes 
Primorskii Krai Krai Sergei Dar'kin N/A 02/04/05 Yes 
Krasnodarskii Krai Krai Aleksandr Tkachev N/A 04/23/07 Yes 
Krasnoyarskii Krai Krai Aleksandr Khloponin N/A 06/04/07 Yes 
Permskii Krai Oleg Chirkunov N/A 10/10/05 Yes 
Kamchatskaya Oblast Mikhail Mashkovtsev Aleksei Kuz'mitskii 06/01/07 No 
Kostromskaya Oblast Viktor Shershunov N/A 04/21/05 Yes 
Ivanovskaya Oblast Vladimir Tikhonov Mikhail Men 11/22/05 No 
Orlovskaya Oblast Egor Stroyev N/A 04/23/05 Yes 
Novgorodskaya Oblast Mikhail Prusak Sergei Mitin 08/07/07 No 
Tambovskaya Oblast Oleg Betin N/A 07/13/05 Yes 
Bryanskaya Oblast Nikolai Denin N/A 10/15/07 Yes 
Smolenskaya Oblast Viktor Maslov N/A 06/24/05 Yes 
Smolenskaya Oblast Viktor Maslov Sergei Antuf‟ev 12/19/07 No 
Penzenskaya Oblast Vasilii Bochkarev N/A 05/14/05 Yes 
Kaluzhskaya Oblast Anatoly Artamonov N/A 07/26/05 Yes 
Amurskaya Oblast Leonid Korotkov N/A 02/24/05 Yes 
Amurskaya Oblast Leonid Korotkov Nikolai Kolesov 06/01/07 No 
Kaliningradskaya Oblast Vladimir Egorov Georgii Boos 09/16/05 No 
Ul'yanovskaya Oblast Sergei Morozov N/A 03/28/06 Yes 
Kurskaya Oblast Aleksandr Mikhailov N/A 02/22/05 Yes 
Vladimirskaya Oblast Nikolai Vinogradov N/A 02/18/05 Yes 
Tverskaya Oblast Dmitri Zelenin N/A 07/10/07 Yes 
Tul'skaya Oblast Vasilii Starodubtsev Vyacheslav Dudka 03/30/05 No 
Sakhalinskaya Oblast Ivan Malakhov Aleksandr Khoroshavin 08/09/07 No 
Yaroslavskaya Oblast Anatoly Lisitsyn N/A 11/02/06 Yes 
Yaroslavskaya Oblast Anatoly Lisitsyn Sergei Vakhrukhov 12/19/07 No 
Murmanskaya Oblast Yuri Evdokimov N/A 02/14/07 Yes 
Lipetskaya Oblast Oleg Korolev N/A 05/28/05 Yes 
Belgorodskaya Oblast Evgenii Savchenko N/A 06/16/07 Yes 
Tomskaya Oblast Viktor Kress N/A 03/10/07 Yes 
Saratovskaya Oblast Dmitri Ayatskov Pavel Ipatov 03/03/05 No 
Vologodskaya Oblast Vyacheslav Pozgalev N/A 06/21/07 Yes 
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Leningradskaya Oblast Valerii Serdyukov N/A 07/09/07 Yes 
Orenburgskaya Oblast Aleksei Chernyshev N/A 06/15/05 Yes 
Omskaya Oblast Leonid Polezhaev N/A 05/24/07 Yes 
Novosibirskaya Oblast Viktor Tolokonskii N/A 07/12/07 Yes 
Irkutskaya Oblast Boris Govorin Aleksandr Tishanin 08/26/05 No 
Rostovskaya Oblast Vladimir Chub N/A 06/14/05 Yes 
Kemerovskaya Oblast Aman Tuleev N/A 04/20/05 Yes 
Nizhegorodskaya Oblast Gennady Khodyrev Valery Shantsev 08/08/05 No 
Chelyabinskaya Oblast Petr Sumin N/A 04/18/05 Yes 
Tyumenskaya Oblast Sergei Sobyanin N/A 02/17/05 Yes 
Samarskaya Oblast Konstantin Titov N/A 04/26/05 Yes 
Samarskaya Oblast Konstantin Titov Vladimir Artyakov 08/29/07 No 
Sverdlovskaya Oblast Eduard Rossel' N/A 11/21/05 Yes 
Moskovskaya Oblast Boris Gromov N/A 05/04/07 Yes 
Evenkiskii A.O. Okrug Boris Zolotarev N/A 03/03/05 Yes 
Aginskii-Buryatskii A.O. Okrug Bair Zhamsuev N/A 09/15/05 Yes 
Koryakskii A.O. Okrug Vladimir Loginov Oleg Kozhemyako 03/09/05 No 
Chukotskii A.O. Okrug Roman Abramovich N/A 10/21/05 Yes 
Nenetskii A.O. Okrug Aleksei Barinov Valerii Potapenko 08/07/06 No 
Yamalo-Nenetskii A.O. Okrug Yuri Neelov N/A 03/11/05 Yes 
Khanty-Mansiiskii A.O. Okrug Aleksandr Filipenko N/A 02/24/05 Yes 
Ingushetiya Republic Murat Zyazikov N/A 06/15/05 Yes 
Altaiskaya Respublika Republic Mikhail Lapshin Aleksandr Berdnikov 12/22/05 No 
Kalmykiya Republic Kirsan Ilyumzhinov N/A 10/24/05 Yes 
Tyva Republic Sherig-ool Oorzhak Sholban Kara-ool 04/06/07 No 
Adygeya Republic Khazret Sovmen  Aslancherii 
Tkhakushinov 
12/13/06 No 
Severnaya Osetiya-
Alaniya 
Republic Aleksandr Dzasokhov Taimuraz Mamsurov 06/07/05 No 
Mordovia Republic Nikolai Merkushkin N/A 11/10/05 Yes 
Chuvashiya Republic Nikolai Fedorov N/A 08/29/05 Yes 
Buryatiya Republic Leonid Potapov Vyacheslav Nagovitsyn 06/15/07 No 
Kareliya Republic Sergei Katanandov N/A 03/03/06 Yes 
Dagestan Republic Magomedali 
Magomedov 
Mukhu Aliyev 02/20/06 No 
Komi Republic Vladimir Torlopov N/A 12/07/05 Yes 
Sakha Republic Vyacheslav Shtyrov N/A 12/07/06 Yes 
Bashkortostan Republic Murtaza Rakhimov N/A 10/10/06 Yes 
Tatarstan Republic Mintimer Shaimiev N/A 03/25/05 Yes 
 
118 
 
APPENDIX F 
Relationship between Tenure and Retention of Office 
Region Incumbent Replacement Date of Putin 
Appointment 
Incumbent 
Retained 
Office? 
Months Incumbent was 
in Office at Point of 
Decision 
Ul'yanovskaya Sergei Morozov N/A 03/28/06 Yes 15.07 
Nenetskii A.O. Aleksei Barinov Valerii Potapenko 08/07/06 No 18.03 
Permskii Oleg Chirkunov N/A 10/10/05 Yes 19.03 
Bryanskaya Nikolai Denin N/A 10/15/07 Yes 33.87 
Smolenskaya Viktor Maslov N/A 06/24/05 Yes 37.17 
Ingushetiya Murat Zyazikov N/A 06/15/05 Yes 37.57 
Sankt-Peterburg Valentina 
Matvienko 
N/A 12/20/06 Yes 38.50 
Tverskaya Dmitri Zelenin N/A 07/10/07 Yes 42.63 
Primorskii Krai Sergei Dar'kin N/A 02/04/05 Yes 43.57 
Amurskaya Leonid Korotkov N/A 02/24/05 Yes 46.53 
Evenkiiskii A.O. Boris Zolotarev N/A 03/03/05 Yes 46.83 
Altaiskaya 
Respublika 
Mikhail Lapshin Aleksandr Berdnikov 12/22/05 No 47.53 
Sakhalinskaya Ivan Malakhov Aleksandr Khoroshavin 08/09/07 No 47.63 
Komi Vladimir Torlopov N/A 12/07/05 Yes 47.70 
Nizhegorodskaya Gennady Khodyrev Valery Shantsev 08/08/05 No 48.30 
Tyumenskaya Sergei Sobyanin N/A 02/17/05 Yes 49.10 
Koryakskii A.O. Vladimir Loginov Oleg Kozhemyako 03/09/05 No 51.20 
Kurskaya Aleksandr 
Mikhailov 
N/A 02/22/05 Yes 51.57 
Krasnoyarskii Krai Aleksandr 
Khloponin 
N/A 06/04/07 Yes 56.40 
Kaluzhskaya Anatoly 
Artamonov 
N/A 07/26/05 Yes 56.47 
Kaliningradskaya Vladimir Egorov Georgii Boos 09/16/05 No 57.90 
Chukotskii A.O. Roman 
Abramovich 
N/A 10/21/05 Yes 57.90 
Sakha Vyacheslav 
Shtyrov 
N/A 12/07/06 Yes 58.80 
Adygeya Khazret Sovmen  Aslancherii 
Tkhakushinov 
12/13/06 No 59.00 
Ivanovskaya Vladimir Tikhonov Mikhail Men 11/22/05 No 59.17 
Orenburgskaya Aleksei 
Chernyshev 
N/A 06/15/05 Yes 65.63 
Tambovskaya Oleg Betin N/A 07/13/05 Yes 66.57 
Smolenskaya Viktor Maslov Sergei Antuf‟ev 12/19/07 No 67.00 
Amurskaya Leonid Korotkov Nikolai Kolesov 06/01/07 No 73.77 
Krasnodarskii Krai Aleksandr Tkachev N/A 04/23/07 Yes 76.67 
Kamchatskaya Mikhail 
Mashkovtsev 
Aleksei Kuz'mitskii 06/01/07 No 77.47 
Penzenskaya Vasilii Bochkarev N/A 05/14/05 Yes 85.07 
Lipetskaya Oleg Korolev N/A 05/28/05 Yes 85.53 
Moskovskaya Boris Gromov N/A 05/04/07 Yes 87.83 
Severnaya Osetiya-
Alaniya 
Aleksandr 
Dzasokhov 
Taimuraz Mamsurov 06/07/05 No 88.63 
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Novosibirskaya Viktor Tolokonskii N/A 07/12/07 Yes 90.10 
Kareliya Sergei Katanandov N/A 03/03/06 Yes 93.53 
Kemerovskaya Aman Tuleev N/A 04/20/05 Yes 93.67 
Tul'skaya Vasilii 
Starodubtsev 
Vyacheslav Dudka 03/30/05 No 96.23 
Irkutskaya Boris Govorin Aleksandr Tishanin 08/26/05 No 96.97 
Vladimirskaya Nikolai 
Vinogradov 
N/A 02/18/05 Yes 98.33 
Chelyabinskaya Petr Sumin N/A 04/18/05 Yes 99.87 
Kostromskaya Viktor Shershunov N/A 04/21/05 Yes 99.97 
Aginskii-Buryatskii 
A.O. 
Bair Zhamsuev N/A 09/15/05 Yes 102.73 
Leningradskaya Valerii Serdyukov N/A 07/09/07 Yes 105.70 
Saratovskaya Dmitri Ayatskov Pavel Ipatov 03/03/05 No 106.60 
Stavropol'skii Krai Aleksandr 
Chernogorov 
N/A 10/31/05 Yes 107.43 
Mordovia Nikolai 
Merkushkin 
N/A 11/10/05 Yes 121.60 
Murmanskaya Yuri Evdokimov N/A 02/14/07 Yes 122.43 
Yamalo-Nenetskii 
A.O. 
Yuri Neelov N/A 03/11/05 Yes 132.97 
Vologodskaya Vyacheslav 
Pozgalev 
N/A 06/21/07 Yes 134.93 
Chuvashiya Nikolai Fedorov N/A 08/29/05 Yes 140.10 
Orlovskaya Egor Stroyev N/A 04/23/05 Yes 144.40 
Kalmykiya Kirsan 
Ilyumzhinov 
N/A 10/24/05 Yes 150.43 
Bashkortostan Murtaza Rakhimov N/A 10/10/06 Yes 153.93 
Buryatiya Leonid Potapov Vyacheslav Nagovitsyn 06/15/07 No 155.50 
Khanty-Mansiiskii 
A.O. 
Aleksandr 
Filipenko 
N/A 02/24/05 Yes 158.20 
Evreiskii A.O. Nikolai Volkov N/A 02/25/05 Yes 158.37 
Samarskaya Konstantin Titov N/A 04/26/05 Yes 163.87 
Rostovskaya Vladimir Chub N/A 06/14/05 Yes 164.20 
Belgorodskaya Evgenii Savchenko N/A 06/16/07 Yes 164.50 
Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev N/A 03/25/05 Yes 165.43 
Sverdlovskaya Eduard Rossel' N/A 11/21/05 Yes 169.17 
Yaroslavskaya Anatoly Lisitsyn N/A 11/02/06 Yes 178.97 
Moskva Yuri Luzhkov N/A 06/27/07 Yes 180.70 
Tyva Sherig-ool Oorzhak Sholban Kara-ool 04/06/07 No 180.70 
Tomskaya Viktor Kress N/A 03/10/07 Yes 184.63 
Omskaya Leonid Polezhaev N/A 05/24/07 Yes 186.43 
Khabarovskii Krai Viktor Ishaev N/A 07/09/07 Yes 188.50 
Novgorodskaya Mikhail Prusak Sergei Mitin 08/07/07 No 189.43 
Samarskaya Konstantin Titov Vladimir Artyakov 08/29/07 No 191.97 
Yaroslavskaya Anatoly Lisitsyn Sergei Vakhrukhov 12/19/07 No 192.53 
 
120 
 
WORKS CITED 
 
“About the Company.” 2008. OAO Tatneft Corporate Website. 19 Mar. 2008.  
<http://www.tatneft.ru/eng/>. 
 
Andreeva, Nadezhda. “Ayatskov vozvrashchaetsya.” 02 Apr. 2007. Novaya Gazeta. 04 Mar.  
2008. <http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2007/23/07.html>. 
 
---. “Favored by Vyacheslav.” 22 Nov. 2007. Novaya Gazeta. 15 Feb. 2008.  
<http://en.novayagazeta.ru/data/2007/87/07.html>. 
 
“Argumenty i Fakty.” Argumenty i Fakty. <http://www.aif.ru>. 
 
Associated Press. “Rice Criticizes Putin‟s Concentration of Power.” 13 Oct. 2007.  
International Herald Tribune. 21 Jan. 2008. 
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/13/europe/13subrice.php>.  
 
Badin, Boris. “Shabashniki na l‟du.” 10 Apr. 2006. Russkii Kur‟er. 03 Mar. 2008.  
<http://www.ruscourier.ru/archive/1247>. 
 
Belonuchkin, Grigorii. “Politika: Vybory.” 29 Mar. 2005. 10 Nov. 2007.  
<http://politika.su/vybory/vybory.html>. 
 
---. “Sekretnyi nomer „Rossiiskoi Gazety.‟” 12 Jan. 2007. 10 Mar. 2008.  
<http://di09en.livejournal.com/2007/01/12/>. 
 
“Biografiya.ru: Biograficheskaya entsiklopediya.” Unified State Register of Legal Persons,  
<http://www.biografija.ru/default.aspx>.  
 
Bocharova, Svetlana. “Saratovskii bunt: Chleny partii vlasti priznalis‟ v simpatiyakh k  
„Rodinu‟.” 31 Oct. 2006. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 03 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.ng.ru/regions/2006-10-31/6_riot.html>. 
 
---. “Vozvrashchenie bludnykh deputatov: Saratovskii gubenator  
ugovarivaet parlamentariev vernut‟sya v partiyu vlasti.” 16 Nov. 2006. Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta. 04 Mar. 2008. <http://www.ng.ru/regions/2006-11-16/6_thereturn.html>. 
 
---. “Deputat ushel na voinu so Sliskoi: V Saratove podal v otstavku  
mestnyi lider partii vlasti.” 21 Nov. 2006. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 01 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.ng.ru/regions/2006-11-21/7_sliska.html>. 
 
---. “Polpred prines elitam mir: Novyi glavnyi federal‟nyi inspektor po  
Saratovskoi oblasti vzyal kurs na dukhovnost‟.” 29 May 2007. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 
03 Mar. 2008. <http://www.ng.ru/regions/2007-05-29/5_saratov.html>. 
 
 
121 
 
---. “Poshli kak po Maslovu.” 14 Dec. 2007. Gazeta.ru. 19 Mar. 2008.  
<http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2007/12/14_a_2427809.shtml>. 
 
Borisov, Sergei. “Governors: On Parade.” 15 July 2004. Transitions Online.19 Jan. 2008.  
<http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/printf.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=7
3&NrSection=3&NrArticle=12373&ST1=ad&ST_T1=job&ST_AS1=1&ST2=body&
ST_T2=letter&ST_AS2=1&ST3=text&ST_T3=aatol&ST_AS3=1&ST_max=3>. 
 
Bradshaw, Michael. “Sakhalin Oblast: Sectoral Globalisation.” in Herd, Graeme P. and Anne  
Aldis, eds. Russian Regions and Regionalism: Strength through Weakness. New 
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 
 
Bushueva, Yuliya, et al. “Privatizatsiya po-bashkirski.” 23 July 2003. Vedomosti. 18 Mar.  
2008. Database on-line. Available from Eastview Russian Central Newspapers. 
<http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=5121470>. 
 
“Byvshii gubernator Nenetskogo okruga prigovoren k trem godam uslovno.” 06 Sep. 2007.  
Polit.ru. 20 Jan. 2008. <http://www.polit.ru/news/2007/09/06/barinov.html>. 
 
Chebankova, Elena. “The Unintended Consequences of Gubernatorial Appointments in  
Russia, 2005-6.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. 22.4 (2006): 
457-484. 
 
“Chem znamenit Dmitrii Ayatskov.” 15 May 2004. Kommersant. 20 Jan. 2008.  
<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=474599>. 
 
Coalson, Robert. “…As Website Speculates That Kremlin Manufactured Crisis.” 16 Mar.  
2005. RFE/RL Newsline. 18 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/03/160305.asp>. 
 
Corwin, Julia A. “Oligarch/Governor Says He Won‟t Seek Second Term.” 30 Apr. 2002.  
RFE/RL Newsline. 24 Feb. 2008. <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/2002/02-
04-30.rferl.html>. 
 
---. “Tatarstan: Moscow, Kazan Agree to Share Power – Again.” 03 Nov. 2005. Radio Free  
Europe/Radio Liberty. 20 Feb. 2008. 
<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/11/8d037c1e-6805-41d3-b0be-
19e95d6cb9b2.html>. 
 
“Demoskop Weekly.” 2002. Institute of Demography at the State University – The Higher  
Institute of Economics. 20 Jan. 2008. 
<http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_nac_02.php?reg=56>. 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
Denisova, Irina, and Marina Kartseva. “Poverty is No Crime: Measuring Poverty in Russian  
Regions.” 2005. Center for Economic and Financial Research at New Economic 
School. 18 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.cefir.ru/papers/WP84Denisova_Kartseva_2005_modified.pdf>. 
 
“Dmitrii Ayatskov ne rvalsya v Minsk.” 10 Feb. 2006. Kommersant¸ 10 Feb. 2008.  
<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?docsid=648665>. 
 
“Dogovor Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Respublika Tatarstan o razgranichenii predmetov vedeniya i  
vzaimom delegirovanii polnomochii mezhdu organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennoi Respublika Tatarstan.” 15 Feb. 
1994. Politnauka Library. 10 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.politnauka.org/library/doc/dogovor-rtrf.php>. 
 
Dolgov, Anna. “Putin Urges Changes to Centralize Power.” 14 Sep. 2004. The Boston  
Globe. 21 Jan. 2008. 
<http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2004/09/14/putin_urges_changes_to_ce
ntralize_power/>. 
 
“Electoral Geography 2.0, Russia.” 2008. 21 Feb. 2008.  
<http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/category/countries/r/russia>.  
 
“Federal‟naya sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki.” The Federal State Statistics Service of the  
Russian Federation. <http://www.gks.ru/>. 
 
“Federal Law of the Russian Federation of 11 December 2004, Number 159-FZ, on the  
enactment of changes to the Federal Law „On the general principles of the 
organization of legislative (representative) and executive organs of state power of 
subjects of the Russian Federation‟ and to the Federal Law „On basic guarantees of 
electoral rights and the right to participation in referendum of the citizenry of the 
Russian Federation‟.” 15 Dec. 2004. Rossiiskaya Gazeta. 15 Nov. 2007. 
<http://www.rg.ru/2004/12/15/gubernatory-dok.html>. 
 
Fishtein, Efim, moderator. “Forum-2000 v Prage: global‟noe sosushchestovovanie – vyzovy i  
nazdezhdy 21 veka. Budushchee Tatarstana  v sisteme Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 
Razrabotka komp‟yuternykh igr kak vid malogo, no perspektivnogo biznesa, 
Sozdanie novykh natsional‟nykh shkol v Sankt-Peterburge.” 11 Oct. 2005. Sponsored 
by Radio Svoboda. 18 Mar. 2008.  
<http://www.svoboda.org/programs/tw/2005/tw.101105.asp>. 
 
Floyd, David. “Review: Sakhalin: A History.” International Affairs. 48.3 (1972): 533-534. 
 
Gerasimenko, Olesya. “Sliska obidela utechka.” 09 Dec. 2006. Gazeta.ru. 02 Mar. 2008.  
<http://www.gazeta.ru/2006/12/08/oa_226069.shtml>. 
 
 
123 
 
Gismatullin, Eduard, and Torrey Clark. “Tatneft Reveals Itself as a Generous Lender.” 18  
July 2005. The Moscow Times. 10 Nov. 2007. 
<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/07/18/046.html>. 
 
Goler, Daniel. “Russia‟s Northern Periphery in Transition: Regional Fragmentation in the Far  
North.” in Gill, Graeme, ed. Politics in the Russian Regions. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007. 
 
Goode, J. Paul. “The Puzzle of Putin‟s Gubernatorial Appointments.” Europe-Asia Studies.  
59.3 (2007): 365-399. 378. 
 
 “Gubernator iz Kazani.” 29 May 2007. Ekspert Online. 11 Jan. 2008.  
<http://www.expert.ru/newsmakers/2007/05/29/kolesov/>.  
 
Guroff, Nick. “Russia: Island on the Edge.” 17 May 2007. Public Broadcasting Service. 15  
Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/rough/2007/05/russia_island_o.html>. 
 
Hale, Henry E. “Explaining Machine Politics in Russia‟s Regions: Economy, Ethnicity, and  
Legacy.” Post-Soviet Affairs. 19.3 (2003): 228-263.  
 
Hough, Jerry. The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-making.  
Cambridge, M.A.:  Harvard University Press, 1969. 
 
IA Regnum. “Novosti Rossii.” <http://www.regnum.ru/>. 
 
---. “Politika” in “Saratovskie SMI za nedelyu: v gorod vozvrashayutsya Ayatskov i bor‟ba s  
inakomysliem, a gorozhanam ugrozhayut doma-ubiitsy.” 05 Nov. 2005. 01 Mar. 
2008. <http://www.regnum.ru/news/539520.html>. 
 
---. “Obrazovanie” in “Saratovskie SMI: gorozhane pereplatili za kommunal‟nye uslugi  
desyatki millionov rublei.” 21 Jan. 2006. 01 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.regnum.ru/news/580289.html>. 
 
---. “Politika” in Saratovskie SMI 17-23 iyulya: v Saratove perepisali oppozitsiyu.” 24 July  
2006. 02 Mar. 2008. <http://www.regnum.ru/news/677999.html>. 
 
---. “Politika” in “Saratovskie SMI: Partiinye million vyshli bokom saratovskim shkolam.”   
28 Aug. 2006. 01 Mar. 2008. <http://www.regnum.ru/news/695049.html>. 
 
---. “Persony” in “Saratovskie SMI: Ayatskov zasteklil balkon Volodinu. no otkazhet  
Putinu.” 16 Oct. 2006. 01 Mar. 2008. <http://www.regnum.ru/news/722192.html>. 
 
---. “Politika” in “Saratovskie SMI ishchut rabotu Ayatskovu i schitayut den‟gi v karmane  
merii.” 11 Sep. 2006. 01 Mar. 2008. <http://www.regnum.ru/news/702677.html>. 
 
124 
 
---. “Vlasti Bashkirii nashli novye rychagi kulyarnogo vliyaniya v Kremle?” 04 Sep. 2007. 18  
Mar. 2008. <http://www.regnum.ru/news/879931.html>. 
 
---. “Ayatskov stanet dal‟nevostochnikom?” in “40 deputatskikh kresel podelyat tri partii:  
obzor pressy Primor‟ya.” 25 Sep. 2006. 01 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.regnum.ru/news/710082.html>. 
 
---. “Prigovor po delu eks-gubernatora Nenetskogo AO ostavlen bez izmenenii.” 26 Oct.  
2007. 20 Jan. 2008. <http://www.regnum.ru/news/905749.html>. 
 
IA Rosbalt. “Putin uvolil gubernatorov Yaroslavskoi i Smolenkskoi oblastei.” 19 Dec. 2007.  
19 Mar. 2008. <http://www.rosbalt.ru/2007/12/19/441831.html>.  
 
IA-Sakh. “Gubernator Aleksandr Khoroshavin vstretilsya s vitse-prezidentom „Rosneft‟  
Sergeem Karaganovym.” 27 Feb. 2008. 12 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.sakhalin.info/news/48404/>.  
 
ITAR-TASS. “Sakhalin Governor Goes to Moscow for Bigger Share of Oil Revenues.” 15  
Mar. 2005. 15 Mar. 2008. <http://www.gateway2russia.com/st/art_272393.php>. 
 
Kaftan, Larisa. “Putin ustroil raznos na Sakhalin.” 08 Aug. 2007. Komsomol‟skaya Pravda.  
10 Mar. 2008. <http://bishkek.kp.ru/daily/23946/71190/>. 
 
Kamyshev, Dmitrii. “Narodnye izgnanniki.” 04 Feb. 2008. Kommersant Vlast‟. 22 Feb.  
2008. <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=848170>. 
 
Kessler, Glenn. “Rice, Headed to See Putin, Cites „Worrying‟ Trends in Russia.” 20 Apr.  
2005. The Washington Post. 21 Jan. 2008. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A1069-2005Apr19.html>. 
 
Kholmogorova, Vera. “Novaya „Zhizn‟‟ na novom postu.” 30 Oct. 2006. Ekspert Online. 04  
Mar. 2008. <http://www.expert.ru/articles/2006/10/30/sprav_ross/>. 
 
Kiselev, Mikhail, and Ol‟ga Popova. “Ostrov stabil‟nosti.” 29 Oct.2007. Ekspert Volga. 04  
Mar. 2008. <http://www.expert.ru/printissues/volga/2007/40/regionalnaya_elita/>. 
 
“Kommersant.” Kommersant. < http://www.kommersant.ru>. 
 
Konitzer, Andrew. Voting for Russia‟s Governors: Regional Elections and Accountability  
under Yeltsin and Putin. Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2005. 
 
“Konstitutsiya Respubliki Tatarstan.” 2002. Official Server of the Republic of Tatarstan. 20  
Feb. 2008. <http://www.tatar.ru/?node_id=222>. 
 
 
Kravtsova, Maria. “„Varyagi‟ nastupayut ostorozhno.” 29 Aug. 2005. Ekspert. 09 Jan. 2008  
125 
 
<http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2005/32/32ex-polit4/>. 
 
“Kreml‟ prishel k vyvodu: khoroshii gubernator – staryi gubernator.” 06 Dec. 2006. Novyi  
Region – Nizhnyi Novgorod. 19 Jan. 2008. <http://www.nr2.ru/nn/95116.html>. 
 
“Kto takoi Oleg Kozhemyako.” 10 Mar. 2005. Kommersant. 18 Mar. 2008.  
<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=553321>. 
 
Kulikova, Nina. “Social Responsibility of Russian Businesses.” 29 Nov. 2004. 15 Mar. 2008.  
Johnson‟s Russia List. <http://65.120.76.252/russia/johnson/8473-20.cfm>. 
 
Kusznir, Julia. “Economic Actors in Russian Regional Politics: The Example of the Oil  
Industry.” in Gill, Graeme, ed. Politics in the Russian Regions. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007. 
 
---. “The New Russian-Tatar Treaty and Its Implications for Russian Federalism.” 06 Mar.  
2007. Russian Analytical Digest. 10 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/rad/details.cfm?lng=en&id=28890>. 
 
Latynina, Yulia. “Going For A Spin Around the Blocs.” 19 Dec. 2006. The St. Petersburg  
Times. 08 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=19805>. 
 
L‟vov, Aleksandr. “Postradavshie ot zemletryaceniya na Sakhaline ne dovol‟ny deistviyami  
vlastei i spasitelei.” 03 Aug. 2007. Belorusskie Novosti. 16 Mar. 2008. 
<http://naviny.by/rubrics/disaster/2007/08/03/ic_articles_124_152103/>. 
 
Magaloni, Beatriz. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in  
Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
Malyakin, Il'ya. “Saratov‟s Governor Dmitri Ayatskov: A New Actor On An Old Political  
Stage.” 20 Feb. 1998. Prism. The Jamestown Foundation. 05 Jan. 2008. 
<http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=5&issue_id=254&a
rticle_id=2876>. 
 
---. “United Russia Party Declares War on Saratov‟s Ayatskov.” 11 May 2004. Russian  
Regional Report. 28 Feb. 2008. 
<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/details.cfm?lng=en&id=13853>.  
 
---. “Procurator Files. Drops Charges Against Ayatskov.” 02 June 2004. Russian Regional  
Report. 29 Feb. 2008. 
<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/details.cfm?lng=en&id=13853>. 
 
---. “In Saratov, Legislature Starts to Assert Itself over Governor.” 21 Oct. 2004. Russian  
Regional Report. 28 Feb. 2008. 
<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/details.cfm?lng=en&id=13853>. 
126 
 
---. “Saratov Elections in Doubt.” 30 Nov. 2004. Russian Regional Report. 28 Feb. 2008.  
<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/details.cfm?lng=en&id=13853>. 
 
Matsuzato, Kimitaka. “From Ethno-Bonapartism to Centralized Caciquismo: Characteristics  
and Origins of the Tatarstan Political Regime, 1990-2000.” Journal of Communist 
Studies and Transition Politics. 17.4 (2001): 43-77. 
 
---, ed. Fenomen Vladimira Putina i rossiiskie regiony. Moscow: Materik, 2004.  
 
Melikova, Natal‟ya. “Stanet li Sobyanin preemnikom Putina? Fenomen Sobyanina: Na  
byvshem gubernatore Tyumenskoi oblasti Putin otrabotal osnovnye elementy 
spetsoperatsii „Preemnik‟.” 13 Nov. 2006. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 18 Jan. 2008. 
<http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2006-11-13/7_sobianin.html>.  
 
Melikova, Natal‟ya, and Natal‟ya Kostenko. “Platsdarm dlya eks-prezidenta.” 26 Feb. 2007.  
Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 23 Jan. 2008. <http://www.ng.ru/politics/2007-02-
26/1_platsdarm.html>. 
 
---. “Loyal‟nye sgodyatsya gde ugodno.” 29 Mar. 2007. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 03 Mar. 2008.  
<http://www.ng.ru/politics/2007-03-29/3_ayackov.html>. 
 
Migdal, Joel. Strong Societies and Weak States. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
 
Moe, Arild. “Offshore Developments: The Compatibility of Federal Decisions and Regional  
Concerns.” in Honneland, Geir, and Helge Blakkisrud, eds. Centre-Periphery 
Relations in Russia: The Case of the Northwest Regions. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2001. 
 
Mukharyamov, Nail‟. “Respublika Tatarstan” in Matsuzato, Kimitaka. Regiony Rossii:  
Khronika i rukovoditeli: Tom 7: Respublika Tatarstan. Udmurtskaya respublika, 
Respublika Mordoviya. Sapporo, Japan: Hokkaido University, 2000. <http://src-
h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publictn/tom7/contents.html>. 
 
Mukharyamov, N.M., and L.M. Mukharyamova. “Tatarstan v usloviyakh retsentralizatsii po- 
putinski” in Matsuzato, Kimitaka, ed. Fenomen Vladimira Putina i rossiiskie regiony. 
Moscow: Materik, 2004. 
 
“Naznachenie glav regionov v 2005-2006 gg.” 2006. Institute of Regional Politics. 15 Jan.  
2001. <http://regionalistica.ru/monitoring/rotation/appointments/>. 
 
“Naznachenie gubernatorov.” Ekspert. <http://www.expert.ru/topics/150257/>. 
 
“Naznachenie gubernatorov.” Rossiiskaya Gazeta. <http://www.rg.ru/plus/gubernatory>. 
 
Netreba, Tat‟yana . “Prezident: Kak dovel rodinu Lenina do ruchki?” 10 July 2002.  
Argumenty i Fakty. 19 Mar. 2008. <http://gazeta.aif.ru/online/aif/1133/02_01>. 
127 
 
“Nezavisimaya Gazeta.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta. < http://www.ng.ru/>. 
 
Nikolaeva, Anna, and Anfisa Voronina. “Ayatskova smenit atomshchik Ipatov.” 25 Feb.  
2005. Vedomosti. 28 Feb. 2008. Database on-line. Available from Eastview Russian 
Central Newspapers. <http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=7405568>. 
 
“Novaya Gazeta.” Novaya Gazeta. <http://www.novayagazeta.ru/>. 
 
“Novosti Google.” Google. < http://news.google.com/news?ned=ru_ru>. 
 
“Novyi gubernator NAO Valerii Potapenko: biografiya.” 21 July 2006. Pravda.ru. 19 Mar.  
2008. <http://www.pravda.ru/districts/northwest/naryan-mar/21-07-2006/191403-
nao-0>. 
 
Nowak, David. “Sobyanin to Manage Medvedev Campaign.” 21 Dec. 2007. The Moscow  
Times. 18 Jan. 2008. 
<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/12/21/011.html>. 
 
Nowak, David, and Anna Smolchenko. “Sakhalin Governor Latest to Resign.” 08 Aug. 2007.  
The Moscow Times. 20 Nov. 2008, Johnson‟s Russia List. 
<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-170-5.cfm>. 
 
NTA-Privolzh‟e. “Obyazannosti Khodyrev kak chlena konsul‟tativnoi komissii pri  
Gossovete RF budut opredeleny k seredine sentyabr – gazeta.” 07 Aug. 2007. 20 Jan. 
2008. <http://nta-nn.ru/news/item/?ID=116356>. 
 
“Onlain-konferentsiya Ayatskova Dmitriya Fedorvicha.” 16 Nov. 2006.  
SaratovBiznesKonsalting. 03 Mar. 2008. 
<http://online.sarbc.ru/showquestion.phtml?id=156&qid=all>. 
 
“Organs of Administration – OAO Tatneft.” 2006-2007. OAO Tatneft Corporate Website. 19  
Mar. 2008. <http://www.tatneft.ru/leaders.htm>. 
 
Orttung, Robert. Russian Regional Report. 1996-2006. The Russian and Eurasian Security  
Specialized Network for Research on Security Related Developments. 20 Feb. 2008. 
<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/index.cfm>. 
 
---. “Business and Politics in the Russian Regions.” Problems of Post-Communism. 51.2  
(2004): 48-60. 
 
Osborn, Andrew. “Putin Squeezes Abramovich to Keep the Roubles Flowing East.” 05 June  
2005. The Independent. 17 Feb. 2008. 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/europe/putin-squeezes-abramovich-to-keep-
the-roubles-flowing-east-493073.html>. 
 
 
128 
 
“Otraslevaya struktura VPR po vidam ekonomicheskoi deyatel‟nosti (po OKVED) za 2005  
god.” 2006. State Commission for Statistics of the Russian Federation. 10 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b01_19/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/stru05.htm>. 
 
Oversloot, Hans, and Ger Van Den Berg. “Politics and the Ethnic Divide: Is Dagestan  
Changing From Complex to Simple Oligarchy?” Journal of Communist Studies and 
Transition Politics. 21.3 (2005) 307-331. 
 
Palei, Natal‟ya. “Leonid Korotkov sobiraetsya posvyatit‟ pedagogike novyi etap svoei  
zhizni.” 3-9 Oct. 2007. Teleport. 21 Jan. 2008. 
<http://www.amur.info/news/2007/10/09/22.html>. 
 
Parsons, Robert. “2005 in Review: Russia‟s Centralization Gathers Pace.” 12 Dec. 2005.  
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 21 Jan. 2008. 
<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/ace0524f-7ade-4a60-be05-
ccf14183ae07.html>. 
 
Patsar, Elena. “Parlament kak nakazanie.” 19 Dec. 2007. Vzglyad. 19 Mar. 2008.  
<http://www.vz.ru/politics/2007/12/19/132798.html>. 
 
Petrov, Nikolai. “Regional Models of Democratic Development” in McFaul, Michael et al.,  
eds. Between Dictatorship and Democracy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2004. 239-267. 
 
---. “Incoming Outsiders.” 09 Aug. 2005. The Moscow Times. 10 Jan. 2008.  
<http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/73015.htm>. 
 
---. “Naznacheniya gubernatorov: tri goda spustya.” July 2007. The Carnegie  
Moscow Center. 07 Dec. 2007. 
<http://monitoring.carnegie.ru/2007/07/analytics/petrov-nikolaj-naznacheniya-
gubernatorov-tri-goda-spustya/>. 
 
Pleshanova, Ol‟ga, et al. “Bashkirskii TEK otkhodit Rosimushchestvu.” 04 Dec. 2007.  
Kommersant. 18 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=832221>. 
 
Politov, Yuri. “Da, posol ty: Dmitri Ayatskov dobiraetsya do Minska s priklucheniyami.” 28  
July 2005. Izvestiya. 23 Jan. 2008. <http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/article2383616/>. 
 
Popova, Ol‟ga. “„Medvedi‟ nesut poteri.” 12 June 2006. Ekspert. 04 Mar. 2008.  
<http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2006/22/news_medvedi_nesut_poteri/>. 
 
---. “Kreshtest dlya partii.” 04 Dec. 2006. Ekspert Volga. 04 Mar. 2008.  
<http://www.expert.ru/printissues/volga/2006/33/regionalnye_vybory/>. 
 
 
129 
 
---. “Golosuyut nogami.” 05 Feb. 2007. Ekspert Volga. 04 Mar. 2008.  
<http://www.expert.ru/printissues/volga/2007/05/nakanune_vyborov/>. 
 
 ---. “Proshchanie s epokhoi.” 03 Sep. 2007. Ekspert Volga. 15 Jan. 2008.  
<http://www.expert.ru/printissues/volga/2007/32/noviy_gubernator/>. 
 
“Press-Vypusk No. 100: Ot kogo zavisit zhizn‟ v regionakh?” 09 July 2004. Russia Public  
Opinion Research Center.  01 Mar. 2008. <http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-
arkhiv/item/single/848.html>. 
 
“Press-Vypusk No. 178: Rossiyane o naznachenii i otstavkakh gubernatorov.” 28 Mar. 2005.  
Russia Public Opinion Research Center. 01 Mar. 2008. 
<http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/1149.html>.  
 
“Prezident Rossii.” The Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation.  
<http://kremlin.ru/>. 
 
Putin, Vladimir, et al. Translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. First Person: An Astonishingly  
Frank Self-Portrait by Russia‟s President. New York: Public Affairs, 2000. 183. 
 
Putin, Vladimir. “Vstupitel‟noe slovo na rashirennom zasedanii Pravitel‟stva s uchastiem  
glav sub‟ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii.” 13 Sep. 2004. The Presidential Administration 
of the Russian Federation. 20 Nov. 2007. 
<http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2004/09/13/1514_type63374type63378type82634_7
6651.shtml>. 
 
“Putin Finds a Place for Kasyanov‟s Arch-Foe.” 05 May 2003. Gazeta.ru. 20 Feb. 2008.  
Johnson‟s Russia. <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7167-14.cfm>. 
 
Radygin, Aleksandr D., and G.N. Mal‟ginov. “Gosudarstvennaya sobstvennost‟ v rossiiskikh  
korporatsiyakh: problemy effektivnosti upravlenie I zadachi gosudarsstvennego 
regulirovaniya.” Mar. 2001. Institute for the Economy in Transition. 07 Dec. 2007. 
<http://www.nasledie.ru/politvnt/19_19/article.php?art=8>. 
 
Razuvaev, Jr., Vladimir. “Skandal‟naya „Istoriya‟ doidet do shkol.” 25 Dec. 2007.  
Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 21 Jan. 2008. <http://www.ng.ru/politics/2007-12-
25/1_uchebnik.html?mthree=1>. 
 
 “Rezul‟taty vyborov.” Mar. 2008. The Independent Institute of Elections. 11 Feb. 2008.  
<http://vibory.ru/election.htm>. 
 
Robertson, Graeme B. “Strikes and Labor Organization in Hybrid Regimes.” American  
Political Science Review. 101.4 (2007): 781-798. 
 
 
 
130 
 
“„Rosneft i Sakhalinskaya oblast‟ podpisali soglashenie o sotrudnichesve.” 27 Sep. 2007.  
Rosneft press release. 12 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.rosneft.ru/printable/news/news_in_press/270920072.html>. 
 
“Russia‟s Only Female Governor Loses in Koryak.” 06 Dec. 2000. Russian Regional Report.  
18 Mar. 2008. <http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/details.cfm?lng=en&id=14155>. 
 
Saidazimova, Gulnoza. “Russia: What‟s Behind Putin‟s Reappointment of Powerful Tatar  
Leader?” 16 Mar. 2005. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 20 Feb. 2008.  
<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/03/644f4ce2-ff39-4f49-885d-
ff62d25a2a31.html>.  
 
“Sakhalin: Economy.” Russia Profile. 10 Mar. 2008.  
<http://www.russiaprofile.org/resources/territory/districts/Sakhalinskaya/economy>. 
 
Samigullina, Aliya, et al. “Gubernatorov razlozhat po  43 punktam.” 29 June 2007.  
Gazeta.ru. 18 Jan. 2008. <http://www.gazeta.ru/2007/06/29/oa_243164.shtml>.   
 
“Saratov Land Law Enters into Force.” 04 Dec. 1997. Jamestown Foundation Monitor. 21  
Feb. 2008. 
<http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=2&issue_id=310&a
rticle_id=3433>. 
 
“Sergei Dar‟kin utverzhden Zakonodatel‟nym Sobraniem Gubernatorom Primorskogo  
Kraya.” 04 Feb. 2005. The Administration of the Primorskii Krai. 14 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.primorsky.ru/content/?a=642&s=72&p=1>. 
 
Shirokov, Slava. “Putin Fires First Governor, In Koryak Okrug.” 15 Mar. 2005. Russian  
Regional Report. 18 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/details.cfm?lng=en&id=13834>. 
 
Shklyar, Natan. “Russian Regions 1998: Year in Review, Economic Crisis Strengthens  
Governors.” Russian Regional Report. 14 Jan. 1999. 18 Feb. 2000. 
<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/details.cfm?lng=en&id=14234>. 
 
Soderlund, Peter J. “Electoral Success and Federal-level Influence of Russian Regional  
Executives.” Europe-Asia Studies. 57.4 (2005): 521-541. 
 
Solnick ,Steven. “Russia between States and Markets.” in Prakash, Aseem, and Jeffrey A.  
Hart, eds. Responding to Globalization. New York: Routledge, 2000. 217-221. 
 
“Stenogramma „Pryamoi linii c Prezidentom Rossii.‟” 19 Dec. 2002. State Television  
Channel “Rossiya.” 19 Mar. 2008. <http://www.linia2002.ru/>. 
 
“Stenogramma „Pryamoi linii c Prezidentom Rossii.‟” 27 Sep. 2005. State Television  
Channel “Rossiya.” 19 Mar. 2008. <http://www.liniya2005.ru/>. 
131 
 
“Stenogramma „Pryamoi linii c Prezidentom Rossii.‟” 25 Oct. 2006. State Television  
Channel “Rossiya.” 18 Mar. 2008. <http://www.liniya2006.ru/>. 
 
Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn. “Russia: Managing Territorial Cleavages under Dual Transitions.” in  
Bermeo, Nancy, and Ugo M. Amoretti, eds. Federalism and Territorial Cleavages. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2004. 301-326. 
 
---. Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post Soviet Russia. New York:  
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
“Svedeniya o provodyashchikhsya vyborakh i referendumakh.” The Central Election  
Commission of the Russian Federation. <http://www.izbirkom.ru/izbirkom.html>. 
 
Treisman, Daniel. After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999. 
 
Trenin, Dmitri. “The Legacy of Vladimir Putin.” 10 Oct. 2007. The Carnegie Moscow  
Center.  21 Jan. 2008. <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/76874.htm>. 
 
Tseplyaev, Vitalii. “Universal‟nye kadry.” 07 Nov. 2007. Argumenty i Fakty. 18 Mar. 2008.  
<http://gazeta.aif.ru/online/aif/1410/bel04_01>. 
 
Turovsky, Rostislav. “Regional‟nye lidery v dekabre 2004 goda.” 29 Dec. 2004. Politcom.ru.  
20 Feb. 2008. <http://www.politcom.ru/2004/reiting15.php>. 
 
---. “Vlast‟ i biznes v regionakh Rossii: sovremennye protsessy obnovleniya regional‟nykh.”  
originally published in Regional‟naya elita sovremennoi Rossii. Moscow: Fund 
Liberal‟naya Missiya, 2005. 143-178. Republished at 
<http://regionalistica.ru/library/articles/rft16/>.  
 
---. “The Influence of Russian Big Business on Regional Power: The Models and Political  
Consequences.” in Gill, Graeme, ed. Politics in the Russian Regions. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
 
“Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii No. 241: O vnesenii izmenenii v Polozhenie o  
Gosudarstvennom sovete Rossiskoi Federatsii, utverzhdennoe Ukazom Prezidenta 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 1 sentyabrya 2000 g. No. 1602.” 23 Feb. 2007. The 
Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. 14 Mar. 2008. 
<http://document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID=38100&PSC=1&PT=1&Page=1>. 
 
“Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Ob effektivnosti deyatel‟nosti organov ispolnitel‟no i  
vlasti sub‟ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii. No. 825.” 28 June 2007. The Presidential 
Administration of the Russian Federation. 08 Feb. 2008. 
<http://document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID=040264>.   
 
  
132 
 
“Valovoi regional‟nyi produkt.” 2006. State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation. 02  
Nov. 2007. <http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b01_19/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/i-vrp.htm>. 
 
“Varyagom bol‟she.” 11 June 2007. Ekspert Sibir‟. 10 Jan. 2008.  
<http://www.expert.ru/printissues/siberia/2007/22/news_zamestilel_gubernatora/>. 
 
“Vedomosti.” Vedomosti. <http://www.vedomosti.ru/>. 
 
Verini, James. “Putin‟s Power Grab.” Dec. 2007. Portfolio. 15 Mar. 2008.  
<http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/international-
news/portfolio/2007/11/19/Sakhalinskaya-Island-Oil>. 
 
Vernidub, Artem. “Poshli snimat‟ guberniyu.” 28 Mar. – 3 Apr. 2005. Russkii Newsweek. 30  
Nov. 2008. <http://www.runewsweek.ru/rubrics/?rubric=country&rid=146>. 
 
“Vse rossiiskoe – gosudarstvennoe.” 21 Jan. 2008. Kommersant Vlast‟. 25 Jan. 2008.  
<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=843221>. 
 
Vysokov, Mikhail. A Brief History of Sakhalin and the Kurils,15 Mar. 2008.  
<http://www.sakhalin.ru/Engl/Region/book/ussr.htm >. 
 
“V Nal‟chike zavershilas‟ tsermoniya proshchaniya s Valeriem Kokovym.” 30 Oct. 2005. 19  
Jan. 2008. <http://www.rian.ru/society/20051030/41937083.html>. 
 
“Who‟s Who?” Russia Profile. <http://www.russiaprofile.org/resources/whoiswho/>. 
 
Wines, Michael. “Putin‟s Plan to Centralize Power in the Kremlin Wins a Round.” 01 June  
2000. The New York Times. 21 Jan. 2008. 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9807E0D6153CF932A35755C0A9
669C8B63>. 
 
Yablokova, Oksana. “Saratov Governor Faces Corruption Charge.” 18 May 2004. The St  
Petersburg Times. 18 Jan. 2008. 
<http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=530>. 
 
Yakushov, Vadim. “Gubernatory, naznachennye po novoi skheme.” Aug. 2007. 12 Nov.  
2007. <http://proekt-wms.narod.ru/states/gubernators1.htm>. 
 
“Yakutskim kandidatam podpisan prigovor.” 13 Dec 2001. Kommersant. As seen in  
Jamestown Foundation Monitor. 13 Dec. 2001. 11 Nov. 2008. 
<http://jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=24&issue_id=2158&artic
le_id=18991>. 
 
“Yandex.” Yandex. <http://www.yandex.ru>. 
 
“Yandex: Press Portrety.” Yandex. <http://news.yandex.ru/people/>. 
133 
 
Yarmoshevich, Roman. “Klub byvshikh gubernatorov.” 27 July 2007. Kommersant. 20 Nov.  
2007. 
<http://www.kommersant.ru/region/khabarovsk/page.htm?year=2007&issue=132&id
=219660&section=7274>. 
 
Yasmann, Victor. “Sakhalin Governor and His Associates Died in Helicopter Crash.” 26  
Aug.  2003. RFE/RL Security Watch. 12 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.rferl.org/reports/securitywatch/2003/08/34-260803.asp>. 
 
“Ya rasschityval na polnoe opravdanie.” 26 Oct. 2007. Rosbalt Sever. 20 Jan. 2008.  
<http://www.rosbalt.ru/2007/10/26/425906.html>.  
 
Zhaglina, Tat‟yana. “„Podumyvayu o rabote tokarem v nebol‟shoi masterskoi.” 08 Jan. 2008.  
Argumenty i Fakty Kamchatka. 26 Jan. 2008. <http://kamchatka.aif.ru/issues/1418-
1419/01_04>. 
 
Zhunusov, Oleg. “Darkin Set to Win Primorskii Gubernatorial Elections.” 06 June2001.  
Russian Regional Report. 20 Feb. 2008. 
<http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=7&fileid=0DB20691-9E0D-
6050-4402-64634A73F13A&lng=en>. 
 
